... law and so on. However, it is crystal-clear that one of the key challenges for both Moscow and Beijing is about how to provide tangible global commons in a highly volatile... ... and unpredictable world with no universally accepted hegemonic power in charge. The Russian and the Chinese visions on the desirable international transition are not identical... ... to discuss both converging and diverging views on major components of the emerging world order.
Sixth,
human dimensions.
The trip might well produce some other positive...
... new needs will fail or disintegrate, such as old security mechanisms between NATO and Russia, and the establishment of new security mechanisms in Europe will be a difficult... ... become more active protagonists, playing the most prominent role, such as the BRICS, the SCO, the EU, NATO, the ASEAN, the ALU, and so on. The institutional inertia accumulated... ... important question in the ongoing transformation is about how could the erosion of the world order might or might not affect individual states. Is it possible to avoid a further...
The whole idea that someone—be it Moscow, Washington or Beijing—can ‘lose’ India looks excessively arrogant, if not completely preposterous
Is Russia losing India? They raise this question at practically every conference, workshop or an expert meeting on Russian-Indian relations since the times of the Soviet disintegration in early 1990s. Quite often, the predominant views expressed by participants ...
... chaotically transitions from the former U.S.-led unipolar system to an emerging Multipolar World Order. Experts debate exactly when this process began, but many agree that its... ... Ukrainian Crisis from 2013-2014 that resulted in Crimea’s democratic reunification with Russia, former U.S. President Donald Trump’s election in 2016, the black swan event... ... paradigm by coordinating their complementary grand strategies in the Eastern Hemisphere: Moscow’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) and Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision.
The U...
... such flexibility today? Could we suppose that over the course of two or three years, Russia would be capable of swapping its current partnership with China for an alliance... ... from the United States, would re-orient itself towards strategic cooperation with Moscow? Such scenarios look improbable at best and absurd at worst. Alas, the leaders... ... not have the flexibility that is absolutely necessary to maintain a stable multipolar world order.
At the end of our short historical sketch, we can ask another curious question...