... this time the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is already over and that some kind of accommodation with the West is already achieved. Such accommodation will be staged and partial; the odds are that even in 2035 some of the US and EU sanctions imposed on Moscow in 2022–2024 will still be in place. It is unlikely that the pre-2022 pattern of Russia-West relations can be restored in full even in eleven years from now. Russia’s pivot to Asia is going to continue even if a direct military clash with NATO is successfully avoided and some level of cooperation with the West is restored. At the same ...
... reached an unprecedented $35 billion. However, this spectacular (2.5 times!) growth became possible almost exclusively due to an explosive increase of Russia’s deliveries of crude oil, as well as of coal and fertilisers to India. In view of the massive Westen economic sanctions and the rapid demise of the Russia-EU strategic energy partnership, Moscow had to sell a lot of its oil to India at heavily discounted prices. On the other hand, the Indian export to Russia did not change in any significant way over the last year—neither in overall numbers, nor in its structure. As a result, we now observe ...
... precisely that in order to maximize their strategic autonomy within this paradigm by coordinating their complementary grand strategies in the Eastern Hemisphere: Moscow’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) and Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision.
The U.S.-led West’s unprecedented anti-Russian sanctions that were imposed in response to Moscow’s special military operation in Ukraine raised concerns that this targeted Great Power would become disproportionately dependent on China in response since the People’s Republic was considered to be its only reliable valve from Western pressure....
