Print
Rate this article
(no votes)
 (0 votes)
Share this article

Author: Christianna Liountri, BA in International Relations (Panteion University), BA in Law (National Kapodestrian University of Athens), Middle East research analyst at the Eastern Mediterranean Observatory

 

Multinational companies willing to invest in Eastern Mediterranean examine the whole range of risks associated with a potential plan to develop oil and gas facilities. The great strategic and economic importance of these facilities make them attractive targets. Even though a conventional war is not a likelihood, an international company assuming cost-benefit approach, will take into consideration «asymmetric threats» which a potential pipeline or offshore platforms could face.

 

An asymmetric threat is a “threat deriving from unconventional methods and means that attempt to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths whilst exploiting his weaknesses, with potentially disproportionate effects”. In the oil and gas industry there are eight types of asymmetric threats: 1) piracy; 2) terrorism; 3) insurgency; 4) organized crime; 5) civil protest; 6) inter-state hostilities; 7) vandalism; 8) internal sabotage. In Eastern Mediterranean, the immediate risk comes from terrorism embodied by Hezbollah and ISIS. In order to form Greece, Israel, Cyprus and potentially Egypt an appropriate strategy to deal with these groups need to have a good understanding of extremist groupings’ nature, their goals, intentions, off-shore capabilities, opportunities and history.

    

 

Credit: www.nato.int

 

Both ISIS and Hezbollah fall into the category of non-state actors: “organized political actors not directly connected to a state but pursuing aims affecting vital state interests”. “Non state armed groups are inherently political actors with highly refined objectives”. They have their base/headquarters in a certain state, operating both inside the state and beyond its borders. Such groups control territory, engage in diplomacy, build constituencies and play politics. Hezbollah and ISIS are non-state actors who “are able to leverage oil market dynamics and use the targeting of installations as a global public relations tool. Such actions will give them international exposure and make them global players”. Both ISIS and Hezbollah are willing to resort to terrorism as a means to achieve political gains.

    

To begin with, Hezbollah is a Shiite Muslim organization with a dual identity being both a terrorist organization and a Lebanese political party. Its leader is Hassan Nasrallah. It was founded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1982 and it has now become a dominant organization throughout the entire Shi'ite population in Lebanon. In 1992, Hezbollah entered Lebanese politics, electing representatives to the parliament. In 2009 national elections, it won 10 seats (out of 128 in the Lebanese parliament). Currently, the unconditional support it has shown to Assad's regime in Syria has set Hezbollah in a peculiar position regarding its future: its behavior raises questions among Lebanese Shi'ites on whether it is a “national institution” promoting their interests or a transnational Shiite group with a wider agenda. Regarding its military capabilities in the 2006 war it became evident that the group possessed sophisticated anti-ship and anti-armor weaponry. There is an ambiguity regarding the exact number and range of the missiles the group holds. Nevertheless, it is generally estimated that the missiles do not have systems with improved accuracy and/or increased precision. Therefore, they cannot strike against targets such as an offshore platform or a pipeline but they can target refineries or big liquefaction plants.

    

On the other hand, ISIS is a terrorist organization, created by a coalition among officers of the Baathist Iraqi army and radical Islamist groups. It wages a hybrid war that combines military discipline and organization, the capability to combine actions, the hierarchical structure of an organized set. They have also copied the American doctrine against guerrilla groups. There is no point in making any estimation or prediction regarding the ISIS’s potential to perform attacks and the range of its capabilities: ISIS continues to expand territorial control and it is unknown how much of the Syrian armature has come to its possession, when its victorious march will stop and how much territory it will end up controlling.

    

Both Hezbollah and ISIS share a common characteristic: they manage to gain “the hearts and minds” of social outcasts considered second rate citizens by the official state power. And this is why “non-state armed groups cannot be eliminated. They can be contained, their capabilities can be degraded but they continue to evolve: they adjust to new constraints, exploit opportunities, and reinvent themselves to meet new environments”. Consequently, all four countries of the Eastern Mediterranean with a strategic interest in the area need to learn to live with these groups and develop the appropriate tools to deal with the threats they pose.

    

To protect oil and gas facilities the four countries need to have well trained and flexible special forces, up-to-date intelligent units, powerful air forces and navies. The armies and their units must have the capacity to guard and defend the pipeline or the facilities at any given time and against any threat. Eastern Mediterranean is a place where maritime security plays an integral role in political and military calculations which is important in order to achieve energy security. All four countries are called to defend the status quo and their territorial integrity.

    

Greece, as a NATO member state, has a modern army which can be used in the framework of partnership with Israel’s Defense Forces. This can turn out very beneficial for both parties. Ever since Turkey alienated itself from Israel, Greece and Israel have initiated rounds of joined military exercises. The increasing security cooperation improves collective security, adding to deterrence ability.

    

From 2011 onward, a major naval exercise «Noble Dina» takes place once a year with the participation of US. This particular exercise is aiming to increase interoperability among the armies. It includes surface and air defense, anti-submarine and mine-swept channel exercises as well as a stern refueling and underway replenishment. Several joint exercises take place in the area, and the gains are of importance, especially for Israel which can use Greek air space to train air forces in the face of threats deriving from increasingly hostile environment. If jihadist groups dominate in the area, Israel will find itself surrounded by radical groups that ask for its destruction. On another note, in Crete, a Russian made S-300 surface to air missile system is based. It is a highly effective air defense system that the Russian government has sold to Iran. The 1400 km distance between Israel and Crete is equal to the distance that separates Israel from Iran’s Natanza nuclear enrichment facility. With 100 tactical planes and tankers, cooperation between the two nations’ air forces has allowed Israeli pilots to engage in bombing drill and the aerial refueling needed for a distance strike.

    

Of great importance is the upgrade of Cyprus’ military position: Cyprus is not a NATO member state and the pending conflict with Turkey has excluded it from any military alliance. However, in 2014, “the Cypriots were invited to participate in Search and Rescue Exercises (SRE) with the US, Greek and Israeli navies: the US Sixth Fleet along with the navies of Greece, Cyprus and Israel conducted a large- scale multinational Search and Rescue Exercise (NEMESIS 2014). The four navies coordinated to deter maritime threats associated with platform attacks, emerging from both state and non-state actors The exercise scenario also involved repelling terrorist attacks on ships and oil rigs. It is more than obvious that under the «Search and Rescue» title lays a promising engagement.

    

Regarding Egypt, «the emerging alliance with Greece and Cyprus fits Egypt’s interests well. Its relations with Turkey quickly soured last year after al-Sisi toppled President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood», and are at an even lowest point, after Turkey decided to give shelter to Morsi, following the decision of an Egyptian court to sentence him to death. Egypt has a precedent of successful cooperation with Israel in the field of energy, since it has been delivering gas to Israel via the El Arish-Ashkelen pipeline (it met 40% of Israel’s gas needs). The road is open for a renewed and enhanced cooperation between Egypt and Israel: “containing radical Islam is the foundation upon which Cairo and Jerusalem have found common ground” (Egypt is facing its own terrorist threat: the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis group in Sinai). The recently appointed Ambassador of Israel in Greece has expressed her wish to set up a Partnership between Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.

 

Nevertheless, «while al-Sisi appears firmly in control, investors in long-term energy contracts require the kind of guarantees that may be difficult for him to deliver. The political, social and economic transition that Egypt is experiencing will remain a concern for all of its regional partners and has the potential to negatively impact the status quo». In other words, al- Sisi has chosen to deal with the threats against his power with a crackdown: he chose to chase Muslim Brotherhood rather than moving to a political compromise to achieve long-term stability. On the contrary, his actions add up to Egyptian society’s sliding into divisive practices and feelings. Despite the fact that Nasser, Sadaat and Mubarak did exactly the same (imprison Muslim Brotherhood leaders), the social variables have changed: Muslim Brotherhood won elections and gained its place as a formal political power/institution. Religious sentiment claimed its position in the public sphere and the political landscape moved away from the concept of the nation-state, as defined by modernity. In case that al-Sisi does not manage to solve issues concerning the liberalization of the Egyptian economy in order to attract foreign investments and cover population’s basic needs (access to water, food and energy supply), he is facing the danger of another popular unrest.

 

Egypt’s participation in the Eastern Mediterranean partnership is significant because of the qualitative characteristics of its army: numerous and well trained by Americas(since 1979). Egypt would have the political will to protect installations and staff, if the resources were also used to cover its energy needs and if the capital from the mining operations were to enforce its state budget.

    

To conclude, asymmetric threats do present a risk for any upcoming investment but Israel, Greece, Egypt and Cyprus are capable of preserving their interests.

 

Rate this article
(no votes)
 (0 votes)
Share this article
For business
For researchers
For students