Arab Solution to Syrian Crisis Bumps into US Sanctions

In the run-up to the May summit of the League of Arab States (LAS), regional media and experts are speculating about the prospect of Syria’s renewed membership in the organization. Such discussions have been ongoing since 2021. The intrigue lies not so much in the outcome of the voting as in whether Syria’s return will be on the agenda at all. Thus, as recently as last fall, Egyptian officials made it clear that the decision to return a seat in the LAS to Assad’s government must be taken unanimously. This is important because the Arabs need to demonstrate unity, given that the reinstatement of the SAR in the League is being presented as its return to the Arab family. And all this is done largely in the teeth of Iran and Turkey. It is no secret that the Arab diplomatic activity has been bolstered by the seeming normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara. However, a unanimous vote is not guaranteed.

With U.S. sanctions being a major impediment to the normalization of the economic situation in Syria, the ability of the LAS member states to influence the current dynamics is severely limited. Private business from the Gulf is unlikely to dare return to Syria as long as the sanctions are in place. Nor will the governments directly provide significant assistance to Damascus or finance reconstruction projects on their own. In the short term, humanitarian aid in the form of food, medicine, fuel and other basic necessities can be expected to increase. This may slightly improve the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Arab states will be able to allocate some funds for early recovery projects using UN mechanisms, rather than directly. But this is probably the most they can do. The U.S. sanctions are imposed by Congress, which is not prepared to change anything until the Syrian government implements Resolution 2254. Among other things, the document provides for the return of refugees, a dialogue with the opposition, and political reform.

Hence, the disappointing conclusion that Syria’s return to the LAS, even if it occurs, will not mean a swift restoration of full economic ties with the Arab world. Nevertheless, even moderate liberalization would benefit Syrian business and allow the population to breathe a little easier. Moreover, even a partial recognition by regional nations could encourage a gradual change in the international community’s attitude towards Damascus, which would gain more room for maneuver in picking political partners.

In the run-up to the May summit of the League of Arab States (LAS), regional media and experts are speculating about the prospect of Syria’s renewed membership in the organization. Such discussions have been ongoing since 2021. Proponents of the dialogue and restoration of relations with Damascus refer to the fact Syria have become estranged from its Arab sisters during the years of absence from the LAS, essentially falling under the influence of other regional players, such as Iran and Turkey.

In the meantime, Bashar al-Assad’s critics tirelessly repeat that the SAR government must first change its policies to normalize the situation—for example, to resume negotiations with the opposition and ensure the return of refugees. The situation is complicated by the fact that Syria’s return to the LAS involves several aspects: procedural, political and economic.

Critical formalities

Alexey Khlebnikov:
Syrian President’s Visit to Russia Amid the Changing Regional Environment

In 2011, 18 of the 22 LAS member states voted to suspend the SAR membership in the LAS. Syria voted against this resolution, while Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria abstained. The condition for return was Damascus implementing the Arab Peace Plan proposed by the LAS, which, due to the rapid escalation of violence in the country, proved unfeasible. The possibility of transferring the seat of the SAR in the LAS to the opposition was considered, although never transpired, as Assad’s opponents were unable to agree among themselves and create unified governing bodies. Subsequently, the unfreezing of LAS membership was tied to Damascus implementing UNSC Resolution 2254, adopted in 2015. However, as the Syrian government forces made progress and Assad regained control over the country’s territory, some Arab countries decided not to wait for the political transit stipulated by the resolution.

Bahrain reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2018, while the UAE, Oman, Algeria and Tunisia have also revised their attitude towards the SAR government. The leaders of the UAE and Oman received visits from President Bashar Assad, while Algeria openly called for the return of Syria to the LAS in November 2022 at a summit held in the country’s capital. Yet, it is believed that the tough stance of Saudi Arabia, unhappy with Damascus’ close ties with Tehran, was an obstacle. The March agreement to reduce tensions between the KSA and the IRI apparently changed the Kingdom’s attitude towards Bashar al-Assad for the better. Riyadh’s approach now looks more flexible, as the visit to Syria by the head of the KSA’s foreign affairs made clear.

If the proposal to reinstate the SAR is put to vote in May, the initiative to return Damascus to the Arab family is likely to be supported by the KSA, Bahrain, the UAE, Oman, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. There is no certainty about the votes of Morocco, Yemen, Kuwait or Sudan, however. Thus, chances that the proposal to return the SAR to the LAS will win a simple majority are quite high. However, political circumstances may intervene in the situation.

Syria in the regional context

Aleksandr Aksenenok:
Twelve Years into Syrian Conflict

The intrigue lies not so much in the outcome of the voting as in whether Syria’s return will be on the agenda at all. Thus, as recently as last fall, Egyptian officials made it clear that the decision to return a seat in the LAS to Assad’s government must be taken unanimously. This is important because the Arabs need to demonstrate unity, given that the reinstatement of the SAR in the League is being presented as its return to the Arab family. And all this is done largely in the teeth of Iran and Turkey. It is no secret that the Arab diplomatic activity has been bolstered by the seeming normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara.

However, a unanimous vote is not guaranteed. Bashar Assad’s government has its consistent critics in the Arab world—most notably, Qatar. Kuwait, where sympathy for the Syrian opposition is traditionally strong, also holds on to an ambiguous position. It is indicative that differences arose at the recent meeting in Jeddah, where the representatives of the Arab Six and their closest partners were gathered, and no agreed decision regarding Syria’s return to the LAS was made.

Skeptics point to the fact that Bashar al-Assad has not adequately responded to gestures of goodwill from Arab countries, such as the opening of embassies, top-level contacts, humanitarian aid after the earthquake. Allegedly, he has ignored their concerns regarding Iranian influence in Syria and the issue of drug trafficking. Accordingly, Assad’s government is first and foremost expected to change its policy towards other Arab states, as well as to implement (albeit limited) reforms, aiming to solve some of Syria’s internal problems and create conditions for the return of refugees, if not from Turkey, then at least from Jordan and Lebanon.

The fact that Iranian presence in the SAR no longer looks so acute against the background of the emerging Saudi-Iranian détente inspires some optimism. The rhetoric of the LAS towards Iran may change, or even become conciliatory, and the return of Syria, which is thought to be an ally of the IRI within the framework of the so-called ‘axis of resistance’, no longer looks unacceptable in this environment. There is also an understanding that it would be counterproductive to demand from Assad the immediate withdrawal of the forces of Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran’s IRGC from Syria, taking into account the strong ties between the SAR and the IRI. In Damascus, too, there is certain wariness towards Arab states, and they remember too well that Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, had been among the main sponsors of the Syrian opposition at least until 2014. It is unlikely that Assad will sacrifice good relations with his proven partner to a phantom idea of Arab unity.

We cannot rule out a scenario when the issue of Syria’s return to the LAS would be postponed, but the country’s president would be invited to the summit of the organization as a guest or an observer. At the same time, the demands on Damascus would be mitigated to a realistic level. Politically, they could be reduced to resuming dialogue with the opposition within the constitutional committee and similar symbolic gestures. A truly heated debate may still unfold around combating drug production and smuggling.

This topic has been widely discussed in the regional media and, while the true scale of the criminal business defies precise assessment, international counter-narcotic experts have admitted in private conversations that Syrian-made synthetic stimulants have become a daunting challenge for the Gulf states, where they are eagerly purchased by migrant workers. And here the economic aspect of Syria’s return to the LAS comes to the fore.

The economic blockade will remain

Ivan Bocharov:
This Distant Damascus

Given the political will and some flexibility from all parties involved, it might be feasible for Syria to become part of the Arab world again. A return to the LAS would undoubtedly be a diplomatic breakthrough for the government in Damascus. Yet, this will remain a symbolic gesture unless regional economic relations are restored.

It should be clarified here that despite a high share of the oil industry in the SAR’s GDP (surely prior to the war), it has always been very important for this country to gain access to the regional market. The neighboring Arab countries, and especially monarchies of the Gulf, have imported Syrian agricultural products and low-cost consumer goods. Remittances from migrant workers were also quite significant.

Now, Syria is forced to survive in a situation of severe economic isolation. Syrians lament that the economic situation in the country has been worse during the last 3-4 years than even before 2018, which was the period of active fighting. And it is not the Arab boycott that is to blame, but U.S. sanctions that made any transactions with the SAR toxic. Banks, insurance and transport companies, including Arab ones, choose to be on the safe side and refuse to cooperate even at the slightest mention of Syria. As if this were not enough, there is a fuel crisis, which has become chronic in the SAR, forcing the country to count days until the arrival of the next tanker from Iran.

Of course, there are informal mechanisms in the Middle East that somewhat reduce the effect of sanctions. For example, the smuggling of agricultural goods into the Gulf is flourishing, and remittances enter the country through a medieval system known as Hawala. But there is no talk of normal business, much less post-conflict recovery. For example, even small workshops and stores go defunct without fuel, as they need fuel to drive generators powering their rudimentary machines or refrigerators. Worse still, the sanctions have prevented humanitarian aid or NPOs from operating, because the cost of shipping goods is exorbitant while the cost of financial transactions keeps growing by leaps and bounds. A case in point is that funds raised for the earthquake relief mission were transferred to Syria via Hawala.

With U.S. sanctions being a major impediment to the normalization of the economic situation in Syria, the ability of the LAS member states to influence the current dynamics is severely limited. Private business from the Gulf is unlikely to dare return to Syria as long as the sanctions are in place. Nor will the governments directly provide significant assistance to Damascus or finance reconstruction projects on their own. In the short term, humanitarian aid in the form of food, medicine, fuel and other basic necessities can be expected to increase. This may slightly improve the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Arab states will be able to allocate some funds for early recovery projects using UN mechanisms, rather than directly. But this is probably the most they can do. The U.S. sanctions are imposed by Congress, which is not prepared to change anything until the Syrian government implements Resolution 2254. Among other things, the document provides for the return of refugees, a dialogue with the opposition, and political reform.

Hence, the disappointing conclusion that Syria’s return to the LAS, even if it occurs, will not mean a swift restoration of full economic ties with the Arab world. Nevertheless, even moderate liberalization would benefit Syrian business and allow the population to breathe a little easier. Moreover, even a partial recognition by regional nations could encourage a gradual change in the international community’s attitude towards Damascus, which would gain more room for maneuver in picking political partners.