... opaque exports, the possibility of proliferation is too strong to ignore.
The ideal solution to this risk would be total unilateral denuclearisation. The North itself has appeared to
put this option on the table
by passing it on to the United States via South Korean National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong. But the sincerity of this proposal is doubtful, not least because no such possibility has been aired in North Korea’s state media. Of the eight non-Soviet states which have ever possessed independent nuclear weapons, only one (South Africa) has ever voluntarily relinquished them. It is unlikely that, having suffered so much yet progressed so significantly ...
... influence on the basis of its nuclear weapons and which uses nuclear weapons as a guarantee of its security, has no plans to do this.
Georgy Toloraya:
Korean Conciliation: Will it Last?
The last thing Washington wants is a rapprochement between North and South Korea, as this would hamper its immediate goal of eliminating the nuclear potential of North Korea (as well as the longer term objective of toppling the entire regime). What is more, the reconciliation of North and South Korea could be interpreted as a reduction of the military threat in its own right. In this case, the United States would ...
... massive pressure will be put on Seoul to push the nuclear issue to the centre of the talks, which is patently unacceptable for North Korea. At the very first meeting, North Korea’s representative put a definitive stop to all such approaches by the South Korean side. He stressed that North Korean missiles are aimed not at South Korea, Russia or China (a reminder to the great powers of North Korea’s new status and capabilities), but at the United States, and North Korea hold talks on that subject with the United States. Apparently,...
... Peninsula: while it is described formally as the ABM defense, in the regional context such actions not so much reduce but rather increase tensions. The presence of the ABM tempts North Korea to strike first and to try to evade a retaliation blow. Thus South Korea happened to be involved in the US–North Korean confrontation.
The probability that the North Korean problem would be resolved by force has grown. Through its chief executives, the US leadership clearly voices its position, which “does not exclude” the force-based options. The Trump ...
... military elite, as sustainable peace on the peninsula is unlikely without it. The need to create channels of high-level political interaction is just as obvious. Such channels could be set up in the form of a “crisis management centre” involving North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan and Russia.
Third, the international community is within its rights to demand a guarantee from Pyongyang that North Korea will not pass on its nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to third countries, ...
... of East Asia continues. Should North Korea be destabilised from the inside with the threat of the disintegration of the political regime and nationhood, Beijing would do all it can to prevent Seoul from annexing the North. Chinese troops would be on North Korean soil well before the South Korean-U.S. alliance
could take any steps
. Beijing would most likely have perfectly legal grounds to do so, acting on an invitation from and with the consent of Pyongyang. The North Korean elites would be more likely to choose China's protectorate ...
... many shorter-range rockets, it was decided to deploy THAAD at a considerable distance from demilitarized zone. As a result, according to some articles, the complex may not be able to ensure security of Seoul agglomeration which encompasses up to 50% of South Korean population. Moreover, North Korean military capabilities are too diverse for one THAAD battery to seriously alter the situation.
Complex deployment has resulted in steep deterioration in South Korea’s relations with China, which is not only the most powerful country ...
... war) is very limited. The compact hit-to-kill missile is unsuited for protecting a large territory since it can only intercept a ballistic target within a range of 15–20 kilometres
[2]
. The worsening of relations between the United States and South Korea, on the one hand, and North Korea, on the other, in
early 2016
predictably rekindled interest in deploying American THAAD on Korean territory. Purchasing these complexes is not the best option, because, first of all, the process takes years and, secondly, South Korea is building ...
... they will not be able to travel across the mountains, and they will be not able to climb over the heads of their comrades.
Today, China is North Korea’s most certain ally.
This order is also conditioned by the relative strength of the two sides. South Korea estimates North Korea’s mobilization potential at 600,000 trained reserve troops and 400,000 territorial militiamen (no more than
1,900,000 with Chinese reinforcements
), while the US and South Korea (without their allies) can deploy no fewer than 2,500,...
... current crisis in relations between the ROK and the DPRK.
The sides also explored the issues of using international sanctions to improve the situation on the Peninsula, as well as of cooperation between independent analytical centers of Russia’s and South Korea’s expert communities.
Andrey Kortunov briefed the Korean Ambassador on the current and planned RIAC projects in the sphere of international security.
