... on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement in late 2021, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron twice
called
Russian leader Vladimir Putin in a bid to find common ground between EU interests and the Sochi-Moscow Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia negotiating format.
Andrey Petrov:
Peace in South Caucasus: What Awaits Russia in Armenia?
The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine overhauled this balance. First of all, the positions of Russia and the West have become holistic....
... military-technical cooperation. At the same time, with Tehran regularly providing its territory as a transit hub of Indian arms to Armenia, this indicates the absence of a real conflict of interests. Therefore, this factor can be perceived as a healthy competition ... ... following the 2020 war is Turkey. It has
legitimized
its military presence in the region,
signed
a strategic document with Azerbaijan and successfully
promoted
its "3+3" negotiation format, which was accepted by the key centers of power—Russia and Iran. In other words, the expansion of Turkey's political, diplomatic and military presence in the South Caucasus allows ...
... renounced its claims on Azerbaijan’s territories (although they have yet to be eliminated from the Armenian Constitution), it makes no sense for Iran to attack Azerbaijan as an ally of Russia and Turkey, and Georgia will never dare to go to war with Russia. Yes, the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia has not yet been signed, and the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish borders have not been opened yet, but these bilateral issues do not constitute a region-wide problem. Even if not de jure, then at least de facto, South Caucasus is now ...
... the issue of the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, which had been in “dormant mode” until 2020, but after the change of the military-political status quo reemerged once again, is far from being settled.
Meanwhile, all these issues, alongside the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem, affect the interests of other parties. Russia is extremely interested in unblocking transport communications and a peace treaty through its decisive mediation. But Turkey (which today feels itself a beneficiary in the Caucasus) benefits from the “corridor logic”, which will connect not ...
By imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan is helping to fuel anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia, where Russia’s image and soft power have seriously suffered
Once in a while, certain parallels appear between contemporary global affairs and classical Russian literature. Particularly, looking at the relationship between the post-Soviet ...
... abandoned by Western companies due to corporate boycotts. Ample opportunities remain for the supply of their products to Russia through Kazakhstan without the sanctions regimes being violated. Their skilful implementation will benefit the country. Like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is benefiting from rising energy prices.
Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan can be considered the main beneficiaries from migration from Russia. At the same time, the question of the stability of such a flow remains open. The Russian government has sent two important signals. The first is that the country does not plan to turn into a repressive state with a mobilisation and a command economy,...
... and difficulties seem to stem from weak institutions, with an enforced political repetition compulsion [
4
] by elites and citizens alike, rather than from external threat(s) [
5
]. Nonetheless, the external threat is presented as the main one (e.g. Russia in Georgia and Turkey/Azerbaijan in Armenia), while the problems seem to be mostly domestic, having a lot to do with corruption or difficulties to accept the change of borders in the post-Soviet order.
Towards the effective implementation of a Blue Ocean strategy in the South Caucasus
A ...
... Georgian Military Road, or the Lachin Corridor. Moreover, Russian control over Kelbajar would effectively resolve the
new border dispute over the Sotk gold mine
.
Finally, rather than concede the “Caucasian Jerusalem” of Shushi (Shusha) to either Armenian or Azerbaijani control, Russia may consider maintaining it as a “neutral city.” Similarly, in the ideal Russian scenario, the final status of Karabakh itself would be determined in a neutral manner. If the Kremlin genuinely seeks a
just and lasting solution
to this protracted ...
The question is whether Russia has an interest today in completing what it started in Karabakh
Russia managed to stop the second Karabakh war after its mediation in completing a historic agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After completing the full implementation of the terms of the agreement (among them are "land swaps" or land passages), Moscow will control transportation between Armenia and part of the Karabakh enclave across the territory of Azerbaijan ...
... attract Russian tourists and its wines are back on the Russian market after being banned for several years, but in both categories, it is far behind its competitors. Russians today get most of their knowledge of the other former Soviet republics, from Armenia and Azerbaijan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, from those who come to seek work in Russia. There is virtually no desire to go back themselves and try to reassemble the empire. The reason is simple: the Russian empire, and particularly the Soviet Union, used to buy the loyalty of the borderland regions using the resources of the ethnically ...