Demography as a Facilitator of a Rapprochement in Russia-Georgian Relations

This article offers an analysis of the importance of demography as a major influence on the development of ties between Russia and Georgia, a factor which effectively facilitated neighborly and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries more than two centuries ago. Today, demographic factors, including migration, may help improve the bilateral dialogue, despite political and territorial differences (among them over Abkhazia and South Ossetia) that have severely aggravated ties over the past 20 years.

This article offers an analysis of the importance of demography as a major influence on the development of ties between Russia and Georgia, a factor which effectively facilitated neighborly and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries more than two centuries ago. Today, demographic factors, including migration, may help improve the bilateral dialogue, despite political and territorial differences (among them over Abkhazia and South Ossetia) that have severely aggravated ties over the past 20 years.

An in-depth study of relations between many countries, Russia and Georgia included, lends support to the notion that the importance of demography is often underestimated, as prominent Russian scientist Dmitry Mendeleyev in the early 20th century insightfully noted in his writings: "Forgetting the primacy of population issues is a major mistake in thinking that generates numerous errors of global importance." [1]

Before taking into consideration the current situation, we should first take a look at history and analyze how demography and migration have advanced Russian-Georgian relations in years prior, since he who knows the past has a better command of the present.

Long-term processes of migration between Russia and its near abroad can be divided into three periods.

The 18th – Early 20th Centuries: the Demographic Factor on the Rise

This initial period is known for migratory processes that centered on Russia and promoted both the formation of the Russian Empire and the development of Central Asia, Transcaucasia and other new constituent territories. For example, migration halted the drastic reduction of the Georgian population which had been underway since the 13th century. Population growth began in earnest only after its accession to Russia in 1801-1864, among other reasons due to the sizeable migratory influx from Russia; this development helped ensure both the restoration of Georgia's statehood and the preservation of its people.

In 1897, the Georgian population numbered almost 1.9 million, in contrast to roughly 785,000 in late 18th century. By 1913, it had reached 2.6 million. At that, at least 20 percent of this increase should be ascribed to settlement from Russia, both Russians and members of other nationalities. By 1917, the number of Russians in Georgia was already more than 189,000 or 7.5 percent of the entire population [2]. Hence, incorporation into the Russian Empire brought Georgia a substantial increase in population, i.e. 80 percent of the overall growth or more than 1.8 million people. This rise had heretofore been unprecedented, with migration playing a key role in this growth.

Between 1897 and 1917, the number of Russian immigrants to Transcaucasia grew from 243,000 to 442,000, in the end totaling more than 18 percent of the region's population [3]. Notably, these settlers formed the industrial core of the Transcaucasian republics. The accession of these states to Russia and subsequent Russian immigration also preserved and bolstered Christian Orthodox fundamentals in Georgia and Armenia. And it was this communality in faith that has prevented deeper antagonism between Russians and Georgians during the current deterioration in bilateral relations.

As a matter of fact, Russia was much more powerful and more populated than these other countries and territories, with their populaces considerably smaller than that of Russia. According to the 1897 census, the entire Transcaucasia region numbered 4.5 million people, while 124.6 million people lived in the Russian Empire and approximately 67.5 million in Russia proper [4].

The Soviet Period: the Turning Point

Liliya Karachurina:
Migration in Post-Soviet Countries

Net migration reversed in the 1960s, with Georgia leading the way and Azerbaijan following suit in mid-1960s. This occurred primarily due to the outflow of Russians who had been gradually ousted from regional governments, the service industry, scientific institutions and other sectors by the locals trained both at home and in top Russian universities.

In the 1960s, aggravated interethnic relations were not the key factor behind this Russian exodus. Instead the out-migration was caused by an excess of labor, open unemployment in the cities, and latent unemployment in rural areas due to accelerating population growth, especially in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. However, it was this period when the interethnic factor first surfaced on account of permissiveness by the central government and erroneous federal nationalities policies (see Table 1 in the Appendix).

Between 1976 and 1991, the migration flows around Russia, including those involving Georgia, become of critical importance (see Table 3 in the Appendix). Russia's migration balance turned positive vis-à-vis all former union republics (except for Belarus) where Russians had been previously emigrating [5].

With regards to the outflow of Russian speakers from former Soviet republics, it seems worth mentioning that as of late native residents also began leaving their homes, as evidenced from the period between the censuses of 1979 and 1989. Transcaucasia became a key source of those emigrating to Russia, with the number of Georgians in Russia increasing by 46 percent (and by 10.3 percent in Georgia) [6].

Today: a Worsening Situation

Over the past 20 years, the demographic situation in Russia and Georgia has drastically deteriorated, with both countries effectively undergoing severe demographic crises that have brought about negative structural changes. In comparison with 1989, the population in Russia has dropped by over six million, i.e. by about four percent, while in Georgia it has fallen by one million, a heavy 20-percent plunge for a small country [7]. Despite signs of improvement over the past five years (see Table 1), the overall demographic situation remains unhealthy. The aggregate birth rate in both countries is under the population replacement figures (2.1 children per one woman of reproductive age), suggesting a dire demographic future [8].

Table 1 shows that in the 2000s, there was some improvement in the infant mortality rate and life expectancy figures, although these figures are still much worse than those from industrialized countries, e.g. in Russia, make life expectancy is 12-16 years less than in Japan, Norway or Switzerland [9].

Structural Changes

In reality, structural changes are shaped by demographic waves, whose magnitude may visibly worsen the birth rate and change the population’s age structure, bringing about the faster ageing of the population and a contraction in its employable segment. For several years running, the total Russian employable population has been decreasing by almost one million people per year, a major reason behind workers opting to emigrate from other countries, among them Georgia [10].

Finally, the demographic crisis has been characterized by qualitatively negative changes in the populations of Russia and Georgia, i.e. overall degradation due to smoking, primarily among youths, alcoholism, including beer consumption among children, and drug addiction, all of which are leading to societal aggression and psychosis, the consequences of which have yet to be analyzed.

tori-tolkacheva.deviantart.com
Anatoly Vishnevsky:
The New Role of Migration in Russia’s
Demographic Development

Most detrimental for overall demography is the basic deterioration of reproductive health, including worsening attitudes to childbirth and upbringing, as well as emergence of people deprived of their maternal and paternal instincts. To a great extent, the cause seems to lie in the westernization of the modus vivendi and spread of the childless attitudes that surfaced in Russia in 2006. Such discussions promoted the rejection of childbirth and a certain individual childless liberty; similarly, the increasing number of same-sex marriages permitted by law in 15 European countries has had a tangible effect.

Moreover, these changes are already having an effect on human biology, as discovered by Academician Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, who has noted the growth of "a genetically distorted disintegrated species as dangerous for mankind as the degradation and demise of the environment." [11] In other words, we are witnessing twin crises of societal demographics and the family.

Childless: a New Philosophy for the 21st Century

A demographic crisis emerged in Germany in late 1960s and early 1970s and later conquered other industrialized countries, giving rise to the concept of a second demographic transition (Dirk van de Kaa). This idea denotes the replacement of the bourgeois family by an individualistic family with reproductive approaches altered to radical reduce the number of children. Especially worrying appears to be the growth in the number of families that are voluntarily rejecting childbirth. According to Dr. Reiner Klingholz, Director of Berlin Institute for Population and Development, in 2012, the share of such families in Germany was about 15 percent. The number of such families in other industrialized countries is harder to determine due to the absence of relevant surveys, but experts believe that it is at about the same level [12].

According to the Russian Federal Statistics Service, "48 percent of the 42 million Russian families are childless, with only five million of those due to medical reasons [13]. These figures appear shocking, but, first, representative data on Russian voluntarily childless families are not available, and, secondly, that 48 percent of Russian families may give birth to children in future. At the same time, the data cannot but worry both the government and the society, compelling them to consider if it is proper to forgo childbirth for the sake of their own wishes and needs. In addition, the time has come to discuss the negative way of life overpowering youths and impeding positive demographic developments for society and the government. This event is especially hazardous for poorly populated countries. These are dangers President Putin addressed in his latest address to the Federal Assembly, when he insisted on stepping up measures to overcome the demographic crisis and for the first time used the term in his language [14].

President Putin is absolutely right, especially in view of numerous forecasts of Russian and Georgian population dynamics, of which we have selected the latest UN survey in Table 2 to present the two most dangerous scenarios that could become a reality if the fundamental role of demography is neglected.

Migration in Russia and Georgia Today

In the period of 1992-2012, migration into Russia reached 6.9 million (eight million according to amended 2010 census data) [15] and helped reduce natural population decline by more than by half (see Table 3 in the Appendix).

The situation in Georgia is exactly the opposite, with contracting levels of natural reproduction aggravated by migration outflows that considerably exceed inflow. As a result, the countrywide population decline is much greater than in Russia (see Table 1).

wikipedia.org
Nana Gegelashvilii:
Russian-Georgian Relations – Continued
Stagnation or Positive Progress?

The evolution of migration between Russia and Georgia since 1992 has been quite unique due to dramatic political shifts and the emergence of the near abroad (or the new abroad). These events have transformed the external and later migration between the republics into an international process requiring fundamentally different migration policies. Between 1992 and 2012, the migration balance has been in Russia's favor by 408,700, though much less than vis-à-vis neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan (see Table 3 in the Appendix) [16].

Of special importance is the 2004-2013 presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili. As shown in the Table 3 in the Appendix, between 2008 and 2012, migration from Georgia into Russia intensified, with the balance between the countries rising from 25,000 in 2004-2007 to 38,000 today. Migration is an unequivocally positive phenomenon that has been a locomotive of progress and development globally and in the Russia-Georgia relationship. It has enriched the two countries in the fields of culture, economy, science, and education among others. At the same time, various harmful consequences may follow as a result of a misunderstanding of its importance essence and subsequent mismanagement of the process. This latter development may occur because of political ambitions and the incorrect attitudes of the countries’ leaders. But in the future, migration, primarily reverse migration, may critically help improve relations between Russian and Georgia.

National diasporas in the territories of the two states, formed by centuries of migratory flows and reproduction within these communities, will help facilitation this rapprochement. As shown in Table 3, the number of Russians in Georgia and Georgians in Russia are unfortunately decreasing in number, most vividly during the 2002-2010 inter-census period, when many more Azerbaijanis, Armenians and other former Soviet citizens moved to Russia. The latter’s movement exceeded one million, to a great extent through migration. Notably, the fall in Russia-Georgia population exchanges is still underway. According to journalist Ia Barateli (Echo of Moscow radio station, March 27, 2013), the number of Russians in Georgia is well under 30,000 [17].

Finally, we must underline once more that the demographic factor and its migratory component may become keys for improving the Russia-Georgia relationship, bearing in mind that migration is good for economy. Georgians settling in Russia remit substantial sums of money home; in 2011, the amount of remittances totaled USD 530 million [18]. Hence, our analysis naturally gives way to several conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions:

1. Historically, the voluntary accession of Georgia to the Russian Empire has contributed to preservation of the Georgian state and, consequently, to substantial growth in the Georgian population. This has helped provide the basis for neighborly relations between the two countries.
2. Migration markedly assisted the improvement of the bilateral dialogue, although in the initial period, this process was exclusively oriented towards Georgia, furthering its economic advancement and the formation of the Russian diaspora.
3. Growth in the size of the Georgian diaspora in Russia gained momentum in the 1970s. Under certain conditions, the formation and development of diasporas may play a key role in improving relations between the two countries.
4. The current demographic situation, deplorable both in Russia and in Georgia, is hampering the rapprochement, for at least two reasons. First, the qualitative degradation of these populations might cause the emergence of numerous disintegrated groups that facilitate the growth of nationalism, xenophobia, aggression, etc. Second, the "no people, no problems" approach is looming, as the absence of diasporas is reducing the need for developing better relations. As such, extinction will take a long time to occur in countries with large populations like China, Germany, Russia, etc., but might only required 50-100 years in scarcely populated countries. According to numerous forecasts, this process is already underway.

Recommendations:

1. The demographic factor and its migratory component hold significant influence on modern societies. Neglecting this immutable fact will lead to a host of global errors and misguided policies, including those aggravating relations between countries and peoples.
2. Migration is beginning to play a special role in many areas, including international relations. The time has come to accept its complexity and diversity in order to develop a strategically balanced migration policy that remains mostly unfit to match these requirements both in Russia and Georgia.

Bibliography:

Danilov-Danilyan V.I. Sustainable Development: a 20-Year-Long Debate // See monograph: Economic Efficiency of Russia's Development. Edited by Professor R.V. Papenov. Moscow, 2007.

V.A. Iontsev. The Current Demographic Crisis in View of the Fourth Demographic Transition / The Horizons of Russia's Demographic Development: the Changed Paradigms of scientific Prevision. Collection of Papers presented at the 4th Urals International Demographic Forum. Yekaterinburg, Institute of Economics at the Urals Department of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013

Iontsev V.A., Lebedeva N.M., Nazarov M.V., Okorokov A.V. Emigration and Repatriation in Russia. Moscow: The Trusteeship for Russian Repatriates, 2001, P. 336

Migration Processes in Russia. Edited by V.V.Lokosov and L.L.Rybakovsky. Moscow: Econ-Inform Publishers, 2014

Vladimir Iontsev, Yulia Prokhorova. On the Issue of International Migration and Nuptiality within the Concept of the Fourth Demographic Transition. Scientific Series: International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World. Volume 27. Moscow, 2013.

Appendix

1. Mendeleyev D.I. The Cherished Thoughts. Moscow: Mysl Publishers, 1995.

2. Iontsev V.A., Lebedeva N.M., Nazarov M.V., Okorokov A.V. Emigration and Repatriation in Russia. Moscow: The Trusteeship for Russian Repatriates, 2001, P. 336.

3. Ibid.

4. Population of Russia during 100 Years (1897-1997). Moscow: 1998, P.32.

5. Migration Processes in Russia. Edited by V.V.Lokosov and L.L.Rybakovsky. Moscow: Econ-Inform Publishers, 2014, P. 98.

6. Ibid., P.100.

7. Author calculations using data from Table 1.

8. See Table 1.

9. The Population of the World (2013). Population & Societies. INDE: Pairs, №503, 2013.

10. Data of Federal Statistics Service, also from Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2013. Rosstat Statistics. Moscow, 2013. P.46.

11. Danilov-Danilyan V.I. Sustainable Development: a 20-Year-Long Debate // See monograph: Economic Efficiency of Russia's Development. Edited by Professor R.V. Papenov. Moscow, 2007. P. 475.

12. V. Iontsev, Y. Prokhorovka. On the Issue of International Migration and Nuptiality in the Concept of the Fourth Demographic Transition. //The Effects of Migration on Areas of Destination. International Migration of Population. Russia and Contemporary World. Moscow: Maskers Publishers, 2013. P.8

13. Ibid, P.9

14. Address of the Russian Federation President to the Federal Assembly, December 12, 2013 http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19825

15. Data of the Federal Statistics Service, inter alia the Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2013. Statistical Collection. Moscow, 2013. P. 22.

16. Calculations made by the author using the data from the Collection of the Federal Statistics Service. Population and Migration in the Russian Federation in 1993-2013.

17. Russians in Georgia, radio station Echo of Moscow. March 27, 2013 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1039658-echo/

18. Tukhashvili M.V. Permanent and Labor Migration of Population in Post-Soviet Georgia // Scientific Series. International Migration of Population: Russia and the World Today. Issue 25. Editor-in-Chief V.A. Iontsev. Moscow. 2011. P. 126.