Oil and Nation-Building in Azerbaijan

In 1994, when Azerbaijan struck the ‘Contract of the Century’, it seemed that the republic’s future was defined for many years to come. The infamous oil contract has had a tremendous effect on Azerbaijan’s role and presence in the world energy network: an estimated 233 billion barrels worth of oil made Azerbaijan a new Saudi Arabia at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and an energy corridor everybody wanted to have a stake in.

It is not surprising that at the signing ceremony President Heydar Aliyev referred to oil as "the main and richest national wealth of the Azerbaijan Republic and Azerbaijani people." However, oil was not than just a plentiful resource but also a strategic asset. “The Contract of the Century” marked a distinct turn in the public image of Azerbaijan as an independent nation-state rather than part of the Soviet Union. For years, since they were first developed in 1871, the oil fields of Baku were associated, first, with imperial Russia, and then, with the Soviet Union. Managing its oil industry was for Azerbaijan also a matter of choosing priorities and landmarks, and for claiming back its own space.

A large part of the change was certainly the re-orientation towards a different political regime and a big move at the democratization and liberalization of the society. In this regard, the political processes in Azerbaijan were similar to those ongoing in most post-Soviet states. The petroleum however, made the difference. Surprising as it may sound, the idea of scientific and technical progress was quite prominent in the turbulent Azerbaijani society after 1991. It was widely believed that under the Soviet regime, the oil industry was heavily mismanaged and backward. Therefore, the shift within the oil industry resulted in a fierce move towards modernization.

Contemporary scholarship of Azerbaijani nation-building continuously emphasizes the importance of scientific progress for the image of Azerbaijan as a modern, progressive country and society. Progress and innovation have become among the main traits of the self-fashioning and self-identification of independent Azerbaijan. As Militz notes analyzing the representation of Baku, in visual media “Baku is invented and reified through physical objects as a way to image Azerbaijan as modern and prosperous”. From the iconic and sleek Baku cityscape to the constant use of technology, especially transport and movement in the public imagery of Azerbaijan - the same images seem to refer times and again to the centrality of the changes brought by the year of 1994 to the new independent and vibrant nation-state.

The importance of oil for the narrative of Azerbaijan’s national history is prominent in political culture as it is in cultural and academic production. From the invented tradition of the elaborate celebrations of ‘The Day of Oil Workers’ on September, 20^th to the strong interest in ‘black gold’ in literature and culture studies – the nation’s plentiful, precious resource has entered the society’s public sphere as a symbolic image and has thus been internalized and naturalized by its citizens.

The very thing that makes Azerbaijan so modern and prosperous, though, may turn out to be its greatest threat. The spectacular petroleum success, as it often happens, masks a number of social and political problems, which elicit a predictable question: is there a “resource curse” in Azerbaijan?

As Baranick argues, the exaggerated focus on petroleum economic sector does hinder the overall development of economy. Agriculture, for example, accounts for only 14% of Azerbaijan’s GDP, with a number of other indicators showing significant underdevelopment as well. The government of the republic makes a lot of effort to balance the situation and advance the non-oil sectors; the results, however, are yet to be seen.

These numbers in itself would make an analyst cautious; but more so do the recent developments in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Alexander Etkind and Ilya Kalinin, the pioneers of cultural studies of oil in Russia, argue that resource-based economic growth can trigger demodernization and actually foster imperial ambition. Jeff Colgan’s ‘Petro-Aggression’, a groundbreaking research on the foreign policy in oil-rich countries, suggests that petroleum states with “strong-leader” regimes are 249% more likely to initiate foreign military conflicts.

This calls one to re-think the recent developments in Nagorny Karabakh. Are we witnessing a downside of Azerbaijan’s oil success and the desire to claim what belongs to the nation, or is it something else?