Stabilization of the region of North Caucasus is absolutely crucial for Moscow

Here is my first interview, answered by Professor Irina Busygina. She is a Professor at the State Institute for International Relations, MGIMO, and she also teaches a class about ‘Center-Periphery Relations in Russia’ at the Higher School of Economics. Both Institutes are in Moscow.

Why is stabilization in the North Caucasus important?

The situation in the North Caucasus can be generally described as the failure of the federal centre policy. Already at the beginning of the 90's, some serious mistakes have been made. So, in 1994, during the first Chechen war, which lasted until 1996, the decision to send troops to Chechnya was determined by a decree of the president of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, this decision did not meet all the constitutional provisions, which was the basis for the State Duma to question the legitimacy of the presidential decree. With the intrusion of the federal troops, the power of General Dudayev (then President of Chechnya) was legitimated in the minds of the Chechen people.

 

Military overcoming separatism in Chechnya was extremely ineffective due to such important factors as serious unavailability of the army for combat; the will of political leadership to achieve victory at any cost, leading to excessive loss of personnel; not taking into account the experience of other operations of the same kind (in particular, in Yugoslavia); and the lack of understanding of the specifics of today's wars and conflicts.

 

The military actions of the federal troops themselves appeared as highly inefficient (e.g. the storming of Grozny). For example, marines from the Pacific Fleet have been deployed in the military operations – and that, far away from the seashore (!) Peaceful civil people have been involved in the conflict, and they form the group with the highest number of casualties. The political objectives set by the leaders of the country have not been realized.

 

In 1999, after a raid of Chechen fighters into Dagestan, the second federal campaign began, which ended with the actual occupation of the federal forces in Chechnya, but the conflict has not been resolved. Today in Chechnya - and in all the regions of North Caucasus - there are massive cases of human rights violations, kidnappings, and repressive actions committed by the federal security agencies.

 

Thus the stabilization of the region of North Caucasus is absolutely crucial for Moscow, as since the destabilization of the region appear as a real evidence that Russia is in fact losing the control of the situation in the Caucasus. This in turn proves the incapacity of the Russian state.

What is the role of foreign states or actors in the instability?

I am not aware of any reliable data, relating to the fact that any foreign state pursues deliberately a policy of destabilization in the NC. This also applies to Georgia, which Russian media have repeatedly accused of doing such a thing. For what concerns destabilization one can only mention non-state actors (such as Islamic radical groups).

What is the role of the Russian government in the instability?

The Russian government does not contribute to the destabilization - the problem is that it does not contribute in the long-term stabilization. There is why the problems are not solved but accumulate.

Are the different policies implemented by Russia and the international community for stability efficient?

Russia's policy can be described as "financial transfers in exchange of a political loyalty." According to results of an official audit, the budgets of the republics of the North Caucasus depends almost entirely on the transfers from Moscow, so, for the past 10 years, Moscow "chucked out" to these regions around 800 billions of roubles. In 2010, the share of federal transfers to the national budget was about 90% in Ingushetia and Chechnya, 75% in Dagestan, and more than 60% in Kabardino-Balkaria. However, this huge redistribution has not led to any significant positive socio-economic dynamics, but on the contrary to a loss of incentive for an independent (endogenous) development. Obviously, it is hard to maintain a flow of this kind – which is extremely expensive for the federal centre - but it is important to understand that any attempt to change the existing situation will bring a brand new redistribution of the profits - political and economic - from one group to another. Therefore, it is highly probable that those political groups which benefit from the current situation will block any meaningful changes.

 

It means that today's stability is based on the preservation of the actual status quo. This one is preserved artificially. As soon as the situation will change (as soon as the centre will not be able to transfer that much anymore) the structure will collapse.

 

As for the international community - it plays a marginal role. I mean, first of all, the Council of Europe. The possibility of the exclusion of Russia from the organization because of its actions in Chechnya was mentioned - but Russia has not been ruled out. Then the question arises: which duties have to be fulfilled to deserve a membership in this organization?

What should be done?

It is not possible to rebuild the relations "Moscow - North Caucasus”, because of the very nature of the Russian state. So the problem is in the central state itself. A new and effective model of relations with the region can develop only if a modernization of the central state is undertaken. However it should be understood that, as soon as the process of modernisation starts, in the short and medium term the situation in the NC will worsen, since the model of actual "artificial stabilization" will be destroyed. However, there is no other way to go through.