On March 24, 2017, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, hosted the presentation of the RIAC and CSIS report "A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations." This project, undertaken during a period of significant tension and distrust in the bilateral relationship, brought together a bi-national group of experts to develop clear and actionable paths forward for U.S.-Russian cooperation in key areas critical to the security and prosperity of both countries. President of RIAC Igor Ivanov pronounced a speech at the event.
On March 24, 2017, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, hosted the presentation of the RIAC and CSIS report "A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations." This project, undertaken during a period of significant tension and distrust in the bilateral relationship, brought together a bi-national group of experts to develop clear and actionable paths forward for U.S.-Russian cooperation in key areas critical to the security and prosperity of both countries.
President of RIAC Igor Ivanov pronounced a speech at the event.
Text of the speech
Dear friends and colleagues!
First of all, I would like to say that I am very pleased to be a part of this discussion today. The joint project of CSIS and the Russian Council is a clear demonstration that even under the most difficult political circumstances scholars and experts can find ways to work with each other generating new ideas and proposals for intentional cooperation. Unfortunately, there are not many projects like that between Russia and the United States today, and scholarly research on both sides is often mixed with journalism and propaganda.
It is particularly deplorable, because nobody would claim that U.S.-Russian relations are on the right track and that a scholarly dialogue is not important.
The current crisis in relations between Washington and Moscow appears even more frustrating when one starts thinking about the multitude of very serious and very urgent problems that the United States and Russia have to confront today—from international terrorism and climate change, to global migration management and United Nations reforms. Instead of focusing on the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century, we tend to bring to life almost forgotten ghosts of the Cold War.
I am talking about “ghosts’ of the Cold War because I do not believe that we can see the old system restored in flesh and blood. During the real Cold War, our two countries were divided by irreconcilable ideological contradictions—something that does not exist now.
Today the world is very different from what it was during the Cold War. We have entered a very complex and controversial transformation process that should result in the establishment of a new global order to replace the one we inherited from the twentieth century. Nobody can say for sure what this new world order will look like; nobody has a master plan of how to build it. But, at the same time, nobody can free the founding members of the UN and, above all, the permanent members of its Security Council, from the responsibility they accepted to bear 70 years ago. It would be extremely dangerous and highly irresponsible to start dismantling the old system until a new one is put in place—until it is tested and demonstrates its efficiency.
Russia and The United States have a special responsibility to confront and contain the present global destabilization, as well as to build a new system of international relations.
Four principal reasons come to mind. First, the relationship between Moscow and Washington formed the axis of world politics in the second half of the last century. Although the Cold War is in the past, it caused numerous problems that continue to poison international politics to this day, generating distrust, crises, and conflicts. Russia and the United States share the primary historical responsibility to overcome this Cold War legacy as soon as possible.
Second, Russia and the United States remain the only countries in the world capable of destroying each other—and the rest of humanity—many times over in a suicidal nuclear war. Therefore, issues such as nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism fall primarily on the shoulders of our two nations.
Third, for many historical, geographical, and economic reasons, Moscow and Washington almost inevitably become involved in the most pressing regional issues of the day.
Fourth, our two countries are caught up in many of today’s global problems. For example, the United States and Russia are, moreover, in a position to do more than other states to confront growing cyber threats and promote effective international cooperation in space exploration.
This is not to say that there are no real issues between the White House and the Kremlin. There are a number of fundamental disagreements about how the world should be managed and what the future global order is going to be based upon. It would be hypocritical and counterproductive to ignore the deep gap in perceptions (one can even say—a gap of values) between the political mainstream in Russia and that in the United States. But this gap—as profound as it appears to be—cannot be a plausible excuse for not trying to work together wherever possible.
One can argue that cooperation—even in areas that are not politically sensitive and cannot be regarded as ‘toxic’—is hardly possible if there is no trust between the parties. Indeed, mutual trust is critical to any successful cooperation. This begs the question of how trust can be restored if the sides do not interact with each other? Trust is generated only through working together and through testing each other’s commitments, consistency, and integrity.
In my view, there are at least three crucial dimensions of the relationship that have to be preserved and developed further. First of all, the U.S.-Russian nuclear dialogue has to be resumed. If there is no dialogue between Washington and Moscow on strategic weapons, that sends a very bad signal to other nuclear countries, potential proliferators, our respective militaries, and everybody else. Our inability to talk to each other means that the new world order is likely to be based on a continuous arms race, expanding membership in the club of nuclear states, and a return to the old notions of deterrence, mutually assured destruction, unacceptable damage, and the whole archaic strategic culture of the Cold War era’s bipolar world.
Second, the United States and Russia have common interests in many regional crises and zones of instability: Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Korean peninsula—to name a few. No doubt, the failure to agree on Ukraine will have, and is already having, a major negative impact on our ability to work together on other regional matters. But this should not be an excuse not to try. Third, our two countries should under no circumstances sacrifice their cooperation in fighting international terrorism and extremism. There is simply no alternative to such cooperation, given the proposition that neither side wants to see the world saturated with terrorist networks, extremists overthrowing legitimate governments, dangerous weapons floating around, and mercenaries migrating from one conflict region to another. To continue cooperation in this area is not a concession granted by the United States to Russia, or vice versa. It is a long-term challenge to both of our societies, as it is to the rest of the world.
Of course, there are many other important dimensions of U.S.-Russian relations that we would like to be preserved. But if we manage to rescue only the three aforementioned, the pursuit of damage limitation policies can be regarded as successful. I hope that the ongoing cooperation between CSIS and RIAC will make its modest, but not insignificant contribution to restoring our cooperation in these and other domains.
Thank you for your attention.
