Azerbaijan and Russia: the present and the future

After the period of confrontation and feelings running high in the 1990s, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations have moved on to the stage of strategic partnership. Russia is interested in a stable and strong Azerbaijan, a state-stabilizer and a natural barrier against the threats posed by the Middle East, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.

After the period of confrontation and feelings running high in the 1990s, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations have moved on to the stage of strategic partnership. Russia is interested in a stable and strong Azerbaijan, a state-stabilizer and a natural barrier against the threats posed by the Middle East, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Secession of Azerbaijan from the USSR

The fashionable clichés used nowadays by certain political scientists describing the collapse of the Soviet Union as “a national liberation movement against the empire” are not applicable to Azerbaijan which was one of the most thriving republics having no need for any “subsidies” from the Center. Despite the embellishments of reality, falsified reporting and demagogy typical of those times, the Republic was in fact highly industrialized, had a powerful agrarian sector and an intellectual potential. Baku was famous for its internationalism and was looked upon as another “Odessa” – on the Caspian Sea.

However, “perestroika” of the social and political system of the USSR launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1998 and held in the atmosphere of voluntarism and demagogy, resulted in dismantling the governance structure of the union republics and renaissance of tribalism and regionalism. The catalyst of destructive processes in the Azerbaijani society was the bloody inter-ethnic conflict with neighboring Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh populated by Armenians, an apple of discord dating back to pre-Soviet time.

Soviet power managed to keep a lid on the contradictions over this autonomous region which in accordance with the Constitution was part of the Azerbaijan SSR. However, the inability to control the “perestroika”, the desire of local elites to take advantage of nationalistic trends   brought about an armed conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict quickly escalated into an armed struggle with both sides using artillery and aviation. An all-out war broke out between the two Union republics. The unwillingness of the Gorbachev leadership to pursue a firm policy in order to put an end to the conflict fueled nationalist forces in both republics and discredited the federal center. Nevertheless, the people of Azerbaijan continued to support the preservation of the Union rejecting the nationalist appeals of the local Popular Front. It will be recalled that 74, 9% of Azerbaijani voters (more than in the RSFSR--74%) took part in the All-Union Referendum on March 17, 1991. The preservation of the Union was supported by 93, 3% of voters, with 5,8%--against[1].

Expressing the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the country, President A.Mutalibov made a speech on August 19 , on the eve of the “GKCHP Putsch” with criticism of Gorbachev’s indecision  “leading the country to anarchy”.  After the failure of the “August Putsch” which coincided with another aggravation of the  Karabakh situation, the nationalistic fervor in the Republic reached its peak.

In these conditions on August 30, 1991 the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan adopted a Declaration on the Restoration of State Independence of Azerbaijan, and on October 18,1991 - The Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Adopted in a state of nationalist euphoria it was emphatically anti-Russian. “Over 70 years –the document said -- a policy of colonialism was pursued against the Republic of Azerbaijan, the national resources of Azerbaijan were ruthlessly exploited, national wealth was plundered, the Azerbaijani people were persecuted and repressed, its national dignity was trampled on”.

After the Declaration of Independence

As to bilateral relations with the former Center, with Moscow, their development in the first years after the “restoration” of independence was painful: both Moscow and Baku were adjusting to the new realities with difficulty. The efforts to form a new national statehood by the radical nationalists resulted in breaches of relations and controversies, negotiations were conducted in the atmosphere of claims, counterclaims and threats.

The country was in dire social and economic conditions.

As a result of the breakup of inter-republican industrial relations many enterprises had to stop production due to the obsolete equipment and lack of spare parts and components for final products which had earlier been supplied by associated enterprises of the union Republics. As   the country had no oil refineries of its own it was left without fuel and lubricants. Transport stopped. Increased unemployment and impoverishment reduced the domestic market. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh and aggravation of the situation in the Russian North Caucasus caused a drastic reduction in transport links with the outside world.

By the time of Heydar Aliyev’s taking office as acting President of Azerbaijan in summer of 1993 so many problems had accumulated in the Russian - Azerbaijani relations that talking of partnership and cooperation was out of the question. Both countries were in a state of confrontation, with continuous stream of messages and protest notes from both sides. There was preparation for the introduction of visa regime and restricted entry of Azerbaijanis in Russia.

A passive position of Moscow leadership in the summer and autumn of 1993 with respect to the Karabakh war, the inability of Russia to render tangible assistance to the economic recovery of Azerbaijan, especially in the development of deepwater oil fields on the Caspian shelf was inevitably bringing the Azerbaijani leadership closer to the West.

On December 12, 1994 the Russian Army started active operations “to restore constitutional order” in Chechnya and on December 19 Russia closed the border with Azerbaijan and Georgia thus imposing a trade embargo on Azerbaijan. The reasons for “the embargo” were based on Russia’s charges that Baku was rendering military assistance to Chechnya (trafficked foreign militants through its territory, cargoes of armaments and ammunition as well as Azerbaijani militants etc.).

With the departure from the political scene of Boris Yeltsin the Russian leadership took drastic measures to eliminate the weak points in its relations with Baku. The intergovernmental commission on economic issues resumed its work; attempts were made to solve long-standing problems in relations among the economic entities. By the mid-2000s the Russian-Azerbaijani relations were already on the mend thus making it possible for the President of Russia to pay the first post-Soviet official visit to Azerbaijan in 2001.

With regard to relations with the outside world, it should be admitted that the active use of “energy diplomacy” promoted economic recovery of Azerbaijan, ensured considerably higher living standards and consolidation of the secular democratic state. Azerbaijan intensified its efforts to integrate into the global community and above all into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Azerbaijan became a significant authoritative member of the international community. 

The Present and the Future of Russian- Azerbaijani Relationships

According to the official estimates of Russian and Azerbaijani leaders, their relations can be described as “strategic partnership”.

The interaction is based on economy and trade underlying the pragmatic and balanced character of the partnership dialogue. At present Azerbaijan seems to be the only country in the region having sufficient potential for a technological breakthrough towards new industrialization and the resources for the creation of new innovation industries.

According to the Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) for 2011 Azerbaijan ranks 13^th in the world as regards the macroeconomic environment competitiveness. In terms of balanced budget the Republic occupies the fourth place, with the level of national savings on the 11^th place.

Modern bilateral relations are reinforced by close links between top leaders and contacts of business elites in the course of work on mutual projects. In all, over 500 Russian companies are doing business on the Azerbaijani market, among them more than 170 companies with one hundred percent Russian capital and 237 joint ventures (AzRosPromInvest”,“HazarLada” and others)

The Azerbaijani investors in their turn put their capital in industrial enterprises in Russia (for instance, “Azersun Holding” finances a tea-packing factory and a cannery in Krasnodar).

There is one more important aspect of bilateral interaction --cooperation in aviation. To illustrate, OAO “Airport “Astrakhan” and “Azerbaijanian Airlines” are working on a joint project worth 200 million rubles. Cooperation in the financial and banking sphere is developing with the participation of the International Bank of Azerbaijan, VTB and “Uralsib”.

The driving force of the bilateral relations is energy cooperation. Volumes of Azerbaijani natural gas deliveries are on the rise. The prospects of cooperation in the gas sphere are rather favorable given the increase in the number of proven and open gas fields (“Umid”, “Apsheron”on the Caspian shelf).Russia may also become a transit country in exporting the Azerbaijani gas to Western markets including through the “South Stream”gas pipeline.

The major transportation line of Azerbaijani oil to the world market is Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. For the diversification of oil export routes purposes the transportation of Azerbaijani oil through the Russian territory along the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline is of no small importance. The volume is not big but constant (about three million tons a year).

Baku and Moscow have started to make greater use of reserves of trans-regional transport links. In the future this will enable Russian and Azerbaijani companies to ensure and strengthen their presence on international markets of the south and south-east of Eurasia. It is planned to open Baku-Astrakhan communication lines, restore federal routes through the territory of Dagestan and Chechnya to Azerbaijan and ensure Russia’s entry in the markets of the Persian Gulf via Azerbaijan.

For Russia Azerbaijan is a natural barrier against the threats coming from the South (from the region of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf).

Therefore a stable and strong Azerbaijan is very important for Russia. In the opposite case the   Russian Caucasus might be faced with unpleasant destructive influence. That is why one of the most important elements of bilateral relations is the cooperation of law enforcement agencies engaged in civil security (cross-border cooperation, antiterrorist activities, suppression of drug trafficking and illegal migration) as well as strategic cooperation in the CIS regional ballistic missile defense (ABM) and air defense (PVO). Rocket and strategic interaction is little-known area of cooperation of the CIS countries in ballistic missile defense (ABM) and air defense (PVO) spheres. The Russian radar system “Daryal” deployed in Azerbaijan tracks rocket launches in the areas of the Middle East and Central Asia. Russian presence in “Daryal” depends on the settlement of the ABM issue. Azerbaijan has acquired several 3PK C-300 air defense missile systems from Russia and got an opportunity to strengthen its defense potential. Now it can complement the overall structure of the CIS PVO with the high-tech segment of defense in the central and southern regions of the Caspian Sea.

Looking to the future one can predict that Azerbaijan will play an increasingly wide-ranging role in the whole region-in economy, politics, cultural and social spheres. The greatest asset of Azerbaijan is not the notorious “oil-gas”, but macroeconomic and social stability. In essence, for Russia and the Russian Caucasus Azerbaijan is a stabilizing state. It is a very important feature and an indispensable asset for the years to come.

“Bakinsky rabochiy”, 20.03,1991