... First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow.
On July 7, 2020, Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General, held an online meeting with Jacob Livne, Chargé d'Affaires of Israel in the Russian Federation, and Yosef Zilberman, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow.
The discussion focused on the state and prospects for resolving conflicts in Syria and Libya, as well as Russia's role in the Middle East and North Africa. Andrey Kortunov informed Israeli diplomats about RIAC research activity on the Middle East project. The meeting also addressed the possibilities of expanding cooperation between ...
... international conflicts resolution.
The event was attended by several experts and students who got the opportunity to hear about the former experiences of the Dutch diplomat in the sphere of conflict management on behalf of NATO, as UN Envoy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and as mediator in Ukraine.
The event was the occasion for an extensive discussion on the evolution of the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution, from its origins until the current crisis of confidence it experiences.
Robert ...
... stronger caliphate relying on social media networks to recruit members and launch attacks. Jordanian Israeli bilateral relations will be tense because of Israel’s intransigence concerning the Palestinian issue, East Jerusalem and the expectation that the Israeli government would annex the Jordan Valley, exerting more pressure on the Palestinians in this region to move to Jordan, causing huge burdens on the Jordanian regime.
Syria will see national reconciliation due to internal and external dynamics paving the way for this end. Yet, Syria will not return to its pre-2011 state, as the Syrian regime will think twice before planning and acting to serve the people, businesses,...
... live together in the region. And this is mostly Russia’s point. However, when it is related to Syria, we see that there are a number of cases in which Russia has tried to make Iranians or Iranian-connected groups back away from the border between Israel and Syria. So this the approach that Russia will take in the future.
Timur Makhmutov, Ruslan Mamedov:
Russia and the Arab Mashreq: The Post-Conflict Period in Syria
Does Russia regard President Bashar al-Assad as dispensable?
Well, first of all, Russia’s ...
... “free hands”, seeks understanding of its motives on the part of the international community, and makes Damascus understand that close contact with Iranian strongholds should be avoided.
After the Syrian forces were moved to the southern Syria to the Israeli-Syrian demarcation line in the Golan Heights area (in July 2018), a local point of tension occurred that can be compared to the one in the northwest in Idlib or in the east - in the areas where the US military contingent is located. Russia, the USA, and ...
... without air force against France before that. The Algerians kicked France out—they also had no air force. So yes, even without air power, such a strategy, as I describe here, could actually be winning for Hamas and Iran against Israel in southern Syria.
What could Israel do to counter this?
Andrey Kortunov, Malcolm Chalmers:
Upholding Stability in the Middle East: An Opportunity for Russia–Europe Cooperation?
Israel could then try 2–3 things, which they tried in southern Lebanon, but which eventually never ...
... invaded by Saudi Arabia. Jordan’s king ruling over a 2/3 Palestinian population needs Saudi money and is pressed by Saudi power. Palestinians also need Saudi money. Saudi Arabia projects power through Sunni groups into western Iraq and into eastern Syria and Idlib. Israel and Saudi Arabia work together. Also vectors of power are strong from Iran with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and potentially Bahrain and Qatar. And vectors of power a very strong from Turkey into northern Syria and northern Iraq. The USA works ...
... counted on the major comparative advantage that distinguished Russia from other main out of area powers involved in Middle East crises — it enjoyed good relations with practically all local players — Sunnis and Shias, Iran and Arab states of the Gulf, Israelis and Palestinians, Turks and Kurds, and so on. The Russian regional activism was also inadvertently encouraged by the US Trump Administration that could not decide on its approach to either Syria or to the regional at large. The launch of the Astana process in the very end of 2016, turned out to be a significant political victory for Moscow. Throughout 2017 Russia was consistently trying to capitalize on this initial success by broadening ...
... International Affairs Council as part of the project "Security System in the Middle East". This paper covers the issue of complex relations between Russia and Israel in the Middle East. The author analyzes in detail Russia’s role in the Israel-Syria-Iran triangle.
The degree of Iranian presence in Syria, the impact of the nuclear deal in the context of Israeli-Iranian regional confrontation, the role of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement in Russian-Israeli relations are also discussed in the ...
... of relations between Moscow and Ankara adversely affected both parties. As the U.S. continued to support the YPG in northern Syria, the Turkish leadership’s pragmatism prevailed and resulted in Ankara sending a letter of regret for the incident in 2015.... ... set a course towards mending relations and reducing tensions with its neighbors. Ankara began this process by restoring ties with Israel (the associated talks took several years), and then went on to make better relations with Russia [
35
]. The sheer volume ...
