Formal or informal leader? Or why leadership in the framework of the EEU is not desired endeavor for Moscow?
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Sub-system formation is foreseen as a leading trend in international politics in 21st century and Eurasia is the region where the international public has already focused in anticipation of an emerging leader and architecture. Considering historical path-dependency and shared political traditions, it is not a surprise that Moscow is already a center of the Eurasian integration process. Still, many argue that the EEU is merely a manifestation of Russia as a great power returned to the international arena rather than an attempt for regional stabilization through the means of economic cooperation. Nevertheless, only forecasts may be discussed at the current stage of the EEU, so it would be of a great interest to examine the risks Moscow is taking by leading the project. The perils complementing the leader status indicate nothing more but the price Russia is ready to pay to foster the Eurasian integration process. Recognizing the risks is not enough to realize the genuine intentions of Moscow with regards to the Eurasian region, however, reveals the scale of the benefits it will obtain if or once the project succeeds and exploits its full capacity.
Risks on national level
“Видна́ пти́ца по полёту.”
(“A bird may be known by its flight” – Russian proverb)
Evolvement of the EEU has been publicly promoted as the spotlight of the Russian foreign politics agenda. In the course of justification the costs and efforts invested by the state, the Russian public has been building great expectations towards the development and the success of the Eurasian project. Consequently, one of the risks Moscow takes on national level with regards to depth of its engagement in the EEU, is solely related to the political stability in the country in case disintegration of the current EEU or a delay of Russian citizens realizing the benefits of the project take place. Although negative developments are not highly likely to occur, still the variety of factors related to their probability can not be estimated, hence, such possibility exist and it bears a huge internal risk for Russia, including social and political destabilization in case EEU fails to operate efficiently.
“Бережливость хороша, да скупость страшна.”
(“Economy is a good servant but a bad master” – Russian proverb)
From purely economic perspective, it would be essential to highlight the fact that when considering international trade, the Eurasian market resembles a very small fraction of Russian market (both imports and exports).[1] Similar conclusions may be derived tracing the origin of direct foreign investments in Russia. It is not a secret that Russia experiences economic problems, nonetheless, its will to ensure a complex framework for economic cooperation in the “Near abroad” certainly reflects on the trade relations with its current Western partners. The leadership role within the EEU structure burdens Russian negotiation position since the flexibility achieved in bilateral relations can hardly be surpassed if EU and the EEU decide to cooperate on supranational level. Despite such dialogues are ongoing no certainty in appropriate time period are guaranteed, which is to be realized as a risk affecting Russian market which is highly dependent on European imports, and national GDP reliant on energy exports.
Risks on regional level
“Вы́ше головы́ не пры́гнешь.”
(“You can not jump above your head” – Russian proverb)
Being economically the strongest member within the structure of the EEU, Russia is expected to aid the economic development in Eurasia. This position, however, encounters several risks. Firstly, financial support may be realized as the leverage putting Moscow in a volatile situation, considering the correlation between payments and membership loyalty of the states in need. Secondly, defending its position as a leader on everyday basis will soon or later exhaust Moscow. Thirdly, in the realm of the domestic economic realities, in addition to the external factors depleting Russian national reserves (dip of oil prices, financial market manipulation), EEU leadership may soon or later take away Russia’s freedom on the international arena of maneuvering lead by appropriateness of its political decision, rather than the instrumentalities on its disposal – namely the EEU. To sum it up, with regards to the economic contributions and benefits among the EEU members, it is hard to explain why Russia is so eager to accept such a great economic risk, affecting its image not only on regional, but national and international level as well.
“Где то́нко - там рвётся”
(“The chain is no stronger than its weakest link”– Russian proverb)
Despite the tone of international negotiations is lead by the notion of depoliticization of economic relations, it is hard to believe a world where politics and economics are not interrelated exists. Keeping in mind the severe problem with regards to diversification of economy, depreciation of the rubble, and the low oil prices, are only few of the factors defining the economic sector as Russia’s weak spot, it is a great risk to become a leader in a block with economic parameters such as the EEU. A recent publication by European Institute illustrated the relations between the EU and the EEU in a peculiar manner. “Dancing with the bear” suggests that the EU must engage in economic cooperation in order to affect the development and operational pace of the partnership.[2] Setting up certain dynamics would exhaust Moscow, and prove its inefficiency and lack of capabilities as a leader. This perception, along with the material problems would bring the EEU to demise at a later moment according in the opinion of the author. Such scenario of economic insolvency jeopardizes Russian national political interests since in case of occurrence it gives great strategic advantage to the West, enabling it to use economic incentives as leverage advocating its interests in Eurasia trough Moscow.
“There are two ways of spreading light: to be the candle or the mirror that reflects it.”
- Edith Wharton
Realizing the great interests of stable and prosperous Eurasia, in addition to Russian promise of active participation in the international affairs, leadership is a reasonable role to be claimed by Moscow.[3] Nevertheless, those goals may not only be achieved via direct leadership. Anyways, relations with the West stay in the shadow of the Ukraine crisis, and following sanctions and bans of import affect every corner of the EEU. In this sense, considering the enormous amount of effort Kazakhstan has put in the integration project, its scientific and economic potential, a rational move would be to give additional authority to Astana within the structure of the Union. Formal leadership might be an advantage, but not a necessity for Russia to be a valuable regional players in Eurasia without bearing additional risks and setting high expectations.
Risks on international level
“A man who wants to lead the orchestra must turn his back on the crowd.”
— Max Lucado
From the perspective of international relations it is of a great interest to explore the foreign reactions to Russia’s role in the development of the EEU. Disregarding the direction the block heads, the rationale behind its existence, the means and the aims it has set, undouble, from a Western perspective the EEU is often seen as a structure set for geo-political purposes. Voting procedures, policy-making, aspirations, internal organization of the Union are being scrutinized as Russian ambitions recreating a platform for dissemination of influence. Meanwhile, Russian relations with Western political and economic partners are shadowed by popular anti-Russian attitude projecting any integration project the RF initiates as an attempt to restore a modern version of the USSR. In order to be a fruitful and efficient core of the Eurasian integration, Russia has to consider the risk of accommodating partnerships supplementing relations with the EU and the USA and their economic benefits. It is essential to mention the huge difference between the Russian exports in key areas such as energy, where the CIS share of the market accounts for almost 1/10 of the non-CIS share. [4] In light of thoughts, a hypothesis suggesting that Moscow conducting its politics with current EEU members in bilateral manner and diminishing its role as a center for Eurasian integration process would be favorable for sustaining profitable economic contacts with partners such as the EU, is valid. Despite European criticism condemns the genuine efficiency of the EEU and promotes that EEU expansion is not a threat, it would be naïve to believe that while Moscow is the core of the EEU, it can fully engage its capabilities in the most profitable for its national interests endeavors.
***
“The key to successful leadership today is influence, not authority.”
— Kenneth Blanchard
Based on the observation above, it is to be concluded that Russia is accepting a great risk investing in the Eurasian integration process. The risk reflects not only on Moscow itself, but might be pivotal for the future of the region. Long time ago it has been said that the keys to Eurasian integration are in Kremlin,[5] nevertheless, an alternative where Russia officially rejects leadership in the Union would surprise the international community. Such act would not only prevent the discussed risks to take place, but enable Moscow to maneuver perusing its interests but not loyalties, while sustaining its valuable relations in a bilateral format, where western condemns and fears would be immaterial. The Russian Federation is authoritative enough to put forward its interests without the EEU platform. Furthermore, it cooperates with EEU members in other regional and sectorial organizations serving as basis for negotiations, however, without the burdens EEU presents.
Nonetheless, leadership in EEU is the approach currently favored by Moscow. Despite all the obstacles and sacrifices it may bring down the road, it certainly confirms the role of Russia not only as a regional leader but as a great power 21st century.
