Presidential elections in Russia and the arrival of a new US Ambassador to Moscow early in 2012 caused a new wave of discussions on the personality factor in Russian-American relations. For the third time over the last twenty years the arrival of new players to the political arena entailed serious changes in the relations between Russia and the United States – in 1992-1993, 2000-2001, and in 2008-2009. In all three instances Russian-American relations received an impetus to renovation which, however, soon came to nothing against seemingly objective obstacles: NATO enlargement, “orange revolutions” in the post-Soviet space and antiballistic missile defense.
Presidential elections in Russia and the arrival of a new US Ambassador to Moscow early in 2012 caused a new wave of discussions on the personality factor in Russian-American relations. For the third time over the last twenty years the arrival of new players to the political arena entailed serious changes in the relations between Russia and the United States – in 1992-1993, 2000-2001, and in 2008-2009. In all three instances Russian-American relations received an impetus to renovation which, however, soon came to nothing against seemingly objective obstacles: NATO enlargement, “orange revolutions” in the post-Soviet space and antiballistic missile defense.
New Impetus
With each new opportunity the hopes for a possible resumption of relations by “wiping the slate clean” became weaker. Pragmatism was taking ground and the level of expectations was getting lower. Today they may be lower than at any given time of earlier change of leaders in the US and Russia. However, in 2012 the two countries embarked on a new cycle of relations with a tangible luggage of achievements. Over the past decade Russia managed to resolve the issue of its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), signed with the U.S. the Treaty on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START-3), gained new experience of close cooperation with the United States in providing security in Afghanistan, outlined some new common viewpoints on resolving disputes on the post-Soviet space.
However, the majority of former problems remain unresolved, while in the early 2010s their inventory was enlarged by a number of new mutual irritants. Russia is concerned with a possible US interference into its domestic affairs and possible application of US public sanctions against Russian officials championed by a group of American congressmen. Washington is displeased with Russian stance on Syrian conflict. Contradiction could become even deeper over tougher sanctions against Iran if the crisis related to the Iranian nuclear program comes to a head.
By the end of the first decade of the century the internal political context of Russian-American relations has also started to change. In the environment of rapid development of social networks and Internet mass media an attempt of a passionate campaign of criticism against the work of the new American ambassador to Moscow undertaken on the Russian public and political pitch resulted in more than 20 subscribers to Michael McFaul’s micro-blog over two months. They are all eager to get acquainted with the US Ambassador’s views. For the first time in the history of Russian-American relations (probably, of the world diplomacy in general) at any time of day a US Ambassador can directly address such a vast audience in the host state.
Under the circumstances today the dynamics of Russian-American relations depend no less than before on the convictions of influential persons, – be it a new president or even an ambassador. Given a political will, a breakthrough in relations between any states could be reached quite promptly. Even after the Kosovo (1999) and South Ossetia (2008) crises Moscow and Washington restored their cooperation in about a year, finding ways to new joint projects. Summing up the results of his foreign policy during his presidential term of office Dmitry Medvedev remembered that a sincere desire of both presidents to speed up and sign the START-3 in the shortest possible time was a substantial stimulus to the official negotiating teams.
Given a political will, Russia and the US could resolve controversial problems in the foreseeable future. Contrary to popular views, a common security threat to the US and Russia is not a prerequisite, the only thing needed is the approach to Russian-American relations as to a game with a positive sum, and not a zero sum option. For one, in the short run Russia’s entry to the WTO and repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would lead, according to expert opinions, to the growth of American export to Russia up to five billion USD over five years, which can bring the US-Russian trade relations close to the level of Russian-Chinese trade volume, for example. The number of mutually issued visas and direct flights between the US and Russia are also gradually growing. Russian authorities also have enough space for a legislative maneuver to undertake necessary measures to remove a potential threat of outside interference, while at the same time not to cause a wave of criticism from the US, and to convince Washington to refrain from using a language of sanctions.
In the mid-term (two-three years) there is no sense for both to reverse the positive tendencies of “reset” undertaken in order to step back from the abyss of military confrontation which they were facing in August 2008. Against the background of generally pessimistic prognostication as regards the agreement between Russia and the US on the ABM defense, a conversation between President D.Medvedev and President B.Obama overheard by the newsmen during their meeting in Seoul caused unexpected hope among the observers. It turned out that the two leaders understand the specifics of electoral cycles and would not pressurize each other at the “wrong moment”, keeping in mind the common target of reaching an agreement. Under the circumstances, over a number of coming years Moscow and Washington will have a good chance to reach a compromise on the antiballistic missile defense issue. It is most likely to materialize through combined efforts of Russia, the US and NATO in the field of antiballistic missile defense on the one hand, and the guarantees that the corresponding system would not be targeted against Russia on the other hand. The task could be facilitated by further improvement of the relations between Moscow and a number of other Central European capitals claiming their concerns about Russia’s intentions in the sphere of European security.
“Strategy 2020”?
A more complicated “strategic” issue is as follows: what can be a binding factor between Russia and the US in the long run, in five or seven years, for example, when the Afghan issue would have lost its urgency, at least for the United States? In his policy article “Russia and the Changing World” published on the eve of the 2012 presidential elections V.Putin stated that Russia would be prepared “to make great strides” and achieve a “qualitative breakthrough” in its relations with the US. Reserve of the Obama administration during the electoral period in Russia, difficult for bilateral interaction, shows that good relations with our country are now part of Washington’s strategic priorities, and the US does not intend to ignore Russia, at least as long as President B.Obama stays in office.
How can a long-term common agenda look like in today’s political environment? First, the ABMT compromise could facilitate progress along other lines of arms control, including further reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear forces, as well as conventional armed forces in Europe. One should also remember that in their joint statement made in London in April 2009, both Presidents declared their commitment to the task of an in-depth disarmament. According to many analysts, “demilitarization” of Russian-American relations could significantly increase the level of trust, which would, among other things, facilitate hi-tech industrial cooperation.
Second, it would be good to translate readiness to find a compromise into efforts in establishing a unified space of Euro-Atlantic security. Before all, such efforts could turn into specific steps in settling the conflicts across the space surrounding Russia. Despite existing contradictions, we have gained ample experience of coordination, for example, in the settlement of conflicts in Georgia during the first months of the “revolution of roses” in 2003-2004, on the situation in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Viewing the advancement of China and other regional centers of force around Russia one can assume that in the short run Moscow would find it difficult to reach the projected goals in relations with its next-door neighbors in the West, South and East all alone. Under the circumstances a joint Russian-American project can be the streamlining of tripartite cooperation (in the “Russia-neighboring states-USA” format) in order to resolve long-standing conflicts and to draft an agreement on a unified space of European security.
Finally, improvement of Russia’s relations with the US NATO allies seems to be an important step forward in implementing those projects. With the reduction of military budgets and weakening of the internal unity, after the operation in Afghanistan is over the North-Atlantic alliance is unlikely to afford operations far beyond the borders of its members. For a long time already the NATO has been discussing the necessity to return to the “roots” – functions of a regional community of security unapt to jump on decisions to undertake military operations in far-away parts of the world. Under the circumstances Russia should make efforts not to assume the role of the main NATO adversary which has been “assisting” the North-Atlantic alliance in substantiating its designation. For that purpose Moscow could persistently put forward ideas and proposals on new joint Russian-NATO projects in the field of security.
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Objective contradictions between Russia and the US in contemporary world are not as complicated as it may seem ex facte. They are all predetermined by mutual distrust and inability (and often unwillingness) to prove the absence of offensive intentions to each other. Based on political will, long-term strategic thinking and experience of former disenchantment the knot of US-Russian contradictions can be untangled in a far shorter time than many expect.
