...
agreement
between the two. Be that as it may, at this stage, the Pacific countries are certainly not ready to host or deal with nuclear weapons in any other way.
Nuclearizing the Periphery: Great Power Impacts
Andrey Kortunov:
Does the Non-Proliferation ... ... each other but also to
middle powers and small states
. At least three out of the five NWSs (nuclear weapon states)—China, Russia and the US—have direct stakes in the region. However, the crippled arms control system has not been trilateralized as China has refused to be included in the configuration, nodding to its incomparably ...
... expert discussions and social movements have played a useful supplementary role.
Without a reliable foundation in the form of arms control treaties, it would be impossible in future to discuss the limitation of conventional long-range high-precision weapons,... ... disruptive technologies. Most likely, the next victim of the destruction paradigm will be the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Russian side has already warned about this possibility at the top level. [
53
] Then, the treaties prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in space and on the bottom of oceans and seabed will also collapse. [
54
] The question of involving third nuclear ...
... commented negatively on Sullivan’s proposals and noted that it might be worthwhile not to try create a complex treaty in strategic arms control including an inspection regime but rather to embark upon the path of “parallel unilateral self-restrictions.” ... ... just that. We are not talking about a series of STARTs—this rather refers to the elimination of huge arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, whereby, by foreign estimates [
7
], the U.S. would get rid of all but a relatively small number of B61 bombs, whereas Russia would reduce them by some 90 per cent relative to the late Soviet Union levels (while still maintaining a significant advantage ...
... of extremely complex documents that make up this treaty.
START I was developed as a bilateral Soviet–American treaty but it became a multilateral instrument following the collapse of the USSR: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine acceded to the current Russian–American treaty and committed to eliminating nuclear weapons on their territories to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states.
To a certain degree, the Treaty’s key achievement lies not solely in asserting arms control but in ensuring that all subsequent treaties resulted in progressively greater reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The comprehensive control system developed as part of START I ensured sufficient mutual confidence in compliance with the ...
... concept since they may provide additional incentives to launch a first nuclear strike (hence, at the Geneva summit in June 2021, Russia and the United States agreed to start a bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue).
The only way to do this is to continue and expand arms control. Since third parties are not going to join the process in the near future and since no one has thus far calculated ... ... the next START should include broader and stricter measures for arms restrictions instead of another direct deep reduction of nuclear weapons. In addition to traditional ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, this means limiting all long-range nuclear air- and ...
... itself need revising in the future. Legally binding, predominantly quantitative “arms control” may very well be replaced by multilateral, informal and predominantly... ... for the development of strategic forces, joint action against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, countering nuclear terrorism and so on.
We are witnessing the dawn... ... potentially more dangerous than the world of the 20
th
century. I would like to hope that Russia, the United States and other leading countries can get past their mutual suspicions...
... United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: a study “Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control” [
1
] and a report on a UNIDIR-UNODA Turn-based Exercise “The Implications of Hypersonic Weapons for International ... ... hypersonic speeds.
Who are the players?
Currently the most active and diverse hypersonic weapons related programs are ongoing in Russia, China and the United States. These three countries are pursuing the whole range of technologies and capabilities with ...
... participate in these treaties.
The New START Treaty, like its earlier versions, focuses on long-range nuclear arm missiles and bombers. A new type of strategic arms control treaty could limit additional types of weapons, such as short-range missiles and non-nuclear weapons that could potentially cause significant damage. Russia has always pushed to include strategic missile defences in these strategic arms control treaties, while U.S. officials have pressed to include so-called tactical nuclear weapons, amongst other areas, but both sides would abandon these positions in the course of the talks.
Andrey Kortunov:
The Post-INF Treaty world: Cutting ...
... comparable to ours, and then we can talk about multilateral agreements’. Moreover, France and the United Kingdom have, of their own accord, reduced the number of nuclear warheads in their own arsenals to 300 and 215, respectively. For comparison, the Russian Federation and the United States have 7,200 and 7,000 units of nuclear arms, including tactical nuclear weapons and warheads stored in warehouses, respectively.
However, arms control cannot be reduced to an arithmetic problem. The question also includes ‘algebraic’ considerations — the combat readiness of nuclear arsenals, their degree of transparency, confidence-building measures, the dialogue on military doctrines,...
... arms race will no doubt have a hand in nuclear cruise missiles returning to the arsenal of the U.S. fleet [
11
], which will increase its striking power significantly, as any submarine or destroyer/cruiser could potentially become a delivery system for nuclear weapons with a range of several thousand kilometers.
Greg Thielmann:
Are We Approaching the End of the Arms Control Era?
What is the situation with Russia? We should immediately note here that the data used is unofficial and taken from open (primarily non-Russian) sources [
12
]. It may sound ridiculous, but the only party that the Russian military shares exact figures with a breakdown by system ...
