Success of a dialogue between Russia and Lithuania in last twenty year should not be overestimated, but the parties definitely attempted to resolve priority tasks after the USSR disintegration, managed to tackle the spheres of mutual interest, despite persistent disputes and conflicts of historical and political origin.
Success of a dialogue between Russia and Lithuania in last twenty year should not be overestimated, but the parties definitely attempted to resolve priority tasks after the USSR disintegration, managed to tackle the spheres of mutual interest, despite persistent disputes and conflicts of historical and political origin.
Twenty years have passed since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and Lithuania (October 9, 1991). During this time Russia largely managed to establish relations with the majority of countries from Western societies who were hostile during the “cold war”. But relations with new neighbors are very much like the ones that used to be during the era of confrontation. As Lithuanian historian C. Laurinavicius once said: “Lithuania today has partner relations with the majority of neighbor countries, not only the nearest one. Unfortunately it’s not attributable to relations with Russia that until recently looked more hostile, than friendly”. The situation is really weird – the state that for many years used to be the part of a common with Russia economic and cultural space has changed its orientation very easily.
More Focus on the West
In an attempt to justify the political choice of the country ten years after it gained independence, first President of Lithuania A. Brazauskas wrote in his memoirs – “Lithuania, freed from the USSR occupation, definitely had thousands of arguments to be politically dissociated from the East and to turn to the West and it was crystal clear for any sober-minded person”[1]. These words, said post factum, should not be understood literally (in 1988 at the Founding Congress of “Saudis” Mr. Brazauskas being at that time the leader of Lithuanian Communist Party called on his fellow citizens to be cautious in view of the possible independence of Lithuania [2]). But during the last years in the USSR and first years of independence the political elite of Lithuania had exactly this view on the country’s place in the world, because Lithuania together with two other Baltic states has always deemed itself as “an organic part of the West, kidnapped by the Soviet Union” [3]. This perception predefined the Euro-Atlantic priorities of its foreign policy, officially proclaimed by Brazauskas on May 17, 1993 in his so called “European speech” [1] that was consistently and rather successfully (at least prior to the global financial and economic crisis) implemented during two decades. By mid 1990-ies EU became the leading economic and political partner of Lithuania and in 1999 the country was invited to negotiate the accession that took place on May 1, 2004 and Lithuania joint NATO the same year.
A difficult dialogue
A principle re-refocusing of Lithuania onto the West posed a serious challenge to Russian-Lithuanian dialogue that in 1990-ies and early 2000-ies was more driven by inertia, than by future perspectives. Lithuania, contrary to Latvia and Estonia managed to avoid the issue of citizenship for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers – by August 1991 the Lithuanians made up 81.5 % of the population and the citizenship was granted to every inhabitant of the country (“zero option”). Nevertheless the disputes continued to arise, and they were settled or at least “frozen” only by mid 2000-ies.
Such disputable and potentially controversial issue was the demarcation of the state border between Russia and Lithuania (Brazauskas in 1990 admitted that “after the war there were no official documents on the annexation of Klaipeda region to Lithuania). As a result, the Russian-Lithuanian border treaty and Treaty on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea signed in October 1997 came into force only in August 2003. The issue of “Kaliningrad transit” is still pending though it was partially resolved by the signing of bilateral intergovernmental agreements for the return travels of citizens (2002) and a simplified regime for railway journeys (2003).
Despite remaining cultural links between the countries (suffices to mention the names of D.Banionis, Yu. Budraitis, R.Adomaitis, R.Tuminas, G. Taranda, I.Dapkunaite etc.) and successful work of the joint Russian-Lithuania commission of historians established in February 2006, the issues of the common historical past since the first days of independence went out from the scientific and historical domain. An exotic pinnacle was reached by the adoption of amendments to the Criminal Code of Lithuanian Republic on June 15 2010 stipulating the criminal persecution for the denial of a so call “Soviet occupation”. Lithuanian politicians and diplomatic more and more often condition the progress of a bilateral dialogue by the acknowledgment of “occupation” by Russia. The results of the poll, conducted on request of Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 2007 are very indicative: 49.4 % of respondents are “sure that the dialogue with Russia should be started with the compensation of a moral damage caused by the USSR occupation”, 43.9% – mean the “material damage” and 47% will be satisfied with the “acknowledgment and apologies”, for 46.8% “material compensation of the damage (payments)” are more important.
Nostalgia for the USSR
Having confronted with the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis that hit Lithuania in 2008, the local society didn’t put into doubt the correctness of a unilateral Euro-Atlantic orientation. The creation of the “Zalgiris” National resistance movement in 2008 “as a reaction to … injustice and abuse of national values and originality” became a milestone event. The actions of this movement that mainly were of philosophical and educational nature clearly demonstrated the disillusionment of Lithuanians with the results of the twenty years independence [4]. At round-table regularly held by the Movement, the Soviet past is frequently commented upon with a favorable nostalgia. For example, one of the founding fathers of this Movement and the signatory of the Independence Act on March 11, 1990, R. Paulauskas once remarked – “It’s not a common knowledge, but just cast a glance into the Soviet Lithuanian Encyclopedia – and you will see surprising figures. It turns out that in the Soviet Union Lithuanians had more cars per 100 citizens, more houses, and more had money in the Savings Bank.
But these changes in Lithuanian public opinion cannot immediately alter the stereotypes of Russia toward Lithuania. While for Russian intellectuals Lithuania remains the “country of Churlenis, Banionis and Sabonis”, the negative image of a “small arrogant country” formed in the 1990-ies became persistent as evidenced by annual polls of “Levada-center” when respondents are asked to name five counties most hostile and unfriendly to Russia. During last six year Lithuania was never out of the list (2-4-th position) while the number of respondents mentioning this country went down (N=1600): 2005 – 42 %, 2006 – 42 %, 2007 – 32 %, 2009. – 35 %, 2010 – 35 %, 2011 – 34 %. Some pragmatism in the foreign policy of Lithuania that appeared when President D. Gribauskaite took office in 2009 didn’t change the image of the county in Russia.
The future of Russian-Lithuanian relations
A certain progress in relations between the two countries is noticeable only in the economic sphere. Russia has always been the key foreign economic partner for Lithuania. In recent years, with the active internationalization of the economy, Russian-Lithuanian relations have been strongly influenced by geopolitical factors, such as key transit East-West flows. Russia has understood the potential benefits (like additional revenues the budget gets from the transit and from the development of transportation and logistical infrastructure and auxiliary business) from the fact that the shortest way from Eastern and Central Asia to Europe goes through its territory.
Lithuania is just beginning to realize that it can be not only the “last stronghold of the West” but “a bridge between the East and the West” or a key link in the chain which is predestined to it by its position in the geographical center of Europe. According to one of the textbooks of General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, the development trends in the transport and infrastructure complex of Eurasia show that due to the central position on the Eurasian continent by 2020 “the transportation system of Lithuania will be incorporated not only into the European, but also into the land-based, naval and airborne transportation systems of the world”. Probably these perspectives will set the foundation for the normalization of Russian-Lithuanian relations.
Success of the dialogue between Russia and Lithuania in last twenty year should not be overestimated, but it is certain that the parties attempted to resolve priority tasks after the USSR disintegration, managed to find common language when it comes to the spheres of mutual interest and to identify sharp differences.
During the whole post-soviet period Russia has remained the most important trading partner for Lithuania and a traditionally reliable market for its agricultural production and food, as well as the main supplier of electricity and energy resources. Russia, in its turn, is interested in favorable conditions for the transit, including “Kaliningrad transit” to provide regular support to its exclave. That said, absolutely different positions it maintains on multiple key issues in the current European and world policy, imposed by Lithuanian notorious “historical” agenda on the interstate contacts and its disregard of the multi-pole world realities set a negative background for the development of neighborly relations.
Of course, it is difficult to ignore sharp statements of the leading Lithuanian politicians addressed to Russia, their unwillingness to resolve real (and not imaginary) historical and political issues. But politicians come and go, while nations that have been living for centuries side by side – will stay. And most probably, the crisis has already awaken the sober elements of Lithuanian society who are ready to conduct a constructive and mutually beneficial dialogue, leaving aside the ghosts of the past and looking into the future
1. Brazauskas A. Five years of presidency: event, memories, thoughts. Moscow, “Uniprint” 2002.
2. Furman E.D. Establishment of the party system in post-Soviet Lithuania. Moscow, “LIBROCOM” book house. 2009.
3. Kolosov V., Borodulina N. Geopolitical discourse and relations between Russian and Baltic courtiers // “World economy and international relations”. 2007. # 9.
4. See – Vorotnikov V. “Lithuanian public movement “Zalgiris” and creation of an alternative philosophy in foreign policy” (on the supplements “Zalgiris” to “Republic” newspapers // The Baltic region. 2011. # 3(9). pp 59–70.
