Tajikistan was the least inclined towards complete independence from Moscow after the collapse of the USSR. However, twenty years later the Russian-Tajik relations strongly resemble the family on the brink of divorce.
Tajikistan was the least inclined towards complete independence from Moscow after the collapse of the USSR. However, twenty years later the Russian-Tajik relations strongly resemble the family on the brink of divorce.
Can you evade the fate by running away?
Independence crashed on Tajikistan like a mudflow with all the political forces in the republic taken aback. The thing is that the national-state demarcation in Central Asia at the time of the USSR was carried out in a rather arbitrary manner and on the premise (not always consistent) of the ethnic component. However, in the history of the region it was the least significant, or rather its significance was not political. Of much more importance was the unity of the political class within the existing state structures. Still more important was the supranational (regional) identity: kulyabets, pamirets, leninobadets etc.
These identities were kept within the new national entity-- the Tajik people--with the help of an extremely complicated inter-elite agreement and distribution of power, with the Federal Centre as an integral component. It was precisely this Centre which was the guarantor of the Agreement, supplied resources which were redistributed through informal channels to maintain the actually existing and not simulated social links within the territorial community and on the level of supra-territorial elites. As the monoculture --cotton-- was destroying the Tajik Socialist Republic’s traditional economy the subsidies from the Centre acquired the ever-increasing importance.
Reductions in economic infusions in the TSSR in the 1980s complicated interregional interaction which had already been exacerbated due to the population explosion in the Republic in the 1970s. It resulted in a series of social cataclysms, outflow of the Russian speaking people and an increasing disintegration of principles of inter-elite interaction. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union the agreement between the territorial elites of Tajikistan was upheld only through the efforts of the Federal Centre. With the system of traditional economy destroyed only the financial and resource infusions from the outside made the survival possible. It was for this very reason that the leaders of Tajikistan were the least inclined towards complete independence from Moscow. The idea was to integrate the two economies more efficiently and to oust the migrant elements from the cities. However, suddenly, without any warning independence fell on their heads.
‘The Peace Treaty’
The main contradiction determining current political processes in the Republic of Tajikistan is the one between “the nation-state” form of the organization of political power and the local type of social links fraught with inter-clan and inter-oblast conflicts. Ousted to the periphery of political life the southern elites decided to have revenge on the “leninabadtsy” who had been deprived of “Moscow” support. As a result, a civil war broke out -- the bloodiest of all the wars waged on the CIS territory. For almost five years government forces and opposition troops fought against each other destroying schools and hospitals, roads and industrial facilities along the way. The unwillingness of Rahmon Nabiev “to share power” brought about many years of confrontation. Only the reciprocal depletion of resources and awareness of the impossibility of victory made the warring parties start a round of negotiations. There emerged a compromise figure of Emomali Rahmon. Under his leadership and due to Russian mediation a civil peace was established. The opposition gained access to power and consequently to the distribution of resources.
Theoretically such a “peace treaty” may pave the way for the formation of democratic structures unique in the Muslim-based society. As a matter of fact, this is what the experts of the IMF and the other international organizations monitoring the situation in the Republic are relying on. However, to ensure progress in this direction it is necessary for an effective economy (which does not exist in Tajikistan) to be integrated into the world economic system. With the appearance of a compromise leader acceptable to both conflicting parties, the basis for national consensus may be “allocation” of access to social and economic benefits. At this turn of events an authoritarian regime in a more or less mild form is inevitable. Furthermore, it is the only way to attain stability and have relatively effective interaction with foreign investors.
‘How Much Water Flows Around for their Daily Bread…’
To enable an authoritarian ruler to maintain civil peace in the country it is also necessary to have economic “drip-feed” though of a different nature. Not the effective modernization and modern production based on competition, but export of unique raw materials. It is necessary to have a resource which could be distributed in conformity with the real power of the clan and covenants among the elites.
In most countries of the region this resource has been found--oil and gas. Their extraction does not require substantial investments in technology or human capital (both became available to new states as part of Soviet legacy). It does not involve competition and is easy to distribute. Accordingly, “the distributor” becomes the central figure. No wonder that the most comprehensive and consistent authoritarian regime has emerged in Turkmenia which is amply endowed with this resource. In Tajikistan such a resource exists in the form of a potential only – it is hydropower stations. The completion of the hydropower station cascade would enable Tajikistan not only to provide itself with energy but to export it to China, Iran and India. However, there is another obstacle to the creation of such a resource – contradiction between a single economic complex of the region and the existence of political boundaries.
Despite “the national-state” demarcation in the late 1920s, the region remained a single economic complex. The fact that transportation arteries and pipelines leading to one republic passed through the territory of another was not viewed as a serious problem. Nor was it important that the upper and the lower reaches of the rivers fell under the jurisdiction of different “first secretaries”. In the 1990s the situation changed dramatically. The availability of transport arteries and pipelines, energy transmission lines and water resources turned into an influence factor of some countries over the others. Consequently, the construction of the cascade of hydropower stations capable of providing Tajikistan with energy should lead to a collision of interests with the authorities of Uzbekistan.
It is not that by keeping most of the fresh water of the region in “the man-made seas” at the hydropower stations the President of Uzbekistan could deprive the population of Uzbekistan of water. These apprehensions are unlikely to materialize. The problem is different. The blow would be dealt not to the economy or livelihood of the neighboring country but to the most sensitive part of politics which is legitimation of power. Like in Tajikistan, the overwhelming majority of the population of Uzbekistan are dekhans (peasants) and it is in this environment that a system of social relations and power centers is formed. The pillar of power is control over the most critical resource -- water. The one who distributes this resource is a true lord. In this particular situation the distributor of this symbolic resource would be the president of another country. No wonder that the project of the construction of the Rogun hydropower station was vehemently opposed by Islam Karimov. This opposition led to the winding up of the construction of hydropower stations in Tajikistan. Both Russia and China, the high-profile potential investors, chose not to quarrel with the Uzbek leader. Nor have western investors been in a hurry to commit their capital.
Hence the multidirectional character of the republic’s domestic and foreign policy: on the one hand, search for foreign investors and constant interaction with international financial organizations, on the other -- the desire to exercise control over the whole spectrum of economic and political life in the country; swinging all the time between the authoritarian tendencies and the necessity to coordinate any action with the influential regional elites. Meanwhile it is becoming increasingly clear that the political stability in the country largely depends on whether a foreign source to sustain the traditional family economy will be found.
Paradoxical as it may seem, stability and authoritarianism are based on the same factor.
Family on the Brink of Divorce
Nowadays the Russian-Tajik relations more and more resemble a family on the brink of divorce. Rows are a thing of the past. Reciprocal indifference prevails. Investments expected byTajikistan from Russia and later from China either did not materialize or their size was greatly diminished. The loyalty of what was until recently one of the most pro-Russian republics is becoming more problematic. A vivid example of serious cooling-off in relations is a conflict around “the pilots’case”.
In reply to the indictment of the Russian pilot in November 2011, Moscow threatened to deport the Tajik migrants from Russia. Now the Tajik migrant workers increasingly tend to set out for the south-east preferring it to “the north” which is becoming more and more inhospitable. It seems that Russia has virtually given up the role of a player on Central Asian fields.
