... only the “five-day war” of 2008, but also the “Russian spring” of 2014. Two military escalations in the Karabakh in 2016 and 2020 demonstrated that the positions of Moscow and Washington may paradoxically be closer to one another than those of Russia and Turkey. Today, this looks like fiction, but before the launch of the so-called “European negotiating format” on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement in late 2021, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron twice
called
Russian leader Vladimir Putin in a bid to find common ground between EU interests and the Sochi-Moscow Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia ...
... International Transport Corridor Means for Iran
One of the beneficiaries of the change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus following the 2020 war is Turkey. It has
legitimized
its military presence in the region,
signed
a strategic document with Azerbaijan and successfully
promoted
its "3+3" negotiation format, which was accepted by the key centers of power—Russia and Iran. In other words, the expansion of Turkey's political, diplomatic and military presence in the South Caucasus allows Ankara to impact and sometimes even set the agenda in the region.
The emergence of a new actor such as India may have implications for Turkey in the context of the balance ...
... constantly oscillating between three options: direct control from the center, self-determination of the autonomy and the integrity of the AzSSR. As a result, the intra-state conflict turned into an interstate confrontation involving various external actors (Russia, Iran, Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union).
However, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict had its own logic and dynamics. And it would be wrong to consider it only as one of the factors (albeit an important one) of the Soviet collapse. The appeal as of February 20, 1988 did not arise out of nothing. It was based on the ...
... successful trading in the new conditions have been created. Turkey accepts Mir cards (Russia’s version of Visa or MasterCard). Most likely, bilateral financial transactions... ... such a job. It is unlikely that the post-Soviet countries will cope with it either. Turkey, on the other hand, has sufficient political weight, it is part of the Western... ... plays an independent role. The Ukrainian crisis has strengthened the status of Ankara.
Azerbaijan is another winning player. Baku maintains partnership relations with Moscow...
... seeks a
just and lasting solution
to this protracted problem, then it may leave Karabakh outside of both Armenian and Azerbaijani control. Instead, it could maintain it as an independent entity controlled by Russian peacekeepers, allowing Armenians and Azerbaijanis to co-exist and live together again. Historical and cultural monuments—both Christian Armenian and Islamic—would be restored and preserved under Russian protection. These would include the
Dadivank
and
Amaras
monasteries.
Basel Haj Jasem:
Will Moscow Lead a Historic Reconciliation Between Turkey and Armenia?
The road to such a peace is certainly not easy, but Moscow understands that decisive steps must be taken to ensure (1) that any peace is lasting peace, (2) that its position as a regional arbiter is preserved, and (3) that a balance ...
... on the Turkish-Greek conflict, the complex Cyprus issue, the confrontation in Libya and Paris' support for separatist terrorism in the Syrian Arab Republic, which threatens the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and later will threaten Turkey and other countries, including Russia in the southern and northern Caucasus.
Finally, after Moscow concluded an agreement to end the battles between Azerbaijan and Armenia with a new map of the powers of control different from those that followed the first Karabakh war, it is true that we are not talking about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but it also appears to be incomplete, where the land ...
... the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, as it is far from the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia.
The city of Tovuz is located near the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, both of which are gates for Azerbaijan to transport its oil and natural gas, the so-called "Caspian Sea wealth," to Turkey, Europe and other global markets.
A Blow to Russian Interests
Christian Wollny:
Nagorno-Karabakh: A Frozen Conflict Rethawed
The location of the attack or the clashes indicates that they were against Turkish-Western and Turkish-Azerbaijani interests. Nonetheless, they are also a blow against Russia's ...
... nature are a fundamental part of any modern-day battle plan. However, they are liable to be just as damaging as conventional weapons.
What Can EU Do For You?
It is clear that a solution in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is inconceivable without Russia. With Turkey deliberately instigating the Azerbaijan government, Russia sees itself as a mediator to both, Armenia and Azerbaijan. While there is a
Russian military base
located in Armenia, and is considered Armenia’s protector, Russian neutrality goes so far that Moscow supplies
weapons ...
... with the Muslim world. In this respect, Nagorno-Karabagh has the appearance of a holy war and it is customary to note the presence of Chechen and Syrian mercenaries, and members of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin alongside the Azeris. As a member of NATO, Turkey's approach which favours Azerbaijan is badly perceived because it could lead to a conflict between NATO and Russia, a threat already mentioned by the CIA in its 1988 report and which worries the White House.
Azerbaijani Armed Forces
With 66,000 men for $2.2 billion of the annual budget, the Azerbaijanis have at their disposal modern equipment with the ambition ...
... Nagorno-Karabakh was one of the first of its kind in the former USSR. Over the past quarter of a century, it has transformed from an intercommunal and inter-republic conflict within a single state (the USSR) into a protracted confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan with the prospects for resolution being unclear
[1]
. Russia (the successor to the USSR) has expressed an interest in settling this confrontation, as have neighbouring Turkey and Iran, and a number of external actors, namely the United States and the European Union.
In May 1994, when
the Open-Ended Ceasefire Agreement
came into force, it marked the next stage of the conflict, which could be defined as “a dynamic ...