Why Turkey did not follow the Arab spring pattern? Interview with Hasan Selim Özertem

Although the protests in Turkish cities seem to have stopped, tensions remain. RIAC discussed the preliminary results of the unrest with Hasan Selim Özertem, researcher of Center for Energy Security Studies at the International Strategic Research Organization.

Mr. Özertem, the world is closely following the anti-government demonstrations in Turkey, which are interpreted differently by various different experts. We would like to get an inside view on the subject. Some experts believe that the demolition of Taksim Gezi Park sparked the massive protests against the Turkish government, but it is common knowledge that the deeper underlying causes and the real reasons are different. In your opinion, what were the real reasons behind this social resentment and led to public protests?

First, this process or social movement emerged because of the urban restructuring process in Taksim. For about a year this project has been underway in the middle of Taksim, to try to redirect traffic over and underground, and to try to renovate urban areas, that includes, in particular, rebuilding barracks, buildings dating back to the Ottoman empire. The municipality decided to implement certain aspects of this urban renewal plan close to Gezi Park, carrying out construction work that requires some trees to be removed from the park. However, people living in nearby neighborhoods were really upset by this. They said that there is limited green space for them to spend time with their families, friends and enjoy life outside, in a natural environment, and at the end of the day these people started to protest to stop this renovation work taking place at Gezi Park, on Taksim Square. Then, when the protests started, the police responded using excessive force. They also really bald statements saying that the reconstruction will continue and it will not be affected by the protests. This created unrest, which spread throughout society as a whole; because people expected the government to listen to them, to stop the construction work and then to reconsider this development project. But instead of doing that, the government continued on its course of coertion. As a result, the protesters became perceived as victims, the demonstrations grew in size and started to attract people who are unhappy with the AK Party government.

According to surveys carried out after the 5th or 6th day of the protests, these people at Gezi Park were mainly Republican People’s Party supporters, some leftist groups, and also AK Party supporters. So it was a heterogeneous group of people who felt that their voices were not heard, especially at the executive level, who went out onto the streets and started to protest alongside the environmentalists. Then the protests spread to Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, i.e. to places with a significant the middle class and where discontent with government’s dominance, the AK Party government’s dominance in politics is strong. Finally, the original core group became a kind of a minority within the protesters, and after 5 or 6 days the protest itself turned into an anti-Erdogan movement.

The problem was that Erdogan was in Africa on an official visit, and before he left there he made his point clear that he will not make any concessions. But when he was away, the President, Deputy Prime Minister, and speaker of the AK Party made statements designed to defuse tensions. But even so, after Erdogan’s return, the public saw that Erdogan had not significantly changed his position. Instead of making concessions, he explained that to the plan was not to build a shopping mall there, but a hotel – as he said first. Later he talked about residential buildings, and even later he said that the plan was to build a city museum on that site. What he said was being built changed – but he made no concessions over the fact that construction work was scheduled to start. However, people were expecting him to say “OK, we will hold a referendum, we will go to the courts and listen to you.” Instead of listening to people to find out what their demands were, what they expected from government, Erdogan started to make big public speeches, sometimes with 5-6 a day, in front of thousands of people. But the language used during this period did not help to defuse tensions.

It was then that the peaceful protest at Gezi Park turned into vandalism. People started to attack police vehicles, civilian vehicles, nearby shops; radical groups took control, which in turn caused a gradual loss of public support and heightened discomfort within society as a whole and in particular within parts of the intelligentsia. People who previously sympathized with the Gezi Park protestors started to feel that there is something wrong in this movement.

Eventually, Erdogan started to change his position: he started a collaborative process. He had meetings with artists, one of which famously lasted about 5 hours, out of which he talked for about 30 minutes, and the rest of time he listened to them. This created the perception in the public mind that Erdogan was trying to understand what was happening, especially compared to the early days of these events, when a Reuters correspondent asked him “Can you understand what these people are trying to tell you?” and Erdogan responded “No, I cannot, can you explain it to me?” But the problem is that the Gezi Park events were not started by a political party or civil society organization. There was no natural leader, representative or official ideology. Erdogan was talking to these artists but none of them represented the protestors out in the streets. So when Erdogan said the courts would be involved in making the final decision, that they will wait for this court decision and if it is in favor of construction work then a referendum may be held, the artists were content, because it satisfied initial demands of the protest. But at the same time, the Gezi Park issue had already become a minor demand within these broader, more diverse protests. Some people were protesting for the airport’s reconstruction, for instance. Some were protesting against the chosen name of the new bridge over the Bosphorus. Some demanded that Erdogan should resign.

Why did they demand Erdogan’s resignation? What made the public upset with him?

Certain amendments were prepared by parliament, which benefit members of parliament i.e. increased salaries and some fringe benefits. They were not perceived as positive by the general public as, although lawmakers’ rights are important, the government should focus on its priorities. Second, some were discontented with new regulatory amendments regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages in Turkey. There are regulations in Europe, North America, and in many other countries, that limit the sales of drinks after a certain hour in the evening, or restrict sales to certain locations, or place restrictions on advertisements. But these amendments were represented as some kind of new government dry law. The PR strategies used were really poor, the government wrong-footed itself throughout the process. But on the whole, I suppose, the main reason behind the public resentment was the  AK Party’s excessive dominance in the political sphere.

The AK Party got 50 percent of votes in the previous parliamentary election and since then has governed with the attitude “I got approval from the whole Turkey and I can do whatever I want.” So, the people out there on the streets protesting are, in part, trying to remind the AK Party and particularly Erdogan’s government that, since they officially represent the whole of Turkish society, they also need to consider the remaining 50 percent of vote when taking particular steps. If we are in a democracy, they argue, we should respect plurality within society, yet some rhetoric used by the government recently made these people feel that their private lives are being redesigned.

The other day, Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arinç raised the possibility that the army could be called in to quell the opposition. Would the use of military force put an end to these massive protests, or would it aggravate the situation?

During these events, especially on Friday, June 14, the police were deployed but when they turned out to be insufficient, when it became clear that the use of force by the police would not convince the protestors to leave Taksim square, they called in the troops. And this, I suppose, reminded Turkey of some unpleasant memories of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 military coup and images of soldiers or armed troops. This also undermines support for the protest, because at first there was sympathy for these environmentalist tendencies, as they were trying to convey democratic messages to Erdogan’s government, but nobody wants to see military rule return to Turkey. That is something everybody wants to be sure is firmly in the past.

Moreover, from what I have seen, there were no official statements made by the office of the Chief of the General Staff. The military chose to watch and only to get involved in this situation when its assistance was needed: this is one of the last decade’s most important achievements. Incidentally, another important message that we should take from these events is that, even though the Istanbul exchange lost something like 10-12 percent in the last 20 days, Turkey died not face an economic crisis. We did not see uncontrollable exchange rates, even though Turkey has floating exchange rates.

It is also important to note that Turkey did not follow the Arab spring pattern, such as during events in Egypt the media was under state control and it was mainly Al Jazeera and CNN that covered the protests. During the first three days of protests in Turkey, we saw that the media was hesitant to show what was happening in the country, but later it was even more explicit than CNN and Al Jazeera. They were suggested constructive approaches, tried to analyze what reasons lay behind the protests and tried to give the government some sort of roadmaps over how to control these events. Also the national, AK Party government, local government, government office in Istanbul, and the mayor of Istanbul were all really active on social media, they reached out to people on the ground: for instance, the governor of Istanbul held a midnight meeting with 150 protestors – to listen to them. Erdogan met with artists, made speeches in Ankara, and Istanbul. Effective media in fact helps bring the tensions down. But if the media is not working properly, then the tensions in society accumulate – in some cases to the point where it causes outbursts or crises. Last, I can say that we understood that elections are important, but we knew we should also be talking about government – not only governing. Elections are the only game in town, but it only happens once every 4 or 5 years, and in between you should also carefully follow the demands, desires and expectations of the general public, to enhance understanding and deliver better government. 

Last but not least, in your opinion, could the Turkish events affect Russian-Turkish relations?

In the near future we will see two elections – presidential and the parliamentary ones. So, particularly from the New Year through September 2014 and later through June 2015 I suppose that domestic issues will dominate Turkey’s political agenda and this may cause a slow-down in the development of Russian-Turkish bilateral relations, however this would only be in political terms. In social terms, the vents will only have a negative impact on tourism, due to security concerns. Although we have yet to see the statistics, we can be sure that, particularly in Istanbul over the last 3 weeks we saw a decrease in tourist bookings. But in economic terms, I do not foresee any significant changes in Turkish industry, which still shows robust production rates. This means that we will still need to buy oil and gas from Russia. And we will closely following the nuclear power plant projects, both the Russian project in Akkuyu and the Japanese one in Sinop. There can be some conjuncture regarding the issues that could cause momentum to slow, such as Syria. Looking at the G8 summit we saw that Russians and Americans hold different positions. And as the debate continues over Syria, where conflict rages unabated, it seems that Syria will be the next most important thing on the agenda. The positions of Turkey and Russia are little bit different from each other – as they are built on different perspectives. But apart from this, I can say that Turkish-Russian relations are strong, and recently they have started to be institutionalized in the form of the High-Level Cooperation Council, Joint Economic Commission, Civic Forum, and the Joint Strategic Planning Group. Russia is holding the G20 presidency this year. Turkey, as a G20 member, wants to share many aspects of its experience, economic progress etc., and I would suppose that other areas for cooperation in Turkish-Russian relations will emerge. So even though there will be some challenges, there will be some advantages ahead.

Thank you for you kind answers.

Interviewee: Liudmila Filippova, RIAC Program manager.

RIAC expresses gratitude to Valeria Khalizova and Skorik Anastasia for the assistance in the preparation of the interview.