... corridors between Russia and Georgia, which are crucial both for Armenia and the whole region. "Armedia" IAA presents an exclusive interview with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin on the implementation of the 2011 Agreement, the Russian-Georgian relations and Armenia's possible role.
At the end of 2017 discussions on the implementation of the Russian-Georgian Agreement signed in 2011 were rather intensified. The agreement envisages the creation of alternative corridors between Russia and Georgia, which are ...
... together and ensuring the modernization and Europeanization of the country. In turn, proponents of Armenia’s Eurasian integration see the instrument’s key aspect in the extent of its compatibility with Yerevan’s commitments within the EAEU and in Russia–Armenia bilateral relations.
Reasonable Europeanization
Ilgar Gurbanov:
Armenia's Doubts on Russia Ties Prompt Pro-EU Maneuvering
The new agreement is a good foundation for Yerevan’s closer interaction with the EU in several priority areas, primarily ...
... of integration processes in the post-Soviet space, discussions on whether the CIS has exhausted its potential are still underway. RIAC experts share their insights into the challenges facing the CIS and its prospects with the editorial board of the Russian International Affairs Council.
Russia's presidency of the CIS: What are our goals?
Irina Bolgova
, PhD in History, Post-Soviet Studies Center at the MGIMO University, RIAC Expert
Russia’s presidency of the CIS in 2017 will prioritize a number ...
... with the EU. This is why, Armenia also tries to foster its military ties by virtue of cooperation with NATO, while being a member of the CSTO. After the April escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the CSTO indeed proved to be a cosmetic image of Russia-Armenia defence and security relations.
EPA/DMITRY LOVETSKY/Vostock Photo
Murad Gassanly:
Azerbaijan and the Four Day War: Breaking
the Karabakh Deadlock
Moreover, in the light of Russia's procrastination efforts on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia ...
... drastically changed (Azerbaijan
took control
of very little ground), the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic preserved its infrastructure, the negotiation process continued both
under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group
[3]
and as
three-party talks
(Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan). At the same time, after the events of April, the de-escalation of the military confrontation
did not put an end
to incidents along the line of contact.
minval.az
Vladimir Evseev:
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Minsk Process ...
... post-independence generation. Of course, the mass media in both countries has a big role to play, gradually embracing proper expertise instead of ”know-it-all” commentators.
The present situation sometimes sends false signals of consensus within the Russian elite that Armenia is and will remain Russia’s key and unparalleled ally in the region. The 17% drop in public perception of Russia’s “friendliness” in Armenia, observed in a Eurasian Development Bank survey in October 2016, should be an ...
... two sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Recent years saw a lot of talk about how this balance had been tilted as Azerbaijan used oil revenues to build up its military potential. At the same time, Armenia was particularly appalled by the fact that Russia, Armenia’s strategic ally, was also the
biggest
supplier of arms to Azerbaijan. Whereas prior to 2016 Moscow was blamed for those supplies mainly by the media, the expert community or by civil activists, after the April events even Armenia’s ...
... with the country’s socioeconomic situation), yet it will be significant in the context of national security. Therefore, the two main points to consider about Mr. Putin and Mr. Sargsyan’s meeting are the regional factor and the factor of Russian-Armenian relations.
The escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh was a serious challenge that jolted Armenia, gave a great impetus to the sociopolitical movement in the contended territory, and made people think about the role of Russia and of the Russian-Azerbaijani ...
... 2019 (and a common oil and gas market by 2025). Until then Russia will remain the main negotiating party of the EU in energy security. EEU leaders will need to take into the account the interests of three major groups of countries: importing countries (Armenia, Belorussia and Kyrgyzstan), exporting countries (Kazakhstan and Russia) and transit countries (Belorussia).
The energy security of the
importing countries
of the EEU consists of “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price....
... significant political results. Azerbaijan’s attempts to denounce the 1994 tripartite ceasefire agreement that Baku took a shot at immediately after reaching a verbal agreement on a ceasefire (Moscow, April 5, 2016) by the chiefs of the General Staff of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with their Russian colleague acting as a mediator, are unlikely to be regarded as such political accomplishments.
In all probability, it is Moscow’s position that appears to play the crucial role in maintaining the negotiation process and the format that have ...
