... for some flexibility but also raises the risks of further escalation
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated an unprecedented use of missile capabilities... ...
against nuclear use in Ukraine. While there remains a conceptual difference between nuclear deterrence and nuclear use, this may still contribute to a conflation of conventional... ... Although Russia has rejected the recent U.S. proposal to
resum
e systematic dialogue on strategic stability and arms control, both states should continue to seek other opportunities—whether...
... those of the U.S. Therefore, in both cases, non-governmental experts have to rely on independent expertise. It attributes more than 1,900 TNWs to Russia [SIPRI Yearbook 2022: 355-368]. However, until recently, tactical nuclear weapons did not feature in Russia’s official documents and declarations.
There is another paradox of nuclear deterrence associated with the phenomenon of limited nuclear war. The enhancement of strategic stability [
37
] through the START treaties and some weapons programs of Russia and the United States since the early 1990s has made a first nuclear strike at the strategic level impossible, as both sides have lost the ability to launch a disarming ...
... to emphasize once again Russia’s interest in this area in the context of an "unhealthy" situation in the field of strategic stability, as well as with the extension of the START.
One of the positive aspects of the document itself is a clear classification of both military risks and threats to be neutralized by the implementation of nuclear deterrence: deployment by states "which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary" of missile defense systems and means, deployment of nuclear weapons, build-up ...
