... demise of the treaty has a direct bearing on all members of the nuclear club.
And fourth, in this situation Russia and the United States should focus on preparations for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Withdrawal from the INF Treaty and, more importantly, refusal to extend the New START Treaty would create major risks for the global non-proliferation regime, and the next NPT Review Conference may turn out to be the last. This will not benefit Moscow or Washington, and so a common interest in preserving the non-proliferation ...
... United States and Russia, as well as by a large group of states that have the necessary capabilities. Many of those countries are in high-risk regions where military tensions are already elevated.
Dmitry Stefanovich:
Post-Helsinki Opportunities for New START and the INF Treaty?
I would venture to suggest that, following the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the U.S. Administration will waste no time in making the decision not to prolong the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed ...
... out. Not only is it difficult and perhaps even impossible to ratify any national agreement today, especially with regards to nuclear weapons, the ongoing U.S.-Russia confrontation further complicates this process. Under such strained conditions, whether ... ... growing use of artificial intelligence.
Going forward, it is possible that instead of traditional bilateral regimes like INF and New START, future agreements will favor more flexible, multilateral formats like that of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Such a format,...
... parties agree to lower the ceilings further, while simultaneously developing new delivery systems.
Thirdly, simply extending New START will not greatly improve arms control in the long run. Any further reductions must envisage the involvement of other ... ... military-to-military) and begin work on precise, agreed, and approved (!) definitions for terminology and broader concepts related to nuclear weapons policy and strategy: deterrence, strategic stability etc. The latter process may start as a Track II discussion....
... latest United States Nuclear Posture Review and other policy papers, as well as Russia’s announcement regarding the development of new nuclear delivery vehicles. China is also developing its own SNF. To assess the role and place of various types of nuclear weapons in the overall structure of nuclear deterrence, we have developed a simplified model of SNF “interaction” for first, launch-under-attack, and second strikes.
As baseline data for our analysis, we used reviews of the world’s nuclear ...
... presidents may have only a few minutes to assess whether warning of a possible nuclear attack is real, and to decide whether to use nuclear weapons in response. Both the United States and Russia—and Europe—would be much safer if we could agree on steps to ... ... jointly to preserve and extend existing agreements and treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and New START Treaty.
These two agreements are crucial to sustaining transparency and predictability. In the absence of these agreements,...
... into account future military aviation and missilery developments, primarily for the Russian Kh-BD and US LRSO cruise missiles;
Nuclear weapons remain the only guarantee against a major hot war in the current situation of massive international confrontation.... ...
to be surrendered in the course of test launches of new ICBMs. The U.S. has been unofficially voicing its concerns about the New START procedure because Russia has tested and supplemented its arsenal with new systems since the treaty came into effect....
... to the NPT review process appear increasingly unwilling to compromise or to search for a consensus. As the Russian expert on nuclear weapons Andrey Baklitskiy rightfully
notes
, there appears to be a “growing temptation to move the discussion on the ... ... their own agenda, ignoring the position of the dissenting states.”
Andrey Kortunov:
Shaken, Not Stirred: Blending an INF/New Start Detox Cocktail
As a result, the 2015 NPT RevCon showed at a glance the main contradictions of this regime. On the one ...
... Russian-American relations.
"Our priority task is not to allow the Russian-American arms control regime break up completely. The most important task for today is to preserve the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), extend the New START treaty. Of course, this is also cooperation of Russia and the US on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as efforts not to let the nuclear deal with Iran fail and to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula to the extent possible," said Andrei Kortunov.
"I think we must try to extend the existing spheres of cooperation, ...
... in late 1960s – early 1970s. With a stretch of imagination, one might argue that both agreements could have been signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. Either treaty includes no points that would address problems of missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, space-based weapons, cyber warfare, third nuclear countries, nuclear terrorism or prompt global strike capabilities.
Moreover, neither INF, nor New Start prevents the United States from spending USD 1 trillion in the next 30 years on modernizing its nuclear bombs, bombers, missiles and submarines. Russia will also continue its large-scale strategic modernization program, even if the two agreements ...
