... taken place in terms of equipping the armed forces of the sides (for example, drones – something that did not even cross the minds of the politicians drafting the treaty back in 1990 – are now widespread). That notwithstanding, the experience of the CFE Treaty retains its value, and one of the strategic tasks of Russian foreign policy moving forward could be to reach an agreement on the signing of a CFE 2 or similar document in the near future.
Shifting the emphasis from counteracting NATO’s inchoate expansion plans to searching for concrete options to limit ...
... a matter of principle, we are on the threshold of destroying the treaty system? Can the expired agreements (ABM Treaty, the CFE Treaty, the INF Treaty) be followed by the endangered START and TOS and then by the CTBT, Non-Proliferation Treaty and other ... ... correct. If the central link falls apart… there are already attempts to undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Russia is already being accused of secretly conducting some tests.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty… If this system collapses, its ...
... demonstrating that they are not interested in an attack. Building new, large forces takes immense resources and years of work, therefore the reconstruction of armies is rarely perceived as a surprise. This was one of the most evident advantages of the CFE Treaty that significantly reduced forces. By the way, Russia reduced the most forces, with Germany following shortly after the reunification of Germany. After that other countries followed, which was great progress. It showed that if you reduce capabilities, you show your intent.
... armed forces. Although we have not yet reached a full arms race, we are on the brink of one. In terms of military options, the issue at stake is no longer “large-scale offensive options” of a continental-size in the sense of the preamble of the CFE Treaty, but the perception of emerging options for a surprise attack in the contact regions between NATO and Russia, particularly in the Baltic and the Black Sea regions.
The Risks of Deterrence
Group Statement on Nuclear Arms Control
Any military deterrence relationship necessarily involves risks and inherently drives escalation. The three most important drivers ...
... European capitals. The wheel of Western sanctions has already gained full momentum, and even the Minsk negotiations breakthrough in February 2015 showed that its spinning will not be affected by any transitory crisis diplomacy decisions. In this context, Russia’s CFE Treaty gambit can neither substantially harm Moscow’s relationships with Washington and Brussels nor tangibly improve them.
Nonetheless, there is an important aspect to the CFE story that renders the document some nostalgic value. And it is ...
