Egypt can be considered the homeland of radical Islamism – Hasan al-Banna, Seyid Khutb, Farag & ors were born and flourished namely in the Land of the Pharaohs. Egyptian know-how in countering terrorism is rightfully seen as one of the best practices in the Middle East. Former President H.Mubarak managed to work out the most effective in the Arab world model of fighting radicals through an all-out war waged in all directions. But the only thing he could do was “to mothball” the threat of Islamism. After all, terrorism in Egypt has become a spent force, at least in the short run.
Egypt can be considered the homeland of radical Islamism – Hasan al-Banna, Seyid Khutb, Farag & ors were born and flourished namely in the Land of the Pharaohs. Egyptian know-how in countering terrorism is rightfully seen as one of the best practices in the Middle East. Former President H.Mubarak managed to work out the most effective in the Arab world model of fighting radicals through an all-out war waged in all directions. But the only thing he could do was “to mothball” the threat of Islamism. After all, terrorism in Egypt has become a spent force, at least in the short run.
Mubarak’s War on Terrorism
Having come to power, H.Mubarak inherited a state with an extremely high level of social tension caused by the defeat in the Arab-Israeli wars, separate peace with Israel and Anwar Sadat’s Intifah economic policy. Eventually, it all resulted in a wave of terrorism which “enveloped” Egypt in the 1990s [1].
Tactics of Islamist terrorism in Egypt had a number of peculiar features. Firstly, in contrast to Algeria where terrorism became an all-out trend and put at risk the existence of the state per se, Egyptian Islamists have chosen the tactics of assassination attempts on top officials. Secondly, it was aimed at undermining the national economy, the travel industry in the first place.
Mubarak who eye-witnessed several assassination attempts of Islamic fanatics on Gamal Abdel Nasser and murder of Anwar Sadat well understood the scale and magnitude of Islamist threat. Since early 1990s the authorities resumed indiscriminate arrests launched already under the Sadat rule, toughened the legal regulation and prosecution of persons suspected of anti-state activities [2], as well as rigid policy in the field of regulations on the non-government organizations’ activity [3]. The authorities also started a dialogue with moderate Islamists through good offices of the senior al-Azhar Sheikh and the Waquf Ministry.
Internationally, the struggle was waged in four essential directions:
- Cooperation with the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF);
- Signing of the Arab agreement on counter-terrorism (1998) in Cairo in the framework of the League of Arab States;
- Bilateral cooperation with non-Arab countries in the field of counter-terrorism [4];
- Cooperation in extraditing own nationals suspected of committing acts of terrorism or involvement therein [5].
The entire range of measures undertaken by the Egyptian authorities allowed “to mothball” the terrorist threat in the shortest possible time: in 1998 the country experienced three terrorist attacks – seven times less than in 1997, and 50 times less than in the most tragic year of 1994. However, a decade later Islamists showed the flag once again: since 2009 terrorist attacks have become more and more frequent. However, Mubarak was already unable to curb terrorism for the second time.
Terrorism Defeats Terrorism
After Mubarak was deposed from presidency on February 11, 2011 the country entered a transition period characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has failed to get the situation under control. Anti-government rallies in Tahrir Square were getting louder with every passing month, and the slogan of “Irhal” (“go away!” in Arabic) – already traditional in Egypt – was more and more often addressed to the Egyptian army big brass.
Thus, the Islamists seemingly crushed under Mubarak managed not only to remind of their existence in the shortest possible time but also, above all, to muster all available resources in order to obtain powers of authority. Having understood the trend, Egypt’s Vice President Omar Suleiman in the fervor of the January revolution invited the Muslim Brotherhood to the negotiating table, which, in fact, was the recognition of Islamists as one of the leading political forces in the country. At the same time, the Mubarak regime on the last days of its life actually started a dialog both with moderate Muslim Brotherhood members and conservative Salafites, drawing the line under his ten year-long attempts to hold back the Islamist threat in the country. Those who were regarded as terrorists and were mercilessly exterminated by Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have ceased to be lawbreakers overnight. The authorities recognized the fact and, consequently, brought even greater discredit upon itself, having played into the hands of both the Salafites and Muslim Brotherhood.
The above can be proved by the results of the first round of parliamentary elections held on December 3, 2011. Freedom and Justice Party collected 36.6% of votes, and the second best result was reached by the Salafite Al-Nur Party – 24.3%. The following is remarkable in this connection. Those are not final results as two more rounds of the elections are coming. Presumably, such a layout is not so adverse to liberal democratic parties though it shows the voters’ attitude in the most progressive regions of the country once considered to be the stronghold of the Egyptian bloc. It is unlikely that two Islamist parties would form a coalition in the People’s Assembly of Egypt which means that the liberals would have an unprecedented opportunity to unite with the Freedom and Justice Party and form a commission on the development of a new national constitution.
Thereby, the Islamists, who were fighting for power throughout all their lifetime by terrorist methods as a rule, have actually hit the mark: at present they are the main driving force on the political horizon of the Land of the Pharaohs. No wonder that 2011 was the year void of terrorist attacks. Ironically, Islamists carried the day in their confrontation with the official regime, if not through terrorist attacks than amid spontaneous and deep social and political shock waves in the Arab world.
As a result, a very odd situation has developed: practically unceasing demonstrations in Tahrir Square surprisingly coincide with vanishing of the terrorist threat in the country, at least in the short run, for those who resorted to terrorism are now coming to the Egypt’s helm. However, this scenario would materialize only if a normal (rather, natural) development of the political process keeps going.
The Experience of the Past
At the very least, there are two factors which can destabilize the process of establishing a political system in Egypt.
The first factor is the Army which can intervene into the election race. For example, in 1991 the Algerian military invalidated the results of the elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front. It resulted not only in a wave of terrorism but entailed a full-scale civil war. However, it is unlikely that the present Army leadership would choose to repeat the Algerian scenario in Egypt and would actively interfere into the electoral process, to say nothing of invalidating the election results. First, it would only fan up popular wrath (including people opposing Islamists and dissatisfied with injustice of the military) toward the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Second, the Egyptian Army can hardly count upon Western support like the Algerian military in 1991. The United States have repeatedly made it clear that they are unprepared to support military suppression of the opposition which had come to power through a democratic process.
The second factor is the disenchantment of Egyptian youth which was the principle driving force of the revolution but, eventually, found itself out of the picture of political power. An identical situation developed in Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979 when the mujahiddins represented by the Iranian youth (in fact, without them the overthrow of the Shah’s regime would have been impossible) launched a war of terrorism on Islamists who took the reins of power into their hands. Certainly, one cannot rule out such a scenario in Egypt, as much will depend on how far Islamists would go in changing the Egyptian constitution, as well as on the results of the presidential race where Islamists promised to refrain from running for presidency.
In 2011 Egypt has embarked on the road of cardinal change. In its capacity of a leading country of the Arab world it will extensively determine the vector of further development of many nations of the region. In fact, gradual shaping of the Egyptian political elite focused on implanting Islamic values in the society is a new phenomenon in the country. As a result, the problem of the Islamists’ participation and influence on the Egyptian political life is no longer an outstanding issue on the agenda which by and large caused terrorist attacks.
To date, Salafites and Muslim Brotherhood have secured quite solid footing in Egypt. Unless the scenario of national development suggested by Islamists brings discredit, it seems impossible to discuss any alternative to say nothing of a new terrorist threat. It means that terrorism has defeated terrorism.
1. In 1994 Islamists presented foreign tourists with an ultimatum demanding to leave the country, and thereupon embarked on terrorism. The greatest public response was caused by the shooting of 18 Greek tourists near Europa Hotel in Cairo on April 18, 1996, arson of a bus with German tourists in the Egyptian capital on September 19, 1997 with 31 victims, and of course the incident in Lucsor on November 17, 1997 which shook the world. On that day Al-Gamaa Al-Islamia activists shot dead 61 people during an opera performance of Aida near the Hatshepsut Temple.
2. Since the introduction of amendments into the Criminal Code in June 1992 more and more civilians faced the tribunal: 48 persons in 1992, 312 – in 1993, 65 – in 1994, 143 – in 1995, and 70 persons in 1996.
3. See, e.g., Annual report of the National Council for Human Rights of Egypt. Cairo: Cairo Publishing House. 2007.
4. See, e.g., Agreement on crime-fighting cooperation between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the Arab Republic of Egypt of 1997.
5. By 2010 the Egyptian Government was soliciting the extradition of about 300 nationals residing abroad.
