The Druze State: Another Consequence of the Middle East Crisis

Jihadist attacks against the Syrian Druze in June 2015 marked the beginning of a new stage of the Middle East crisis. They prompted the involvement of Israel and Lebanon in the Syrian conflict and revealed a tendency of establishing new states in the region on the ethnic and religious basis.

Jihadist attacks against the Syrian Druze in June 2015 marked the beginning of a new stage of the Middle East crisis. They prompted the involvement of Israel and Lebanon in the Syrian conflict and revealed a tendency of establishing new states in the region on the ethnic and religious basis.

Druze – the origins

The Druze are a unique ethnoreligious minority, living mainly in the mountainous and desert areas of Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. The Druze religious and everyday life customs differ markedly from those of the rest of the population in the region. So, the Druze believe in reincarnation; they do not observe certain traditional religious rituals, including the obligatory prayer; they reject polygamy, etc. This explains why Islamic radicals do not consider the Druze Muslims, label them as devil-worshipers and infidels and call for their enslavement and extermination. Representatives of the Druze community are sometimes ascribed to the Shia Isma’ilis, but many members of the Shi’ism do not recognize them as their own.

The complexity of the Druze relationship with their neighbors is largely due to their rather obscure ethnological origin. Some ethnologists consider them Arabs, while others trace their origin, apart from the Arabs, to the Aramaeans, to the Persians, to descendants of the Hittites and the Samaritans as well as to the Kurds’ ancestors. Some believe that the Druze are descendants of the ancient Hebrews.

In the countries of residence the Druze constitute an absolute minority of the population (less than 3 percent). The Druze community does not exceed 2.6 million people, its foreign diasporas including. The region itself is home to no more than 1.5 million Druze. The largest Druze community – the Syrian one – numbers, according to various estimates, from 700 to 850 thousand people.

Small-numbered Druze occupied for the most part poor unattractive lands, which helped them to survive in often hostile environment. The Druze people have been known for their martial prowess as well. So, they were the main driving force behind the rebellion of 1925-1927 in the Levant, which nearly resulted in the collapse of the French colonial power, established there. [1] This explains why in countries of residence they are often recruited into the special operation forces.

The importance of control over the Druze areas is due to the fact that the Druze occupy strategically important territories at the junction of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, including the Golan Heights.

Having replaced the Turks in the region in 1918-1919, the French tried to play the Druze card. In 1921, they established Jabal Druze State in the French mandate of Syria, designed to function under French oversight. The state ceased to exist as an autonomous entity in 1936 and was incorporated into Syria.

The idea of ​​creating a Druze state was raised again by Israeli politician Yigal Allon after the Six-Day War in 1967, during which Tel Aviv captured a sizeable Druze territory. Yigal Allon put forward a plan to create a pro-Israeli Druze state, designed to become a buffer between Israel and hostile Arab countries. The ideas underlying the plan fit well with the Alliance of the periphery concept, calling for Israel facing hostile environment to develop strategic alliances with non-Arab and non-Muslim states.

Given the international isolation of Israel, the idea of creating a Druze state, tantamount to the partition of Lebanon and Syria, was given up. However, the Israeli secret services continued to maintain contacts with the Druze.

In 2012, Walid Jumblatt, a prominent representative of the Lebanese Druze, appeared to be among the first to remind of this project.

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Druze political camps

Historically, the Druze political movement has been split into many diametrically opposed camps. The situation is complicated by the fact that the antagonisms among the clans are of long standing.

The attitude towards Israel is just one issue that splits the Druze. Most Israeli Druze (except for the population of the Golan Heights, holing the Syrian citizenship) are integrated into the political system of the country and constitute one of its pillars. At the same time the majority of the Lebanese and Syrian Druze are hostile to Israel.

Currently, the main contradiction is due to the conflict in Syria. Previously, most of the Syrian Druze supported Bashar al-Assad, while their fellow tribesmen in Israel and Lebanon faced the lack of unity on this issue. However, as the conflict in Syria gathered pace, the line-up of forces began to change.

Until now, the alliance with the Druze appeared to be one of Bashar al-Assad’s “natural” pillars of support in his confrontation with the jihadists. Given the ethnic and religious factors, the Druze had no serious grounds for discontent with Damascus, as they were granted access to power. Some of them have occupied important positions in the leadership of the country, for example, Major General of the Syrian Republican Guard Issam Zahreddine, Minister of Presidential Affairs Mansour Azzam, journalist Luna al-Shibli, who heads the Syrian propaganda machine (both Azzam and al-Shibli are members of Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle).

In addition to that, the Druze areas enjoy a relative economic prosperity, as compared with many other regions of the country. So, over the past decade their capital Al-Suwayda in southwestern Syria that used to be a provincial agricultural town has developed into one of the country’s industrial centers.

The Druze militia helped the Syrian army to control the south of the country. The reverses suffered at the front in 2013 prompted the beginning of the crisis in relations between the Druze and al-Assad’s regime. At that time, having lost 300 men in battles with jihadists, the Druze clerics urged their fellow tribesmen to remain neutral in the Syrian conflict. The withdrawal of Syrian troops to provide cover for different directions that faced the greatest threat, exposed the Druze to jihadists’ attacks and exacerbated the crisis.

In August, the Druze leaders called on Bashar al-Assad to give them heavy weapons, failing which they threatened to get the weapons themselves. The parties failed to reach an agreement. Bashar al-Assad demanded to mobilize the Druze in the Syrian army, threatening to stop protecting them, but his demand was never met.

The June attacks by jihadists provoked further deterioration of the attitude of the Druze towards the official Damascus. Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinawi noted that they could no longer rely on the Syrian army. In a related move, formation of independent law enforcement structures representing one of the real attributes of the Druze statehood (27 thousand militiamen) was intensified.

At the same time, in 2015, there was established in Syria an anti-Assad Military Council of the Druze in Syria, headed by dissident Col. Marwan al-Hamad. This could denote a split of the Syrian Druze community.

Druze relations with neighboring countries and countries of residence

The Lebanese and Israeli Druze (the second and third largest Druze communities), whose involvement in the affairs of their Syrian fellow tribesmen gains momentum as the jihadists’ pressure intensifies, have played an important role in shaping the political developments taking place in the Syrian Druze community. This is due to the common ideological base, as one of the principles of the Druze faith is “Protect brothers, always and everywhere”. In June 2015, the residents of the Syrian district Khader, who repelled an assault of Islamic militants, received an armed assistance, which was provided under the auspices of the security forces of Israel. Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Hebrew acronym Tzahal) publicly stated that the Israeli army operates on the basis of “blood alliance with our Druze brothers”.

Such a reaction has been largely due to a burst of Israeli Druze protests in June 2015, who were outraged by the fact that wounded jihadists were given medical treatment in Israeli hospitals. The protesters demanded not only direct involvement of Israel in the Syrian conflict to save their tribesmen from genocide, but also attacked the Israeli military that helped wounded Syrian oppositionists.

These developments have called into question the Israeli Druze loyalty to Tel Aviv. However, having managed to prevent further clashes between them and the jihadists in June 2015, Israel put an end to these disorders.

It is indicative that the leadership of Dzhabhat al-Nusra apologized for “unjustified killing of the Syrian Druze,” promised to “punish those involved in the massacre” and assured that such incidents would not repeat. In turn, the Syrian Druze promised Dzhabhat al-Nusra to break off their alliance with Bashar al-Assad and to oppose his forces.

All of this suggests the existence of a permanent channel of communication between the Syrian Islamic opposition and Israel.

Thus, the developments in June 2015 showed that Israel is really well-placed to save the Druze. Ayoub Kara, Deputy Minister for Regional Affairs and a Druze by origin, made it clear that should the situation with the Syrian Druze aggravate any further, Israel will not stand aside: "We are coordinating actions with our brothers in Syria and take care of them. If need be, we will destroy the Islamic State and Dzhabhat al-Nusra. “Tzahal will soon go into Syria and take Quneitra, which will become the center of the Druze state,” said another prominent Israeli politician Munzer Safadi.

Judging by the statements, Tel Aviv is interested in creating a buffer border state with loyal population to protect against the jihadists in the event of a possible downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Flickr / K. Aksoy

Jordan has specific plans for the Druze too: by rendering then aid, it aims for creating a “security buffer,” should united Syria disintegrate ().

The Druze amidst the Arab Spring development and the Islamic State activity in the region

The process of establishing the Islamic State, which can be regarded as a stage of the Arab Spring development, compels the opposing forces, including the Druze, to consolidate. In Lebanon, they form self-defense squads. Apart from their fellow tribesmen, who have served in the Lebanese army, the instructors of these groups are officers from Latin American diasporas, who get involved in the process of granting the Druze areas certain statehood.

Given the influence of major foreign actors on the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, it can be argued that further development of the situation with the Druze will depend largely on them. They get an incentive to use them in further struggle as one of the “natural” forces, as has been the case with the Kurds. However, it can be done under two conditions only: the establishment of a Druze state with his bodies of government and power structures and getting an outside assistance.

In fact, these processes are already underway. Israel's efforts to protect the Druze can serve as an indicator of selecting them intentionally for using as a tool for handling the situation in the region (and not only on the part of Tel Aviv).

It should be noted that the emergence of the anti-Assad Military Council of the Druze in Syria was preceded by a visit to Israel at the beginning of June 2015 of General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the talks the sides discussed the issue of increased assistance to the Syrian Druze. This event could result from agreements reached in June between Israel, Jordan, the United States and Saudi Arabia on supplying arms and military equipment to the Syrian Druze through the territory of Jordan.

The due regard paid by the United States to these events is unlikely to be accidental. It is possible that the US has its own plans of using national-religious minorities in the region, as it was in respect of the Kurds. It is entirely probable that Washington will try to ride the wave and place a stake on reformatting the region in compliance with the real ethno-religious boundaries, rather than with fictitious administrative ones. As a result, the plans of Americans and of Israelis may not coincide.

Russia and the Druze

Due to historical reasons, Moscow has comparatively weak contacts with the Druze, since the latter have not been subjects of foreign policy [2]. Efforts to build up separate relationship with them were fraught with worsened relations with the countries of their residence.

The Lebanese Druze make an exception in this regard due to the specifics of the Lebanese state, which emerged in the result of a compromise of various ethnic and religious groups, including the Druze. Accordingly, Moscow needed “parallel” contacts with the leaders of local groups.

It is noteworthy that the leaders of the Lebanese Druze come to Russia often enough. However, there is no unity among them on Russia’s role in the Middle East. For example, Walid Jumblatt speculates on the issue that the United States and Russia “have secretly agreed on his future”. In January 2012, he came to Moscow to persuade the Kremlin to abandon the policy of Bashar al-Assad’s support. At the same time, another leader of the Druze in Lebanon Talal Arslan, a representative of the Lakhmids ancient royal family that ruled the region before the advent of the Prophet Muhammad, holds a diametrically opposite view on the issue and emphasizes the importance of Russia's efforts in resolving the Middle East crisis.

There is little doubt that Russia has the opportunity to promote its protégés in the struggle for influence among the Druze, with an eye to their eventual taking up significant posts in the Druze state. However, to achieve these aspirations Russia should build ties with the Syrian Druze.

Amidst the collapse of Syria and the development of similar processes in Lebanon, Russia is faced with the fact that the vanishing states are being replaced by new “ethnic” state entities such as the Druze or the Kurdish one, while extremist groups become the real centers of power.

As the situation in the region changes, more attention should be paid to the development of trusted connection at the micro level, including “informal diplomacy” with national leaders and the Druze among them. This will facilitate quick and appropriate response to the new “signals” coming from there.

Prospects for the establishment of a Druze state

Given the ongoing Arab Spring that has already resulted in the collapse of old states in the region, the Druze minority is forced to solve the problem of survival, fighting against the jihadists.

As noted above, the Druze did have their own statehood in the twentieth century. Therefore, in the medium term, the chances of establishing a Druze state are realistic enough. Due to the current situation, the Druze, like the Kurds, have to carry out this project at a time, when the countries of their residence cannot guarantee their safety.

Israel has the largest resources (including monetary funds and the army) in the areas inhabited by the Druze, and, accordingly, is placed better than others to manage the project. However, the situation is complicated by the disagreements among the Druze themselves. For example, many Lebanese and Syrian Druze oppose the project of creating their own state, fearing the prospect of becoming “Israel’s puppet”.

However, against the background of disintegration of the united Syria, the process of acquiring statehood by the Druze-populated areas is underway. The Druze already have such a state attribute as their own power structures that control the territory.

The Druze have demonstrated an ability to mobilize during the crisis, which testifies to their potential to exert profound influence on the developments in the Middle East. At that, the jihadist attacks against the Syrian Druze revealed the existence of a genuine alliance among the Druze communities of Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Recent battles of many days against jihadists (and even before receiving outside help) suggest that the Druze have become a real force in the region, preventing the return of Assad's rule to their territories.

At the same time, expectations of establishing a “full-fledged” Druze state appear somewhat premature. If such a state is created, it will be based on several centers of power, not just Israel.

Turning the Druze state project into reality faces a number of challenges: they are small in number and scattered (their enclaves are separated from each other by vast territories). However, the support from Israel, Jordan, the Kurds and other friendly forces enhances the chances of the Druze for survival.

Nevertheless, for the time being the Syrian Druze are unlikely to officially proclaim creation of their state and to break off relations with Damascus, as  the course of the war may change, all the more so since their political fragmentation does not yet allow to complete the project. At the same time, a growing external threat may promote their consolidation.

1. S.S. Balmasov. Foreign Legion. Moscow, 2004. P. 75.

2. Nissim D. The Druze in the Middle East: Their Faith, Leadership, Identity and Status. Sussex Academic Press, 2003. P. 23.