... blocking Azerbaijan’s maximalist aspirations.
Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi in March 2024 was quite revealing in this regard. Brussels believes now is the time for geopolitical homogenization of the region. The crisis in Russian-Armenian relations, Georgia’s desire to monetize its status as a NATO “aspirant” as soon as possible, the bolstered cooperation between Baku and Ankara (NATO’s second largest army) – all these factors work to promote the West’s agenda. However, the mosaic in the Caucasus is multicolored. And the Alliance ...
... their
first sin: NATO expansion
. However, for an Armenian, the current global crisis did not begin on February 24, 2022, but on September 27, 2020, with the beginning of the second full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh. In its support for Azerbaijan, NATO member Turkey sought
to expand its geopolitical influence
deep into Russia’s post-Soviet neighborhood. Its infamous Bayraktar drones covered Karabakh’s skies like black clouds, terrorizing Armenian civilians for 44 consecutive days. Although today Turkey prefers to play the role of “peacemaker”, the demonstrated “success” of the Bayraktars in fact encouraged Ankara to
market its drones to Kiev
. It was this step that ultimately ...
A path forward would be to strengthen the strategic alliance between Russia and Armenia, with the aim of preventing Turkey, and by extension NATO, from establishing any domination in the post-Soviet Transcaucasia
This July will mark the 300th anniversary of
Peter the Great’s
Caspian campaign. The campaign proved costly for the Russian emperor in terms of lives and resources, and the ...
... News
Second, the news of Russia’s loss of influence in the post-Soviet space is very dated. The Baltic states have been in NATO for sixteen years; Ukraine has been pro-Western and anti-Russian since the Maidan revolution; so has Georgia, only for a decade longer; Moldova is torn in both directions, but leaning ... ... Turkey; Uzbekistan is vociferously independent; and Turkmenistan is reclusive, shunning foreign connections. That leaves only Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—five out of fourteen ex-republics—as Moscow’s formal allies and ...
... Trans-Caucasus will remain a divided region. The “three countries — three different strategies” principle will remain. Armenia will attempt to remain an ally of Russia, while Georgia will try to stay an ally of the “collective West in general” without forgetting to diversify its foreign ... ... Erevan and Tbilisi will have internal and external restrictions. Moscow will hardly welcome Erevan expanding its cooperation with NATO and the EU, while Washington will hardly welcome Georgia improving its relations with Russia and China. Azerbaijan will have ...
... difference in the political part. For the economic part we have to make sure that there is no contradiction with our commitments vis-a-vis the EEU, which Armenia is a member of, stressed Sargsyan. He had also positively assessed the cooperation with NATO, and that this is no contradiction with the country's military ties with Russia.
The relations between the EU and Armenia warmed up with the visit of the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini to Armenia in March 2016, which endorsed the new ties between Brussels and Yerevan despite the strained relations between the EU and Russia. The influential Armenian diaspora ...
... until 1991 has become greatly fragmented. Some former Soviet republics have joined NATO and the European Union, while others are trying to form an alternative to the Euro-Atlantic... ... the borders formed during the Soviet period. Many new independent states, including Russia, have faced challenges in the form of separatists and lived through ethno-political... ... republics of the Soviet Union, four have no diplomatic relations with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Unregulated border disputes are the bane...
