... rescued, but only if Russia and the United States demonstrate political goodwill. The two countries need to be able to both demonstrate and explain the specifics of their own weapons systems and accept the opponent’s explanations.
The prospects of the New START being prolonged are moot, and the balance may shift either way. In fact, if the INF Treaty is cancelled altogether, there may be fewer obstacles than if both Russia and the United States allegedly violate it. On the other hand, yet another destroyed treaty would evidently result in a reduction in mutual interest and trust in arms control.
Ideally, it would obviously be useful if a new arms control architecture ...
... two-thirds majority. Given the much worse state of relations with Russia today, compared to 2010, there would be broad support within his own party if President Trump were to announce that he would not support renewal of New START without substantial further Russian concessions. If the New START Treaty were also to disappear, the world would be left without any constraints on, or transparency over, nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.
Such developments would, to say the least, not create the most propitious circumstances ...
... that leaders today recognize their responsibility to work together to prevent nuclear catastrophe and provide a foundation for other practical steps to reduce the risk of nuclear use—including resolving the current problems with INF and extending the New START Treaty through 2026.
There remains the challenge of rebuilding trust between the United States, NATO and Russia so that it will again be possible to address major security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic region. This was done throughout the Cold War and must again be done today. This process could begin with a direction by leaders to their respective governments ...
... judgment about Russian non-compliance, but not necessarily Washington’s response. Divergent European and American approaches to the INF crisis would be highly damaging.
Even more troubling would be the likely consequences of the Treaty’s demise.
The New START Agreement, which limits US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, expires in 2021 and the INF crisis increases the risk that it will not be extended or replaced. Collapse of INF would spur the development of new nuclear and strategic conventional weapon systems,...
... the security of its closest allies in Europe, Asia and throughout the world.
It is perfectly clear that the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty will only accelerate the deployment of that type of missile by both the United States and Russia, as well as by a large group of states that have the necessary capabilities. Many of those countries are in high-risk regions where military tensions are already elevated.
Dmitry Stefanovich:
Post-Helsinki Opportunities for New START and the INF Treaty?
I would venture to suggest that, following the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the U.S. Administration will waste no time in making the decision not to prolong the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed ...
... peril: since the early 1970s, strategic arms control has been a foundation of the relationship. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Washington have struggled to define an alternative core for almost three decades—for instance, the New START Treaty, not Russia’s accession to the WTO or the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, was considered the main accomplishment of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy. As the extension of the New START Treaty is also up in the air, removing the centrality ...
... Treaty” in the first place. On the other side of the table, there is President Trump, who is categorically opposed to all the achievements of the previous Administration. We can hope that direct talks helped both leaders to understand the value of New START, but still interpersonal dynamics may play an important role.
Secondly, Russian criticism regarding US compliance does not appear to be extremely significant, but it does illustrate the shortcomings of New START. The main questions are about the irreversibility of “launcher reduction” (i.e. launch tube “sealing”) ...
... use of short- and medium-range missiles. In such a situation, the New START would no longer work, and a new agreement would be next to impossible to sign, with all the consequences this would entail for the international security system.
The INF and New START treaties exert a deterrent effect on the other nuclear powers, even though they are not signatories. The existing agreements between the United States and Russia still indicate a continuing consensus between the two military superpowers, and possibly their readiness to join efforts on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies. In other words, the regulatory capabilities of the two ...
The simulation has shown that a sudden first strike by the United States on Russia would take out up to 86 per cent of Russia’s SNFs in “delivery systems” and 87 per cent in “explosive tonnage”.
The development of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) is becoming an increasingly relevant topic in light of the latest United ...
... jointly to preserve and extend existing agreements and treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and New START Treaty.
These two agreements are crucial to sustaining transparency and predictability. In the absence of these agreements,... ... Statement.
The complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is an obvious area for the United States and Russia to pool their experience and collaborate in reducing global nuclear risks.
These five steps taken by Presidents Trump and ...
