... stemming from Russia's decreasing reputation as an ostensible 'security guarantor' in Armenia, mostly due to: (1) Russia's arms export to Azerbaijan, which Armenia is in conflict with and (2) Russia's neutrality during the military escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in April 2016. Moreover, the impartiality of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) on the protection of Armenia in case of potential military escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Favourable gestures with preferential relations ...
... to the conflict view Russia as a desired intermediary (that was not the case in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, at least during the early 2000s)
[6]
. Both Baku and Yerevan are interested in developing bilateral relations with Moscow outside the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. Azerbaijan and Russia are brought together by their common border in Dagestan and by a series of threats, such as the spread of radical Islamism. Baku and Moscow also cooperate on a wide range of issues in the Caspian region. Armenia is a member of the ...
... transition within the ruling family may at any moment prove to be wrong. Thereby, the growing instability and unpredictability of Azerbaijan will continue to channel a sizeable portion of Armenia’s budget to military expenditures, which will now be used ... ....am/news/armenia/eabr-v-armenii-zafiksirovano-rezkoe-padenie-vospriyatiya-rossii-kak-druzhestvennoy-strany/
4
.
http://www.panorama.am/en/news/2016/06/27/Washington-Nagorno-Karabakh-Vienna-Saint-Petersburg/1603785
5
.
http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/20352/
... pronouncements, raised the issue of the Russian arms supplies at a meeting with Russia’s PM Dmitry Medvedev.
No matter when exactly the Iskanders arrived to Armenia, the fact that Yerevan has them at all helps maintain a balance between the two sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Recent years saw a lot of talk about how this balance had been tilted as Azerbaijan used oil revenues to build up its military potential. At the same time, Armenia was particularly appalled by the fact that Russia, Armenia’s strategic ally, was also the
biggest
supplier of arms to Azerbaijan. Whereas prior to 2016 Moscow ...
... will be forced to make unfounded concessions so that Azerbaijan could join the EEU. The implication is that Moscow does not intend to force any country into the EEU and to turn it into a “Soviet pioneers” organization. If the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is not settled, Azerbaijan will not be able to become a full-fledged member of the EEU. This is why Moscow insists that the countries move to a compromise discussion via negotiations in bilateral or trilateral format.
Baku and Yerevan often attempt to view Russia’s ...
... represents material progress in Azerbaijan’s wider international political strategy on the Karabakh issue.
And Baku is feeling increasingly confident about its position in the conflict. First, there is a growing international legal recognition of Azerbaijan’s case on Nagorno Karabakh. For example, the European Court of Human Rights passed a judgement last year, confirming that the Republic of Armenia "
exercised effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories
" (rather than the so-called “
NKR
” authorities), which
carries long-term international legal implications
.
etatist.com
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan:
Ahead of the ‘Substantial’ ...
... now, the one and most important milestone (no, it’s not the Formula One) in the peace process is perhaps June 16, which marks the 12-month deadline envisaged by the European Court of Human Rights in Chiragov and Others v Armenia and Sargsyan v Azerbaijan cases in Grand Chamber. To refresh, these are two cases before the Grand Chamber
dealing with the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, among important legal aspects (there is a lot of rhetoric of what actually these cases are about!), raising the question of Armenian and Azerbaijani
refugee rights and just compensation
. The Strasbourg Court invited the ...
... an interview with Bloomberg agency that
he sees no point in negotiations
, unless the provocations on the contact line stop. At about the same time
a draft law was submitted
to the National Assembly of Armenia on recognizing the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
In the event of a fresh escalation Armenia would be ready to officially recognize the independence of the NKR.
Although the draft law was not, after all, put on the agenda, the message to Azerbaijan and the international community was clear: in the event of a fresh escalation Armenia would be ready to officially recognize the independence of the NKR. Nor was there a shortage of tough statements on the part of Azerbaijan. The day before ...
... external and internal diplomatic and military-political factors that have not yet encouraged optimism.
1
. With Russia acting as a mediator, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the respective defense ministers of the three warring parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and confirmed by subsequent agreements in 1994-1995. See more:
http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/docs.htm
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh are far from over, and that places Russia in a very uncomfortable situation: trying to maintain friendly relations with two strategic allies while getting them both to the negotiating table.
By Pavel Koshkin
The frozen conflict in ...
