... that resulted in their declaration that they would respect the 2003 cease-fire accord. Earlier in 2018 the UAE together with Saudi Arabia played a key role in mediating the 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 2020 Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed played a key role in the attainment of the Abraham accords between Israel and several Arab states. The UAE is also seeking diplomatic solutions to tensions around countries such as Syria, Libya and Yemen.
Small countries do possess important advantages in conflict mediation compared to large economies – as noted by D. Lanz ...
... Yemen’s domestic political scene could not fail to notice this. In addition to the unrecognised authorities in Sanaa, including the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), which controls the greater chunk of the territory in the North, home to three-quarters of Yemen’s population, the STC led by General Aidarous Zubaidi has been active in the South and, with the UAE’s support, has gained such influence that even Saudi Arabia, leader of the AC, has to take it into account. A question begs to be asked: if the IRP and the STC could engage in talks on establishing joint authorities, why cannot this model be extended to another PIC in Sanaa? Maybe the reason does ...
... leader of the Houthis Abdul Malek Al Houthi to abort the dreams of the Houthis to have their political and military power in Yemen and in the region. Simultaneously, the Houthis will increase their targets in both KSA and UAE and this time by targeting entities of civic services to convey stronger messages to their leaderships.
Kuwait
In Kuwait, ... ... elections will be held in 2020, paving the way for the country to have further democracy. Yet, the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would reflect on Kuwait as the Kuwaiti community is divided between both regional powers. Regarding the ...
... the Salaphites being a prominent group among them. The Salaphites are relatively well organized and have extensive ties with southern tribes. Additionally, they share a common enemy with the United Arab Emirates: the al-Islah Islamic party on which Saudi Arabia relies.
In the summer of 2019, the United Arab Emirates began to pointedly reduce its military presence in Yemen. The south was transferred to the control of the pro-UAE STC. This allowed the United Arab Emirates to solve several problems with one move: first, it reduced tensions in the country’s relations with Iran, which finances the Houthis; and second, it relieved the United Arab Emirates of its responsibility ...
... “ended” by the insertion of a Saudi- Egyptian dominated “Arab Peace Force” into Beirut – effectively an occupation.
Saudi Arabia
:
(a) The political family-system is changed with US engineering. The country liberalizes.
(b) The oppressive systems ... ...
continues as hitherto.
Israel
, Gaza and the
West Bank
continue their existing increase in tensions (as described above).
Yemen
continues to be war-torn. Kuwait, the UAE and Oman continue their current path.
The North
Iran
will in all cases continue with the basic structure of its existing political ...
Regional Forces in Yemen and the Possible Balance of Power after Saleh’s Death
On 4 December 2017, former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh ... ... the Houthi movement and the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, formed a tactical alliance. Hadi, in turn, took refuge in Saudi Arabia, which intervened in Yemen’s domestic conflict. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in conjunction with the Gulf Coalition ...
The Murder of Ali Abdullah Saleh May Lead to a More Violent Saudi Campaign in Yemen
Clashes erupted in Yemen’s capital Sana’a on November 29, 2017 between former tactical allies, the armed Houthi militias ... ... in the mountainous northern province of Saada. Following an attempt on his life in June 2011, Ali Abdullah Saleh retreated to Saudi Arabia to recuperate, returning to Yemen in September of that year. He then signed a
Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored ...
... regional hegemon is claimed jointly by Saudi Arabia and UAE, with Saudis providing most of the “hard” power, while Emirati contributing its political ideology and strategic vision. Even if we put aside moral and legal deficiencies of this model, both Yemen and Qatar cases question the mere feasibility of a “regional uni-polarity”: neither Saudi Arabia nor UAE seem to be capable of successfully “managing” arguably much less powerful regional players. On the contrary, political divisions in the region are getting deeper and prospects for a regional reconciliation are becoming more and more remote.
Another ...
