... presidency, Beijing’s inclusion in strategic arms control was, for some time, a
mandatory condition
for as much as extending the New START. Under the Biden administration, this issue was still in the initial stages, implying a softer touch, though it has ... ... simultaneously and independently”, as the most difficult and previously unprecedented challenge. Besides, Washington is concerned about Russia’s much larger and more advanced arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
In the inception of a long journey possibly leading to a new agreement or a set of agreements, a format for a ...
...
For example, they could issue a joint declaration that they would not violate the New START Treaty and preserve its verification regime until its extension. After all... ... takes everything into account. Various capabilities of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons are most likely always taken into account in one way or another. Speaking... ... Trump explicitly demanded that China participate in any future treaty. In response, Russia recalled Britain and France, saying that, in this case, they should also negotiate...
... prevent them from doing so. The only way to explain this is that the development of nuclear weapons in these countries, while a direct violation of the non-proliferation... ... go back to the 1970s, or even to 2010, when Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama signed New START.
On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that there are states in the... ... about China developing its own nuclear arsenal, the ballistic potential of Iran, etc. Russia, in turn, will have to take the ever-increasing capabilities of the official...
... their vision of ways out of the current crisis, including prolongation of the Prague New START.
At the event, RIAC expert Ilya Kramnik spoke with Aleksey Arbatov, Vice-Chairman... ... National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), and Academician of the RAS. The conversation focused... ... hierarchy now? How significant is the effect of anti-missile systems, long-range non-nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapons?
Regarding anti-missile defence, its effect...
... Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China has a No First Use (NFU) doctrine, saying the PLA will never use nuclear weapons first. Chinese officials say that they are uninterested in joining Russian-US agreements like INF and New START since they have fewer nuclear weapons than Russia or the U.S. They also claim, not very credibly, that their weapons do not threaten other countries. A more recent argument one hears in Beijing is that it's impractical and too complex to enlarge these treaties. The Chinese also accuse the U.S....
... effect’: if it abandons the INF Treaty, it puts the New START treaty’s extension into question. Mutual accusations about the failure to abide by this treaty — at least in terms of its spirit, if not the letter — are becoming increasingly loud both in Russia and the US, as are statements that the national security of either side will be guaranteed even if the extension of the treaty is renounced.
Without the New START, there will be a broader issue of maintaining the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime. We should not forget about the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty either. The United States, by the way, has not ratified the CTBT, but is now criticising Russia for alleged CTBT violations.
Thus, a chain reaction ...
... crumble too, as it is looking dangerously unlikely that the bare minimum of extending the agreement will be achieved. It is time we started preparing ourselves for the possibility of waking up in March 2021 in a world where there are no restrictions on nuclear weapons.
The potential disintegration of New START would not be catastrophic for Russia, all the more so because the country could derive some benefit from the “inter-treaty” period and approach the next, and hopefully inevitable, stage of arms control from the best position possible. However, a protracted nuclear arms race would ...
... reducing nuclear arms, the priority task for all should be to prevent a nuclear war
For several years, serious experts in Russia and the West have repeatedly warned the public about the threat of the collapse of the international nuclear arms control ... ... relations and this is already happening before our eyes. Washington has launched a campaign accusing Moscow of conducting secret nuclear weapons tests. Thus, the future of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that has been signed but not ratified by ...
... U.S. and Canadian Studies, retired Major General, RIAC expert, noted that the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty threatens New START — an agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive ... ... a new treaty,” said Zolotarev.
The speaker underscored the very vague prospects of The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: “While Russia and the U.S. were engaged in maintaining strategic stability in a bilateral format discussing ...
... to do it eventually anyway. Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty is an opportunity to start considering ways to do this, because the demise of the treaty has a direct bearing on all members of the nuclear club.
And fourth, in this situation Russia and the United States should focus on preparations for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Withdrawal from the INF Treaty and, more importantly, refusal to extend the New START Treaty would create major risks for the global non-proliferation regime, and the next NPT Review Conference may turn out to be the last. This will not benefit Moscow or Washington, and so a common interest in preserving the non-proliferation ...
