Post-socialist Bulgaria: two decades of transformations

Of all former Soviet Union states, Bulgaria was mostly affected by the union’s disintegration and forced reorientation of its policy and economy towards the West. But now a host of objective reasons is dictating that the country should restore relations with its former ally, which is now called Russia.

Of all former Soviet Union states, Bulgaria was mostly affected by the union’s disintegration and forced reorientation of its policy and economy towards the West. But now a host of objective reasons is dictating that the country should restore relations with its former ally, which is now called Russia.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and socialist camp, which took place twenty years ago, became one of the most significant and dramatic events of the 20th century. The radical change of the entire ideology, foreign and domestic policy, economy and even people’s views of life severely affected everyone involved in the events. Bulgaria was one of the socialist countries which suffered the most, since it was heavily oriented towards the Soviet Union both economically and politically. What did Bulgaria gain and lose by cutting ties with its former partner, in what state are the Bulgarian-Russian relations and what prospects do they have?

Disintegration of Soviet Union and choosing a new course

As opposed to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, which attempted to modernise the model of socialism imposed by Moscow, or Romania that was an active “dissident” within the socialist commonwealth, Bulgaria had been considered the Soviet Union’s most loyal ally right from the establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Cooperation within the framework of this and other organisations was complemented with cultural and linguistic closeness and long-standing historical ties between the countries. Bulgaria was called the “sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union” not for nothing in the Soviet years.

The Soviet Union’s aid meant a lot for Bulgaria: more than 300 industrial enterprises were built in the country in the post-war period; the Soviet Union accounted for up to 60% of Bulgaria's export; the Union stimulated the development of agriculture and supplied hydrocarbons and fuel to Bulgaria at significantly reduced prices. That’s why most Bulgarians did not support the directive on re-orientating towards the West as soon as possible and decisively abandoning the socialist past, which dominated in Central and Eastern Europe after the victories of “velvet revolutions.”

As a result, the revolution went smoothly in Bulgaria and ended up with the top echelons’ overthrow - at the November 1989 plenary meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee, Todor Zhivkov, the party’s chairman, was swept from office by his colleagues. They started reforming the political and economic systems, and the Bulgarian Communist Party was renamed into the Bulgarian Socialist Party and became one of the country’s leading political forces. Its leaders obviously did not strive for any abrupt moves in relations with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), its eastern partner. There was even the discussion held about transforming the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance into a new organisation and modernising the Warsaw Treaty.

But there were also forces in Bulgarian society that were geared-up for radical market reforms and immediate integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. They also were eager to break relations with RSFSR as soon as possible. They united into the centre right Union of Democratic Forces which became a long-term opponent of the Bulgarian Socialist Party.

The Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), the current ruling party, is the Union’s direct ideological successor. The dualism of Bulgaria’s policy regarding Russia depended, to a large extent, on which political party – the socialist or the centre right – was in power. But even the politicians themselves had to take into account the two positions - the pro-Western and the pro-Russian - which existed in the public opinion. For instance even most ardent Bulgarian Atlanticists had to constantly make statements that the country’s course towards joining NATO is by no means directed against Russia.

Choosing a new ally: was there any alternative?

Bulgaria, as most post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, hastened to declare its aspirations to integrate into the Western economic and political structures even before the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance officially dissolved in 1991.

In November 1989, it expressed its willingness to become a member of the European Council and one year later it applied for the EU membership, though an official full membership application was submitted in December 1995. In many respects this was a formality since Bulgarians were in no hurry to fulfil all the requirements, necessary for accession, and carry out radical economic reforms. Some politicians of the Bulgarian Socialist Party even spoke of Bulgaria’s own path of development.

Bulgaria’s accession into NATO was subject to heated discussions within the society. Having joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, socialists did not hurry to draw up an application for a full-fledged NATO-membership saying that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has sufficient mechanisms to ensure security in Europe. In his criticism towards the socialists’ course, Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov referred to experiences of other former socialist countries, which had first oriented towards Europe and were reaping the fruits of such policy. “For Bulgaria the chances to recover from the crisis are associated with the accession to the European Council, and the only way to the EU is through NATO membership,” Stoyanov said.

The economic crisis, which shook the country in 1996-1997, had a decisive impact on making the final choice. The choice was made later though than compared with other central and eastern European states. Bulgaria had to prove its loyalty to NATO during the Kosovo crisis; it had to conduct a “shock therapy” in 1997 to demonstrate its loyalty to the European Union. Incidentally, Slovenia had to go along the same path to belatedly join both organisations.

Naturally, the following question arises: did Bulgaria have any alternatives? Perhaps, it didn’t. And this had nothing to do with illusions of integrating into the “western prosperous society” fast. Amidst the 1990s economic crisis in Russia and the escalating disintegration, the West was the only place where Bulgaria could find means for a much needed and long overdue modernization of Bulgarian economy. And how could it be possible to look up to a state that requested the West for credits and humanitarian aid?

“We are choosing not between the West and Russia, but between the West and nothing,” a Balkan political scientist said then. The only thing the United States and the allies were left to do was to do their best to prevent the post-socialist states from arranging a multi-vector policy in joining NATO, at first, and then the EU.

Achievements and costs

Despite the difficulties Bulgaria went through, by the end of the 21st century's first decade Bulgaria achieved positive results in reforming the economy, found its export niche on foreign markets, created an environment for the inflow of foreign investments.

But, following the decade of reforms, the struggle for western markets resulted in the reduction of Bulgaria’s trade turnover by 200%. Export fell by 240%. If in 1992 Bulgaria’s trade turnover amounted to 30.3% for the EU countries and Russia’s share was 20%, in 1999, the EU countries’ share grew by 51.5% and Russia’s share dropped to 14.2% [1]. In absolute terms, the trade turnover between Bulgaria and Russia fell from $15 billion to $1.2-1.5 billion. Fields oriented on the Soviet market, such as electronic engineering, petro-chemistry, oil refining, military industrial complex, agriculture, were affected the most. The foreign trade’s negative balance became a distinctive feature of the country’s economy. The country’s GDP fell by 44% and the real income of the population dropped by more than 50%.

As for the living standards, Bulgaria experienced severe recession to reach the rates of 1989 only in 2004. Bulgaria still holds the last place among the EU states in terms of a per capita GDP (40% of the average EU level). Partial fulfilment of Brussels’ requirements became the reason for Bulgaria’s postponement of plans to join the Schengen area and enter the euro-zone.

Also a high price had to be paid for getting an illusion of security from NATO. Only Bulgaria’s joining to sanctions against the former Yugoslavia has caused a damage of up to two billion Euros to its economy, not to mention the expenses on the re-equipment of its military forces under the NATO standards and participation in the NATO operations.

Restoring ties

The socialist government started pursuing the course of restoring relations with Russia in mid 1990s. But the growth of the Russian-Bulgarian trade turnover became noticeable only after the countries’ economies had finally stabilised. (see Table 1). The highest rates were achieved in 2008 amounting to 4.4 billion Euros, eventually they reduced due to the beginning of the global financial crisis; in the first three quarters of 2011, the rates amounted to 3.44 billion Euros. However, the foreign trade balance was not in favour of Bulgaria (see Table 2). In 2010 Russia became the second largest investor in Bulgaria. LUKoil and Mechel, producing oil and steel respectively, became the main investors.

In 2007, three huge projects, which could bring up the Russian-Bulgarian relations to a totally new level, were initiated. They were: laying the South Stream gas pipeline and the Burgas–Alexandroupoli oil pipeline via Bulgaria and constructing the Belene Nuclear Power Plant. But Prime Minister Boyko Borissov's government, forced to constantly try to please Brussels and Washington, started delaying the deadlines.

On November 30, 2011, it was decided to grant the South Stream’s Bulgarian part a status of a site of national importance. But a week later Bulgaria announced of its withdrawal from the Burgas–Alexandroupoli project (although, a number of Russian analysts consider the step an element of an auction). It is obvious that Bulgaria’s positive decision on these projects will be a sort of a check of the readiness to expand cooperation with Russia.

Prospects of Russian-Bulgarian relations

There is no doubt that the potential of the Russian-Bulgarian relations has not been used to its full. First and foremost, trade and economic relations, based on mutual interests, will be their driving force. Bulgaria is important for Russia, first of all, in terms of routes for transporting Russian hydrocarbons and implementation of regional transport projects. Besides, up to 300,000 Russians annually visit Bulgarian resorts; many Russians display interest to property in the country.

Interests of Bulgaria, in its turn, are concentrated around Russia’s energy resources and raw materials, implementation of energy projects, inflow of investments in different economic spheres. The Russian market is very attractive for a plethora of Bulgaria’s traditional industrial goods. Interregional ties, especially in the small and medium-sized business remain a substantial reserve for developing trade and economic cooperation.

Cultural, scientific and educational projects continue to be in the domain of Bulgarians’ particular interest. But this interest should not be overrated. Of course, there are numerous groups of friendship with Russia engaged in cultural and educational activity but, in general, Bulgarians’ knowledge of the Russian language is getting worse. Russian was withdrawn from school curriculum as a compulsory subject long ago, and the number of experts in Russian language and literature does not exceed 400 persons a year.

An entire generation of Bulgarians who see their future in the Euro-Atlantic community has grown, but empathy between Russian and Bulgarian people has nevertheless maintained. Recent researches by the Communitas Foundation showed that Bulgaria is the European Union's most pro-Russian country: 88% of its citizens favour Russia, and only 10% are against it. Russians, in their turn, favour Bulgaria much more than other Central and East-European states: according to the Public Opinion Foundation, 67% of those polled called Bulgaria a “friendly nation.

Nevertheless, an economic interest based on healthy pragmatism, rather than the much-talked about cultural and linguistic proximity, will be stimulating the development of Russian-Bulgarian relations in the long-term perspective.

1.Central and Eastern Europe in the Second Half of 20th century. In three volumes. Volume 3: Transformation of the 1990s. Part 2. Moscow. Nauka, 2002. Page 62