... on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement in late 2021, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron twice
called
Russian leader Vladimir Putin in a bid to find common ground between EU interests and the Sochi-Moscow Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia negotiating format.
Andrey Petrov:
Peace in South Caucasus: What Awaits Russia in Armenia?
The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine overhauled this balance. First of all, the positions of Russia and the West have become holistic. There is no room left for nuances or shades. That ...
... International Transport Corridor Means for Iran
One of the beneficiaries of the change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus following the 2020 war is Turkey. It has
legitimized
its military presence in the region,
signed
a strategic document with Azerbaijan and successfully
promoted
its "3+3" negotiation format, which was accepted by the key centers of power—Russia and Iran. In other words, the expansion of Turkey's political, diplomatic and military presence in the South Caucasus allows Ankara to impact and sometimes even set the agenda in the region.
The emergence of a new actor such as India may have implications for Turkey in the context of the balance of power in the region and transport-related communication....
... unlike the Iranian case where Moscow has to assist Tehran with the completion of the Astara-Resht railroad section of the North-South ITC.
Azerbaijan’s friendliness towards Russia
is also a consequence of its sobriety and its sense responsibility. Russia and Azerbaijan border on each other in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, being brought together by centuries-old ties. Unlike neighboring Georgia and Armenia, where historical and humanitarian factors do not prevent the authorities from aspiring to Euro-Atlantic integration projects, Azerbaijan ...
... citizens alike, rather than from external threat(s) [
5
]. Nonetheless, the external threat is presented as the main one (e.g. Russia in Georgia and Turkey/Azerbaijan in Armenia), while the problems seem to be mostly domestic, having a lot to do with corruption or difficulties to accept the change of borders in the post-Soviet order.
Towards the effective implementation of a Blue Ocean strategy in the South Caucasus
A major obstacle to effective implementation of a Blue Ocean strategy in the region will come from the phenomenon ...
... hypothetical and unlikely scenarios as destabilization in the Russian North Caucasus, the war of Russia and Turkey, etc. Another defrosting mechanism can be a regional war, which arose initially due to the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh — Turkey, Russia and, less likely, Iran may be involved into a full-scale war of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This may also involve Georgia in these catastrophic processes. In this sense, the key to peace in the South Caucasus lies in Nagorno-Karabakh. The settlement or at least a deep freeze of this conflict can mitigate most of the regional military risks.
1
. Military Balance 2018. IISS. 2018. p. 187
2
. Ibid
3
. Ibid
4
. Ibid
5
. В ожидании бури: ...
... pipeline system
[21]
.
In 2014 European Union was a major consumer of Azeri natural gas and oil, thus making Russia and Azerbaijan competing parties. However, the incommensurable volumes of production and export between the two countries cannot make Russia see Azerbaijan as a potential opponent at the European market.
The South Caucasus region cannot be regarded as a vital oil and gas market for the Russian Federation. Currently Russia provides only its strategic partner with energy – Armenia, while Georgia is partly dependent on Azeri exports, and Azerbaijan is ...
... Moscow co-chairs the OSCE Minsk Group securing the negotiation process between the conflicting parties and the development of a formula for a final settlement. Both the US and France supported Moscow’s efforts in the 2008-2011 trilateral talks (Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan). In fact, Moscow sees its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process as a way of preserving its influence across the South Caucasus, as well as an additional opportunity for constructive dialogue with Western partners.
Thirdly, Azerbaijan holds a strategically important position as a link between the Greater Caucasus and Central Asia (via the Caspian Sea) on the one ...
