Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union politicians and pundits are still concerned about the interests Russia should pursue in the post-Soviet area and prospects of their realization. The assessments of the Russian policy in the post-Soviet area range from highly pessimistic with doubts about the necessity of continued integration efforts to enthusiastic ones predicting a stronger political influence and economic growth of Russia due to greater cooperation with the closest geographic neighbors.
Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union politicians and pundits are still concerned about the interests Russia should pursue in the post-Soviet area and prospects of their realization. The assessments of the Russian policy in the post-Soviet area range from highly pessimistic with doubts about the necessity of continued integration efforts to enthusiastic ones predicting a stronger political influence and economic growth of Russia due to greater cooperation with the closest geographic neighbors.
“A Civilized Divorce” as the “Greatest Geopolitical Catastrophe of the 20th Century”
Difficulties involved in the construction of new independent states were similar for all the former Soviet republics, with one priority – not the least important – the necessity to change the relations with foreign partners. Russia had to integrate into the global democratic context, with the simultaneous resolution of the fundamental security problems in the disintegrated military and political space and creation of conditions for economic stabilization and further development. At the initial stage the external influence was decisive. The Russian leadership proclaiming a policy of “democratic solidarity” with the West focused on solving the most important problems: nuclear-free status of Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, prevention of mass bloodshed in the conflict areas of Georgia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, maintenance of the minimal economic stability level inside the country.
The results achieved by 1994-1995 matched the efforts made. Due to certain pressure on the part of the international community primarily concerned about the nuclear problem, this issue was solved and taken off the agenda. The hot phase of the conflicts of self-determination in the newly formed independent states with Russia’s active mediation was over and the established modus operandi remained unchanged till August 2008. Russia linked its further economic development with material and ideological assistance of the West, which shaped the economic policy of the first half of the1990s on the basis of “the Washington consensus”. The burden of vertically oriented links with the former Soviet republics, considerable indirect subsidies to the new national economies which often freeloaded on the remaining links ,were regarded as an obstacle to the movement in the new direction. Refusal to preserve the single ruble zone was natural and seminal for Russian relations with the post-Soviet space states. The step, tactically motivated, in many ways predetermined further controversies in the Russian strategy of economic interaction with the CIS countries.
The Burden of Desires
Shortly after the phase of uncertainty in the post-Soviet space was over, when it became apparent that large-scale destabilization and irreparable harm to the continental and global security had been avoided, the Russian leadership was confronted with disappointingly cooling attention on the part of Western assistants. Changes in the rhetoric and practice of Russian foreign policy also affected the attitude to the post-Soviet space. The conceptual vision of future cooperation was set forth in the document “The Strategic Course of Russia with the States-Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States” (1995). In practice, Russian initiatives were confined to attempts of multilateral and bilateral reintegration of national economies. The decline of the real sector of the economy, lower industrial output, opening up of new markets for the products of developed countries stepped up the competition for Russian companies on the post-Soviet markets. It resulted in gradual curtailment of Russian exports to the CIS countries against the background of efforts to create institutional formats, above all various customs unions which could protect the regional markets from outside expansion. However, the similarity of the commodity range of the post-Soviet exports (mainly natural resources and agricultural produce) alongside with the desire to expand the circle of extra-regional partners predetermined the competitive character of foreign trade aspirations of the new independent countries. It hampered the promotion of Russian initiatives beyond the declaration level. The institutional projects remained in the logical context of “integration for survival”, collided with the counter- activity of major international operators and did not give Russia an opportunity to affirm its regional leadership. The tactical component was unfavorable: continued subsidizing of national economies (in the form of lower prices for energy resources as compared with the world prices) did not produce the desired political effect and was aggravated by the asymmetry of the results which were immediately visible to the partner states but whose effect was delayed and uncertain for Russia.
Unavoidable Responsibility
The present policy of Russiain the post-Soviet area in many ways is determined by this multifaceted post-bipolar legacy. Activity vectors of external players have been determined and not challenged since the early 2000s. Russia has to further its national interests in the context of the military presence of the USA in Central Asia, greater economic influence of China, expansion of European Union activity formats in the western part of the CIS. Commitment to multi-vector foreign policy, a desire to determine by themselves the distance in relations with Russia are typical even of those states which are regarded as allies in the post-Soviet area. In this situation the goals of the Russian foreign policy consist in determining the parameters of multilateral interaction with the region on the basis of Russia’s own interests which involve maintaining national security and forming the international economic centre capable of enhancing Russia’s influence in the world.
As shown by the political crises of recent years (in Moldavia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan), Russia is the only player able to assume responsibility and ensure stability in the post-Soviet space. Alongside with obvious internalization of conflict solution processes Russia continues be the initiator of key stages of these processes and in many ways forms the international policy framework in which they unfold. After a short general bewilderment caused by the five-day war in August 2008 and its political aftermath, the involved players in one way or another recognized the right of Russia to determine mechanisms and level of foreign involvement in the situations of conflict and post-conflict settlement. Political declarations welcome the expansion of the circle of mediators; support the activity of existing multilateral formats and creation of new ones (for example, the Mezeberg Memorandum on Creation of the EU-Russia Committee on foreign policy and security issues on the ministerial level). However, the range of instruments of the Russian foreign policy is quite self-sufficient here.
At the same time the political issues depend on the pragmatic economic interests which is openly admitted in the seminal foreign policy documents of Russia. The promotion of integration initiatives is a method of increasing one’s own economic resources, in particular due to the increase in the aggregate economic potential and rational use of the multilateral cooperation environment. Yet it is evident that the existing system of internal mutual links and outside influence determines the major paradox of the current situation: Russia acts as a major sponsor of economic and political processes in the sphere of its privileged interests and simultaneously is their major hostage. Meticulously assembled chain of interdependence in the framework of collective security formats (first of all CSTO) and economic convergence (the Common Economic Space with the declared prospect of developing the Eurasian Union can be ruptured in one of its links; the donor state finds itself in a trap of necessity to keep it intact at all costs.
The major issue of the present-day development of Russia on the post-Soviet space is still a problem of finding a new basis for mutual relations which is not determined by the common past but oriented towards the commonality of the future. Integration as an end in itself does not make sense and has no prospects while common future should take into account the direction of the global development vector in order to have the potential to influence it.
