Pan-Arab nationalism has lost its popularity, in contrast to the local state nationalism. However, now Islamism has come to the fore in the "Arab Spring" countries, which is a historically justified phenomenon. And nationalism is now bound to be dyed in the colors of Islam.
Arab nationalism is a unique phenomenon. First, let us ask ourselves a question: is there an Arab nation? Any Arab would give you an affirmative answer, at the same time mentioning that he is Egyptian or Syrian or Yemeni, etc.
Pan-Arab nationalism has lost its popularity, in contrast to the local state nationalism. However, now Islamism has come to the fore in the "Arab Spring" countries, which is a historically justified phenomenon. And nationalism is now bound to be dyed in the colors of Islam.
"A Great Giant" has not been born
Arab nationalism is a unique phenomenon. First, let us ask ourselves a question: is there an Arab nation? Any Arab would give you an affirmative answer, at the same time mentioning that he is Egyptian or Syrian or Yemeni, etc. Thus, Arab national identity seems to have two levels. The first level is pan-Arab: people identify themselves with the Arab nation. Academics studying Arab nationalism usually distinguish the following features of the Arab nation: the language, the culture, common values, pride stemming from the feeling of their affiliation to the Arab world. It is noteworthy that religion is not included in this list. This may seem paradoxical as a vast majority of Arabs are Muslims. In fact, it is logical because the mentioning of Islam as a criterion for being an Arab national would immediately sever Christians whose role is particularly high in Egypt (Copts), Syria and Lebanon. Moreover, the very ideology of Arab nationalism was created by Christian Arabs in the Ottoman Empire more than a hundred years ago, when the idea of liberating the Arab world from Turkish domination came to the fore. Arab Christians in their turn borrowed the idea of a nation previously unknown in the East from Europeans.
Again, this is the first level. A single Arab nation is a kind of a common denominator, a common roof or a "super-nation”. Vis-à-vis an external world "we are all Arabs", we are all one family. But in practice another lower level turned out to be more important, i.e. belonging to the Iraqi, Syrian, Algerian or other nation. Arabs see no contradiction in this: there is a single Arab nation, but also the Egyptian or Moroccan, etc, the more so that in Arabic the word “nation” is “ummah” which literally means "community”. Why is it not possible to belong to two communities, one of which is large and the other -- small, inside the large one? It is something like a nested Matryoshka doll.
The movement for the unification of the Arab world gathered momentum in the middle of the 20th century and had a lot to do with, first, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the Egyptian revolution and, second, with the name of the Baath Party which proclaimed the slogan "A single Arab nation with an eternal mission". (Now the Syrian wing of the party which considers itself to be pan-Arab, is struggling for its existence in Syria where the Baathists have been in power for nearly half a century).
Practical efforts to unite the Arab world were made only by Nasser, the author of the “Al- Umlyak Al-Jadid” concept (“New Giant”), i.e., the idea of forming a new global power. In 1958 Nasser joined Egypt and Syria creating a new state called “The United Arab Republic”. Overcome with euphoria, young Arab nationalists everywhere believed that an avalanche of unification began from “The Ocean to the Gulf”, that is from Morocco on the Atlantic coast to the Persian Gulf (the Arabs, by the way, do not recognize this term -- for them it is the Arabian Gulf).
The UAR lasted only three years. Syrian officers- nationalists overthrew the government and returned to Syria its independence. The question arises: what kind of nationalists were they if they had undermined the very idea of the unification of the Arab nation? This event brought to the fore the difference between the pan-Arab nationalism which turned out to be more a declaration than reality and much more viable local or state nationalism. The three years were enough for the Syrians to develop profound distaste for what they called the “Pharaoh rule” of arrogant Egyptians. Fundamental differences in mentality, traditions and culture were revealed. Certainly, a more prosaic factor, too, played an important role: the unification of one state with the other always involves the elimination of numerous jobs, from top officials to ministers, governors, etc.
Events associated with the formation and imminent failure of the unified state demonstrated the priority of state nationalism over the pan-Arab concept. In subsequent years only Colonel Gaddafi tried to revive the idea of unification suggesting, in turn, to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Chad the creation of a single state including Libya. But then, no one took it seriously. The idea of “a new giant” uniting the Arab world died along with Nasser.
“Islam –this is the solution”
“Arab Spring” began as a protest of educated urban youth against the entrenched autocrats, and its motto could be the words “We’re tired! We do not believe you! We’re not afraid of you!” No ideology, no class, nationalist or religious slogans. “Freedom to the people! We are all united!” But, as it always happens, some people start the revolution while others take over (or ruin) it. The pioneers of the revolution were intellectuals but it was the broad masses which became its driving force. They did not need freedom, much less democracy which was unknown to them but justice, dignity and subsistence. That was what the new leaders-Islamists promised and the people followed them.
For decades, the Islamic fundamentalists, that is, advocates of a return to the roots would put forward one idea: all the troubles of the Muslim world occurred because the wicked rulers had departed from the true, pure Islam taught by Prophet Muhammad, a messenger of Allah. These rulers are mired in corruption, they are arbitrary and tyrannical; they either sell the country to the godless and corrupt West or tried to copy socialist order repugnant to the spirit of Islam. Both are destructive. “Islam – this is the solution” is the motto of "Muslim Brotherhood", the oldest (over 90 years old) and most well-known fundamentalist organization. “The Koran is our Constitution, the Allah is our leader!” The core of their ideology is a categorical denial of the principles of secularism. In practice, the Islamists (radical representatives of “political Islam”) both in Egypt and other Arab countries have gained wide popularity due to the fact that they have always helped the poor, opened their own hospitals, schools, created a kind of “mutual aid funds”. People looked upon them as defenders of their interests in contrast to the soulless and corrupt government officials. And it comes as no surprise that the Islamists have won at the very first free elections in Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco, and Kuwait (and even earlier, in 2006, in the Palestinian territories). Indeed, there is no other ideology that can attract the awakened masses. Democratic ideas have been compromised both by the failure to create grotesque copies of Western political systems in the first years after independence and associations with the West, oppressor of yesteryears and invaders of today (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). The idea of socialism has been discredited as a result of inglorious experience of rule by the left-wing regimes supported by Moscow, which proved to be incapable of solving the pressing problems of the society, eliminating poverty, corruption and tyranny. The ideology of Arabism (nasserism, baathism) has lost its popularity after the failure of attempts at unification and defeat of the nationalist governments in the wars with Israel.
It is only natural that people should rally under the banner of Islam: it is not only a religion but the core and foundation of an entire civilization. For fourteen centuries the Arab people lived in the “Muslim atmosphere”, under the complete domination of Islamic order. The Quran defined both moral foundations and laws of the society. ”Islamic spirit”, centuries-old Muslim traditions seem to be something more organic, even the most adequate for modern Arabs living under the conditions of modernization.
Now everyone is asking the same question: will the “soft”, moderate Islamism (with Turkey as an example) take root or will hard-core bigots seize power, similar in spirit to the Taliban? This depends to a great extent on whether the Islamists who have no experience in government will be able to cope with economic problems, improve the living standards of the people, seriously reduce unemployment etc. For the "Arab Spring" has aroused hopes, a sense of euphoria, and naïve people thought that the removal of the tyrant would quickly bring them happiness. Since this is not to be, Islamists are in for difficult times. The disappointment of the people will result in total disruption of their claims of effective governance.
The extremist Islamism will clearly be unable to ensure the normal development of society, to carry out modernization, attract foreign investments etc. From this point of view the moderate Islamism has many more chances. It will have to incorporate Arab nationalism in its local, national version; it will be difficult because Islamism is in principle hostile to nationalism, it recognizes only one nation -- a Muslim one. Apparently, a certain symbiosis will have to be achieved, so that, alongside with very pious masses, the rapidly growing new medium strata of the population could receive their share in the changing society. If the Islamists continue to represent only the most disadvantaged, impoverished people, ignoring the interests of educated and dynamic middle class, it will all come to nothing.
The ideology of the middle class is not so much Islamism as nationalism and, as already mentioned, not pan-Arab, “unifying”, but local. However, while “pan-Arabism” is a thing of the past there remains such a powerful force as Arab solidarity which in times of serious international conflicts becomes a part of Islamic solidarity. There is even such a term as “Muslim nationalism”, which seems strange at first sight. But at second it doesn’t. Once it is accepted that there is a Muslim nation, there should exist its ideological expression.
In any case, it seems that nationalism has not disappeared (which is out of the question) but has significantly altered by acquiring an Islamic shade. So, in the foreseeable future the dominant ideology in the post-"Arab Spring" countries will likely to be a combination of Islamism in its rather moderate form with local, state nationalism.
