On July 30, 2021, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) co-hosted a webinar titled “Situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Russia’s and China’s approaches”
On July 30, 2021, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) co-hosted a webinar titled “Situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Russia’s and China’s ...
... invited to Moscow for talks regarding the Afghan peace process in
March 2021
. Russia will likely coordinate with its allies in the CSTO and SCO to take a larger role in promoting stability in Afghanistan. Direct unilateral military involvement in Afghanistan by Russia is unlikely due to the legacy of the Soviet-Afghan War but collective support vis-a-vis multilateral forums remains in the realm of possibility. It has also recently been reported that Russia has made a surprising bid for cooperation on Afghanistan ...
... could perceive a Chinese official communication on this subject as a deliberate choice by Beijing to challenge Russian military influence in the post-Soviet space.
Russia’s presence has been limited since the end of the USSR and the end of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), and apart from the Russian language, Moscow is now a secondary economic partner in Central Asia, behind China, so the loss of Russian military influence could be misinterpreted.
China and the Water Crisis in Central Asia
While the international community focuses on the ...
...
Moscow Is Still Central Asia’s Top Security Ally
On the other hand, from now on, the future of Afghanistan should be a matter of concern not for remote overseas powers, but for regional players around this country—such as Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia, India and Central Asia countries. The ability or inability of these players to come to a common denominator on their respective approaches to Afghanistan will become the critical external factor affecting the country's future.
Unfortunately, no consensus about Afghanistan exists between major regional players. Each of them has its own history of relations with the Afghan state and the Afghan ...
On June 10, 2021, Said T. Jawad, Ambassador of Afghanistan to Russia, and Navid Fayz, Trade and Economic Counselor at the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, visited RIAC
On June 10, 2021, Said T. Jawad, Ambassador of Afghanistan to Russia, and Navid Fayz, Trade and Economic Counselor at the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, visited ...
... since it will not be able to become a factor that forms an organised hostility towards Russian interests and values in these countries.
Russia and the Central Asian states jointly touch the southern belt of Eurasia, which includes such states as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Their own scale and demographics make absorption and full integration with Russia and Central Asia impossible. At the same time, there are historically strong and fundamental ties between this region and such Central Asian countries as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Afghanistan itself is a clear dividing line between East and West,...
... progressive disengagement by the United States and NATO has been considered as a substantial loss by the Central Asian countries. By May of this year, according to the Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan, the US should withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. While this event could reshape Russia’s role in the region, the agreement between the Taliban and Washington seems to overlook the potential consequences for the security of Central Asia [
iii
]. Moreover, a widespread fear of Central Asian returnees from the Middle East and the ...
... controlled borders with former Soviet states, has facilitated the transnational smuggling of opium produced in Afghanistan (which accounts for 90 per cent of the world's heroin output). Travelling through the
Northern route
, the drugs are smuggled to Russia through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. While Afghanistan might be the Colombia of Central Asia, the Central Asian drug market presents different characteristics from its well-known Latin American counterpart. It is not organised in mega-cartels with the power of a small state, but in smaller more ...
... he will actually do it. The thing is, if we do not see any real steps made in the intra-Afghan process, then the Americans will find it increasingly difficult to put on a happy face. This is what makes the joint call of the special representatives of Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan for foreign troops in Afghanistan to “withdraw in an orderly and responsible manner to ensure a smooth transition” published on May 18, 2020, particularly relevant. Both the government of Afghanistan and U.S. officials have made it clear that they are ready to open the ...
... and global economic environment.
The re-shaping of the US-Russia Cooperative can be a gateway for the two countries to work together and build trust without compromising their core values. In correlation with the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, a stable Afghanistan serves both Russian and U.S. interests concurrently by countering terrorism and drug trade, as well as boosting regional stability, which in turn would support the pipeline security.
Ruslan Mamedov:
Escape from Responsibility: the U.S. Is Looking for a Way Out of ...
