New ‘Axis of Resistance’? – Why Russia Avoids Full Identification with the Syrian-Iranian Alliance

Author: Hanna Notte, Doctoral Candidate in International Relations, University of Oxford, Alfa Fellow at the Moscow Carnegie Center and Institute of Oriental Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences)

The ongoing crisis in Turkish-Russian relations, caused by Ankara shooting down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet on November 24, has thrown into relief another international trend connected to the war in Syria: the apparently growing robustness of a Syrian-Iranian-Russian alliance. Speaking to media on Sunday, Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated that "Iran has a duty to reduce tensions between Russia and Turkey".

As is well known, Russia and Iran jointly support the Assad regime in Syria and have coordinated their involvement in the conflict.

REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki

Lebanon's Hezbollah deputy leader Sheikh Naim Qassem speaks as Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem  and Iran's Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ali Jannati listen to him during the International Media Conference Against Terrorism in Damascus, Syria July 24, 2015.

Yet, considering Syria’s and Iran’s joint mission and strategy historically, it remains to be seen how much depth the trilateral alliance can truly be expected to have from the Russian perspective. Russia will pay lip service to an alliance which has the reputation of an “axis of resistance” against Western-led regime change in the region, insofar as that supports its strategic aims in Syria and bolsters Putin's “anti-West" image. But ultimately, its identification with the alliance will lack real depth because Moscow has little interest in supporting Syria’s and Iran’s militant anti-Israel stance. And in terms of strategy, while Russia supports close military cooperation with Syria and Iran at the government-to-government level, it is uncomfortable with both players’ reliance on non-state actors, like Hezbollah. Finally, Russia will be careful to counter any perception it is aligning itself with an explicitly Shiite, anti-Sunni axis in the region, given its own predominantly Sunni Muslim population, as well as economic ties with Sunni powers.

Historically, joint resistance against Iraqi and Israeli offensive military power, as well as growing US influence in the Middle East, has been the glue holding the Syrian-Iranian alliance together. Syria assisted Iran during the Iran-Iraq war with arms deliveries and political support. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Iran could return the favor, helping to fight back Israeli forces and prevent a defection of Lebanon to an Israeli-US orbit of influence, which was anathema to Syria. Syrian-Iranian cooperation again picked up after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. By strengthening the insurgency in Iraq, Damascus and Tehran hoped to keep the US embroiled in protracted conflict and thereby prevent (or at least delay) military pressure turning to them. In short, for much of the past 35 years, Syria and Iran have assisted each other in defending their interests in Iraq and the Levant, in ensuring their regimes’ survival and resisting actors “meddling” in the region.

How comfortable is Russia with this Syrian-Iranian “axis of resistance” project? Certainly, Moscow is all for supporting the sovereignty of Middle Eastern states and jumping on the anti-regime change bandwagon. Joining an alliance that has a historical reputation for its “anti-Westernism” also serves Russia’s current self-positioning as the only country truly interested in the fight against terrorism, in contrast to Western states it accuses of prioritizing Assad’s ouster over defeating IS. Yet, in practical terms, Russia will always want to make sure cooperation with the West – whether in the Middle East or in other areas – remains a possibility. And by the way, Iran’s self-image as an anti-American player has also somewhat crumbled since the signing of an agreement on its nuclear program, which has raised the possibility of Western sanctions removal.

However, it is on Israel that Russia clashes most clearly with the Syrian-Iranian alliance’s proclaimed historic mission. Russian-Israeli relations have become much closer under Putin, lingering frictions over Moscow’s cooperation with Iran and Syria and engagement of Hamas notwithstanding. In past years, the two sides have managed to agree on security issues through reciprocal concessions, with Israel halting military supplies to Georgia after the 2008 war with Russia, and Moscow in turn shelving plans to supply the S-300 air defense system to Iran and Syria.Last year, Israel maintained relative silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine and reportedly pulled out of a deal to supply military hardware to Kiev, whilst Russia muted its criticism of Israel’s military campaign against Hamas in Gaza. Again today, in the context of Russian airstrikes in Syria, Russia and Israel have been careful to coordinate their military activities along the Syrian-Israeli border in order to prevent accidents, reiterating that commitment last week on the sidelines of the Paris Climate Summit. Moscow, whilst pursuing its strategic goals in Syria, wants to avoid the risk of seriously alienating Israel, let alone associate with the militant anti-Israel rhetoric characteristic of the Syrian-Iranian alliance’s discourse.

Turning to strategy, the methods the alliance has used towards achieving its objectives are also not exactly from a Russian textbook.

REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Moualem walk before they start a meeting in Tehran August 5, 2015.

Syria and Iran have relied on a Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, to fight Israeli military power since the 1980s. More recently, Hezbollah has been involved in the Syrian war, where it initially played a covert role enforcing the Lebanese border against Syrian opposition forces, but has since the 2013 battle of Qusair deployed fighters in more significant numbers.   

In support for other non-state actors, Iran and Syria reportedly fuelled the Iraqi insurgency in the aftermath of the US invasion, with Tehran cultivating ties with Shia militias, while Damascus aided and abetted the passage of Arab and Sunni Muslim fighters from Syrian territory into Iraq. And coming back to the Syrian war, apart from enabling Hezbollah, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is said to have stepped up its support to various pro-regime paramilitary groups, most notably the Syrian National Defense Forces (NDF).

Such reliance on non-state actors does not gel neatly with the Russian modus operandi. Since grievances over state collapse in Libya and Iraq feature prominently in the Kremlin’s thinking, it wants to avoid a situation in Syria where non-state actors and regional proxies dominate on the ground. While Syria’s conventional army relies mainly on traditional Soviet and Russian combat doctrines, Iran’s delivery of tactical weapons and dispatch of special brigades to Syria is already leading to operational changes. With regard to the NDF, Russia has called for its incorporation into the Syrian army, while Iran wants to maintain it as an independent force. Throughout the Syrian crisis, Russia has emphasized its opposition to providing military support to any “illegal structures”, instead arguing that only “legitimate government entities” should be assisted.

Finally, though the Syrian-Iranian alliance has arguably endured for so long due to pragmatic Realpolitik, rather than ideological affinity, it is still widely perceived as a Shiite axis pursuing offensive regional goals. And certainly, social media propaganda denouncing Russian airstrikes in Syria is full of allegations that Russia has taken the side of the Shiite crescent. Sunni clerics have accused Russia of pursuing a sectarian war, interfering in intra-Muslim affairs on the Shiite side. However, Moscow has forcefully argued against such claims, presenting its actions over Syria as aimed at restoring intra-Muslim unity and downplaying differences between its own approach and that of its main critic, Saudi Arabia. Aware that a Sunni-enemy image could seriously backfire, given Russia’s own largely Sunni-Muslim population and continued problems with radical Islam, Moscow has taken great pains to explain it is not fighting for a sectarian agenda in Syria.

Having undeniably become attached to the Syrian-Iranian axis via its support for the Assad regime, Russia will avoid full identification with that alliance. Instead, Russia will continue to carefully manage its relationship with Israel, welcome the support of “international partners” for its military campaign in Syria as opposed to putting its stakes on non-state militias, and manage its image on the Arab street as a regional power that has no sectarian ambitions but intends to mend the Shia-Sunni divide in the region.