Strategic Offensive Arms in Non-Nuclear Configuration: Another Irritant for Russia–U.S.Relations

Does the development of Conventional Prompt Global Strike means the beginning of a new round of arms race between the U.S. and Russia?
Alexander Saveliev, IMEMO: I don’t see any reason for serious concerns about the strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration.
James Acton, Canegie Foundation: A U.S.-Russian arms race in strategic conventional weapons is an unfortunate possibility—but it is not an inevitability.

Does the development of Conventional Prompt Global Strike means the beginning of a new round of arms race between the U.S. and Russia?

Alexander Saveliev, IMEMO RAN, Russia: I don’t see any reason for serious concerns about the strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration.

James Acton, Garnegie Foundation, USA: A U.S.-Russian arms race in strategic conventional weapons is an unfortunate possibility—but it is not an inevitability.

Alexander Saveliev

Alexander Saveliev: I don’t see any reason for serious concerns about the strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration

A.G. Saveliev, Dr. of Political Science, Head of the Department of Strategic Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The issue of strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration has been increasingly proliferating as a topic of discussions and all kinds of assessments among the Russian expert community. Russian officials have also weighed in on the subject. Naturally, the key matter is the assessment of this programme’s impact on Russia’s security, and what steeps need to be taken to respond to yet another ‘challenge’ posed by the United States. Unfortunately, emotions often trump facts in such assessments. A case in point is the stormy Soviet reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative, where ‘daring designs’ of American scientists, politicians and the military to create an ‘impenetrable’ missile defence shield proved to be yet another myth. However, the ‘Star Wars’ programme severely damaged U.S.–USSR relations, sharply increasing suspicions when assessing declared and ‘real plans for large-scale military programmes.

Admittedly, the strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration programme and the Conventional Prompt Global Strike concept it underlies are no match for the SDI, neither on scale nor in terms of potential consequences.Yet it has been generating the same fears and suspicions from the Russian side. Some even believe that the American programme is ‘forcing’ Russia to move in the same direction, that is, to develop the same types of weapons that the United States does. Only the United States is developing this programme to target China, countries that disseminate WMDs and terrorist groups.Who are the Russians going to target? Do they have a concept for using such weapons? What contribution are WMDs supposed to make to strengthen the country’s security? Do Russian technologies enable warheads to hit targets with several metres’ precision from thousands of kilometres away? The list of questions goes on and on, and, in my view, any decisions on this matter could be only made once satisfactory answers have been received.

As to Russia’s strategic relations with the United States, they are defined and regulated, among other things, by existing international agreements and the established practice of such relations. And as long as the United States remains within those agreements without attempting to circumvent them in any way, I don’t see any reason for serious concerns about the strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration.

James Acton

James Acton: A U.S.-Russian arms race in strategic conventional weapons is an unfortunate possibility—but it is not an inevitability

James M. Acton, a senior associate at the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

A U.S.-Russian arms race in strategic conventional weapons is an unfortunate possibility—but it is not an inevitability. The U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike program is in the research and development phase. No procurement decisions have yet been taken and, if the U.S. does ultimately move forward, deployments are unlikely before the mid-2020s. Similarly, Russia also appears to be some years away from being able to field long-range, hypersonic conventional weapons.

Moreover, even if both states do deploy such weapons, cooperation could stabilize any competition. One possibility would be to make all long-range, hypersonic conventional weapons (including non-ballistic systems) accountable in a future arms control treaty. Unfortunately, given that the arms control process is stalled, Russia and the United States should focus on other forms of confidence building for the time being. To this end, reciprocal declarations of acquisition plans, data exchanges, inspections and launch notifications could all help build mutual security.

The United States is not considering acquiring Conventional Prompt Global Strike weapons for use against Russia. In the final analysis, therefore, I remain hopeful that such weapons can be managed to avoid a costly and potentially dangerous arms race.