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Affairs Council**

**WORKSHOP CONFERENCE
MATERIALS «EURO-ATLANTIC
SECURITY COMMUNITY:
MYTH OR REALITY?»**

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Contents

Igor Ivanov , President of the Russian International Affairs Council.....	7
Dmitry Medvedev , President of the Russian Federation.....	8
James Jones , US President National Security Adviser (2009-2010).....	14
Volker Rühle , FRG Defense Minister (1992-1998).....	16
William Perry , Professor at Stanford University, US Secretary of Defense (1994-1997).....	18
Desmond Browne , UK Secretary of State for Defense (2006-2008).....	20
Humanitarian and economic aspects of security	22
Thorbjørn Jagland , Secretary General of the Council of Europe.....	22
Common values and overcoming mistrust	25
Anatoly Torkunov , Academician of RAS, Rector of MGIMO University the Russian MFA.....	25
Aleksandr Chubaryan , Academician of RAS, Director of the RAS Institute of General History.....	26
Vladimir Lukin , Ombudsman in the Russian Federation.....	28
Jessica Mathews , President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.....	29
Robert Legvold , Professor of political science emeritus at Columbia University.....	30
René Nyberg , Head of the East Office of Finnish Industries, Ambassador of Finland to the Russian Federation (2000 - 2004).....	32
Russia and the EU: potential for cooperation	33
Vladislav Inozemtsev , Director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies, Board member of the Russian International Affairs Council.....	33
Vladimir Chizhov , Permanent Representative of Russia to the EU and Euroatom, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation.....	35
Reiner Hartmann , Chairman of the Executive Board of the Association of European Businesses in the Russian Federation, Head of E.ON - Ruhrgas AG.....	38
Mikhail Kovalchuk , Director of the Russian Scientific Center «Kurchatov Institute», Academic Secretary of the Science, Technology and Education Council under the President of the Russian Federation.....	39
Valery Yazev , President of the Russian Gas Society Non-profit Partnership.....	40
Aleksandr Grushko , Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation ..	41
Military and political aspects of security	43
Missile defense – a factor of security or confrontation?	43
Alexei Arbatov , Academician of RAS, Head of the Center for International Security Center of IMEMO RAS.....	43
Dmitry Rogozin , Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation.....	44
Serguey Ryabkov , Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.....	49
François Heisbourg , Advisor to the President of International Institute of Strategic Studies (France).....	51

Viktor Yesin, Chief of Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (1994-1996),
 Leading Research Fellow at the Center of Military and Strategic Studies of the
 RAS Institute for US and Canadian Studies, Colonel-General.....52

Richard Burt, US Chair of Global Zero, former US Chief Negotiator
 at START talks.....54

Enhancing military security: the role of arms control.....57

Serguey Rogov, Academician of RAS, Director of the Institute for the US and
 Canadian Studies.....57

Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.....58

Bruce Blair, President of the World Security Institute (USA), Co-founder
 of Global Zero.....61

Viktor Koltunov, Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic Stability,
 Major-General.....63

Yevgeny Buzhinsky, Senior Vice-President of the PIR Center,
 Lieutenant-General.....65

François Heisbourg, Advisor to the President of International Institute
 of Strategic Studies (France).....66

Conclusion.....70

Igor Ivanov, President of the Russian International Affairs Council.....70



IGOR IVANOV, President of the Russian International Affairs Council

Distinguished colleagues, on behalf of the Russian International Affairs Council I would like to thank you for accepting our invitation to participate in today's workshop conference. President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev actively supported this initiative and agreed to make a keynote speech. Senior officials of the President's administration, the Government of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, other ministries and agencies as well as prominent Russian scholars, experts, representatives of business community, educational establishment and the public at large take part in the work of the conference. Particularly I would like to appreciate the participation and readiness to speak at the conference of Mr. Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe.

There is only one item on the today's agenda – the possibility to establish in a vast Euro-Atlantic space such relations that would allow the states and the peoples to stop being afraid of each other but instead jointly combat common threats posed to security. And provided such a possibility exists, what concrete steps should be taken to consistently move towards achieving this goal. This may seem trivial to somebody. The issues of Euro-Atlantic security have been under discussion for more than a decade already, however, they remain high on the agenda. If we make real progress in security sphere in the Euro-Atlantic space, it will qualitatively change the whole situation in international security, allow us to join efforts in combating contemporary threats and challenges and successfully address development problems. Therefore, we can not agree with the opinion that the wrong timing for discussing security issues, the main thing to do now is to overcome the consequences of the economic and financial crisis in the Euro-Atlantic region. The problems of development and security are interconnected and the solution of one problem is impossible without making progress in resolving the others. Unfortunately, the years after the end of the Cold War haven't added optimism so far in terms of creating a comprehensive system of Euro-Atlantic security. Of course, we have become more open, we are visiting each other more often, our business, cultural and scientific contacts and exchanges are expanding. That said, we continue to distrust each other as we used to do it in the past, and in the sphere of security we continue to think in the same obsolete terms dividing security between ours and theirs. Are we doomed to this scenario? Surely, not – as many experts and influential politicians of Russia, Europe and the United States believe.

Among the handouts you can find a collection of works of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. It contains the results of the studies done by the leading Russian experts over the last two years. In the handouts there is also a report produced by the Tri-lateral commission which was established two years ago on the initiative of the Carnegie Endowment (the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Prominent politicians and experts from Russia, United States and European countries participated in this commission. There have been other studies performed

in this regard testifying not only to the possibility of achieving progress in the sphere of security but also to urgent necessity of doing it. The Tri-lateral commission's report makes, in particular, a substantiated, from my perspective, conclusion that instead of getting focused on the enlargement of the existing alliances, the establishment of new institutions and the adoption of new declarations it's necessary to take efforts to remove the existing barriers and mistrust in the relations between our states. On this very premise we are planning to build the work of our today's conference. However, we realize that not a single conference can give answers to all the questions. I want to emphasize that this agenda will continue to dominate the program activity of the Russian International Affairs Council. In the beginning we'll consider the problems of humanitarian and economic security, then the floor will be given to our keynote speaker, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and after his speech we will go on to discuss military and political aspects of security.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV, President of the Russian Federation

Colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

It was with great interest that I accepted the invitation to take part in this conference. There is a very high level of representation here. As far as I know, experts from nearly 20 countries have come here to discuss the very relevant task of building the Euro-Atlantic security community. I want, first of all, to welcome all of our guests to Moscow and Russia.

Let me start straight away by answering the question before us: is the Euro-Atlantic security community a myth or reality? I think that it is still a myth for now, but a myth that must become reality; and this is something we can all take part in.

Constructive and unbiased dialogue with scholars and experts is essential in order to help those whose job is to think about the future of their countries and peoples and who feel real responsibility for our world's future make the right practical decisions. In today's world of fast-paced globalization these are not just polite words, they have become an axiom.

Russian International Affairs Council was established two years ago. We supported this initiative and I think we were right to do so. I hope that the civil society representatives, scholars, diplomats, and military people on the Council feel the real demand we have for their views and contribution.

Speaking frankly, Russia most certainly seeks to build a Euro-Atlantic security community in which all feel safe and comfortable and equally protected. This endeavor has clear global importance, and no matter how hard this road is, Russia will follow it together with other countries, with our international partners. We will not abandon this road or adopt a wait-and-see position, but will act.

Security does not come just all of its own accord. Guaranteeing security is a task requir-

ing effort and input by all countries. We still have much work to do to overcome the crisis of confidence. As you know, the crisis of confidence was named as the main reason for the global economic crisis that swept the world in 2008. The crisis years have brought us their share of dramatic events, but have also taught us much (by 'us' I mean the international community and countries' leaders). Above all, we have learnt to listen to each other in critical situations, which simply did not happen before on economic issues. The crisis served as a serious warning to us all and convinced us of the need for fundamental changes to the system of international economic relations. We have not made all of these changes yet, but we are advancing along this road. Indeed, in some areas we are moving faster than I imagined possible when we first met at the end of 2008 in the USA in a not very optimistic mood.

We must do the same in foreign policy, work together to resolve the modern world's problems and join our forces on a fundamentally new basis.

I remain convinced that security can only be indivisible and equal. Attempts to bolster one's own security at the expense of others destroy the very idea of building a community of countries and undermine the basis for cooperation. Even more serious, they raise the specter of new dividing lines, create tension and instability. The problem is not just that such oases of security are not viable and cannot last in a globalised world, but that their collapse could bury in its ruins the entire existing security system and ultimately, the system of international law.

More than ever before, the Euro-Atlantic region demands a solid partnership. We share many things and we need each other overall. We have many common problems. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural and manmade disasters, financial and economic instability, international terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking are all problems that require us to stand closely together. Certainly, these threats existed before too, but in a globalised world they become all the more evident and all the more dangerous.

We have plenty of the conditions we require for building partnership and enough experience of good-neighborly cooperation. We have helped each other in many different situations. We in Russia have not forgotten, for example, the difficult situation we had with the wild fires that struck our country the year before last. We are very grateful to our European partners for the great help they gave us then.

We help each other in evacuating embassy staff from conflict zones, combat piracy at sea together, and work jointly to fight transnational crime and terrorism. We have organized information exchange on terrorist groups.

We have accomplished a lot over these years, including together with the European Union. We have simplified visa rules, and are working on the Partnership for Modernization program, which I think is an important undertaking. I hope it will continue and that other countries will get involved too. We have joined efforts too, to overcome the enormous number of hurdles that were in the way of Russia's joining the WTO. Western business is now finding a more comfortable environment in Russia, or, at least, has seen our rules become clearer and easier to understand. This does not mean that all problems have been resolved, but there is a sense of greater closeness now, and this is a convincing signal we can send to all involved in security.

Not so long ago, military power was the universal measure of a country's strength. We all hope that these times are now a thing of the past. Countries today are strong above all through their openness and their readiness to work as partners. I will go further and say that helping our partners is one of our priority national interests, because a world in which mutual support reigns is a secure world.

Acting in this light, we are developing our integration within the Commonwealth of In-

dependent States and are working together closely with our allies to strengthen cooperation within the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Let me say that we see this organization not as an isolated group, but as an effective regional mechanism for countering the common threats we face. Actually, I would recommend that our partners in NATO think about expanding and deepening their ties with the CSTO. I think the time for this is ripe. This is in our mutual interest, in our common interest.

Today, we have made decisive progress and reached a new stage of economic integration within the Eurasian Economic Union that is in the process of formation between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

I think that in our relations with NATO it is time to free ourselves of the phantoms of the past and mistrustful instincts that on both sides are clearly hindering our attempts to build a full-fledged partnership.

The time has come for rapprochement and joint decisions aimed at building a more stable and fairer world order.

I remember the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon in November 2010, where it was stated convincingly that security of all countries in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible and that the security of NATO and Russia is interlinked. I am ready to sign my name to these words today, too. The meeting was positive in spirit overall, and open in its discussions of the different issues. Our position is that Russia's relations with NATO form one of the cornerstones of security in the Euro-Atlantic area and play a big part in shaping strategic stability at the global level.

At the same time, of course, we cannot organize cooperation between Russia and NATO without resolving the issues that concern our countries' fundamental interests. The test of how ready the United States and other NATO members are for genuine partnership with Russia is really very simple: to what extent will they take our interests into account, above all regarding the European missile defense issue?

Reliable military technical and geographical-based guarantees that a deployed missile defense system would not be directed against Russia's nuclear deterrent forces are of principle importance for us. Missile defense forces and the system overall should fit the stated purpose of countering possible missile threats from beyond Europe, and I stress this point – beyond Europe. No one has yet explained to me clearly why we should believe that the new European missile defense system is not aimed against us. On the contrary, we are always being told, 'This system is for you, not against you. Use it too'. But how are we to use it? Whichever way you look at it, it upsets nuclear parity. I can tell you frankly that no matter how good my relations with my colleagues and no matter how deep Russia's relations with NATO member countries, we have no choice but to take this issue into account and respond if the circumstances call for it.

The dialogue continues now and no doors are closed. I ask you to remember that this was not our decision. We did not come up with this idea and are not the ones carrying it out. To be honest, many European leaders tell me privately in the corridors that they do not need this system, but that, 'we have the principle of Atlantic solidarity, and so will go ahead with it, even though we'd rather not spend money on it'. Well, we do not need this system either.

There is still time, though it is starting to run short. I believe it is in our mutual interest to work swiftly on finding a mutually acceptable solution, but any agreements here must be genuinely mutually acceptable. I have no doubt that we can agree, all the more so as recent years furnish many examples of successful cooperation. Indeed, I am rather proud of the results we have achieved. One of the biggest was the conclusion of the New START Treaty, based on the

principles of equality, parity, and equal and indivisible security for both parties. Incidentally, the preamble, as I recall, states the link between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons. If anyone has forgotten, I recommend that you open the Treaty and take a fresh look. I believe that if we take the same approach to the missile defense issue we will certainly find a solution.

We have solid cooperation in all aspects of ensuring reliable nuclear security. We have prepared thoroughly for the upcoming summit in Seoul. I will be there and I hope that the summit will mark a new stage in strengthening and expanding cooperation in physical nuclear protection, preventing potential nuclear terrorism threats, and preventing the emergence of black markets for nuclear materials and trafficking in such materials.

Russia pays close attention to the security and protection of nuclear materials and related installations. I will talk about this in Seoul, explain the steps we have taken in this area, and discuss possible forms of contact and exchange of experience with our partners.

The task of strengthening the foundations of international relations is the basis of another of our proposals, namely, the idea of a European Security Treaty. In the draft version of this document we tried to set out the basic principles for security in interstate relations in the Euro-Atlantic area. These principles are conscientious compliance with international obligations, respect for countries' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and the renunciation of use of force. This Treaty would give us the conditions we need to develop effective cooperation mechanisms that will enable us to respond adequately to security threats and challenges.

This initiative is not directed against anyone, and I am sure that it would consolidate us, build confidence between us, and add stability to our relations.

Colleagues, I hope that this conference will give a new boost to concrete discussion on how to improve the European security architecture and help to answer a number of very important questions. Answering these questions will help us to reach agreement on the most difficult issues and this will ultimately help to change the security paradigm.

Equal rights are a cornerstone of international law, and imply equal responsibility and also equal obligation for making a real contribution to ensuring security. The norms and principles of international law are the universal and time-tested instrument of interstate relations. Methods for regulating and governing international processes can be viable only if they comply with and use the principles of supremacy of the law, and of countries' sovereignty. The United Nations plays an indisputable role and has indisputable influence here as the organization in which we have vested the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. This does not always happen in practice. We are to close any loopholes for bypassing the Security Council and using force without its consent, and such attempts happen regularly in various guises. The arguments given are simple: that we were unable to reach agreement in the UN, and so it, or the policy of particular countries, is flawed, and we will therefore take action on our own initiative in the interests of a better world and of democracy. But where do we see the supremacy of international law in such arguments?

I note in particular that we have seen an increase of late of people seeking to use force as a means of resolving problems. We hear not just experts but officials make statements of an ultimatum nature complete with threats of outside armed intervention. I think this is very dangerous and quite simply unacceptable. Some want to hurry to make Syria a modern democracy, and some want to sort out the Iranian nuclear program as quickly as possible. We are also very concerned by many of the events in the world, including the issues I just named. But behind these various statements and actions, we often see a flawed logic and psychology of war.

No matter what the good intentions motivating attempts to impose one's view or one's freedom on those who disagree, they are not compatible with the principles of international relations. Let us try to listen to each other more attentively and without prejudice, and be more attentive about taking into account the history and cultural and religious specificities of different countries and regions. Most important is not to let propagandistic attacks undermine or suppress the supremacy of international law, or else international relations will descend into a spiral of anarchy and arbitrary action.

Today we urgently need competition of ideas on how to bolster the cooperative foundations of international relations, and common efforts in this area to act as a counterweight to the race for geopolitical supremacy. This kind of race for supremacy always reproduces an outdated approach to conducting international affairs and brings only short-term success. We often see how relative such victories turn out to be in the end. Today's advantage won is lost tomorrow, faded away, but the cost and the price to pay in terms of destroying and undermining regional and global balances and trust are very high.

We have made our contribution to this competition of ideas with our European Security Treaty, but we are ready to discuss other ideas too on how to ensure indivisible security. We never put on blinkers and do not take the attitude that our idea is the best and that we should not therefore discuss any other proposals. This is not the case. But we have yet to see and hear these other ideas. What we hear is that there is NATO and this is sufficient. Those who are not in NATO are often perceived as latent enemies or as international losers, and this is not a good thing.

Let me say a few words about the new security dimension. Today, we are witness to persistent attempts to make mass manipulation of public opinion a tool in international relations. This sees a country or group of countries instil their own aims and objectives in the consciousness of others as a kind of unquestioned political truth, with other points of view rejected. We all should be more tolerant and learn to listen to each other better.

I believe that any initiatives and action, even if they have the majority's support, must not violate international law and democratic decision-making procedures. Syria's case is illustrative in this respect. A very active media campaign unfolded with respect to Syria. I will not now discuss the nature of these events, but what is clear is that this media campaign had little to do with the task of ending the violence as rapidly as possible and facilitating the national dialogue that we all want to see there.

But if we concentrate on professional and serious discussion rather than propaganda efforts, the international community is capable of working out a common approach to settling this conflict. This is evident in the agreement on the five principles reached with the involvement of our country's foreign minister and his colleagues from the League of Arab States, and in the approved statement issued a few days ago by the chairman of the UN Security Council in support of Kofi Annan's mission. I stress that the provisions of this document are in line with the proposals that Russia has been making right from the start.

With regard to the Syrian issue, I note too, the role the expert community plays in providing objective and unbiased analysis of international events. Of course, we are all grateful to journalists for giving us timely information and for their self-sacrificing work in sometimes very dangerous situations. They deserve our praise. But truly in-depth and professional analysis must come from the experts, the professionals who have comprehensive knowledge and rich experience, including diplomatic experience and experience in resolving crisis situations. We therefore think it so important to listen regularly to your voice, assessments and conclusions.

Colleagues, we hear more and more often today about security as a multidimensional concept that includes a humanitarian dimension too. The Euro-Atlantic region faces many human rights challenges today. They include basic racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance. They include too, issues regarding national and ethnic minorities, refugees and displaced persons, and migrants. The list goes on. These problems affect all of our countries to some degree, all of the Euro-Atlantic countries. We can address them effectively only through constructive and equal cooperation using the full spectrum of regional cooperation mechanisms including the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Russia is ready for this cooperation and consistent in calling on all of its partners to join in.

We see these issues as intrinsically linked to spirituality, moral values, and historical traditions, and cannot accept their separation. We oppose attempts to impose upon sovereign countries recipes for solutions to these problems. We cannot accept a selective approach to assessing the human rights situation. This approach is usually based on double standards and ultimately devalues the basic principles of international relations and of the classic concept of democracy itself, inculcated in us in the schoolroom and in university classes.

How are we to see the mantras repeated by particular countries that consider themselves the main exporters of democracy if, say, in the Libyan and now the Syrian cases, countries whose internal political lives are governed by completely different norms are chosen as models to follow for democratic development? You either have democracy or you don't. Does it not sadden you too, to look at what is going on?

We are to cast aside this kind of opportunistic thinking and realize just how deep and serious are the changes taking place in the world. Only in this case we will be successful in building a united Europe, a Europe without dividing lines, and it is this that is our real task. We in Russia want this very much. The time of separation and division has passed now, fortunately, and there is no going back to it. Our peoples' will and their desire for unity is the guarantee of this.

More than ever before, the state of international security depends on human potential in Europe as a whole. Russia treasures immensely its human wealth. We are a multi-ethnic country, a very complex country with a system of values shaped over the centuries and developed and enriched through interaction with other European cultures. We realize too, that our historic and spiritual commonalities are at the foundation of the European identity, and these are not empty words.

In conclusion, I want to say that we are open to dialogue and a search for mutually acceptable decisions on all security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. I hope very much for your contribution to reaching these truly historic objectives.

I wish you all success and thank you for your attention.

JAMES JONES, US President National Security Advisor (2009-2010)

Mr. President, it's a great honor to be with you today. When I read the title of the conference it struck me not so much as a question about the present but a choice about the future, one in which Russia, the United States and the entire Euro-Atlantic Community share an enormous stake, as the President pointed out. I also reflected on the deeper and richer meaning of security in the 21st century, one which encompasses economic development and the rule of law that are instrumental to sustainable security and progress.

If Euro-Atlantic Community is in fact a myth, then that's bad for all of us. If we make it an enduring reality then that is very good for all of us. Currently in private life I cherish the fine memories of the relationship I enjoyed as National Security Advisor with my Russian counterparts some of whom we hear today. To advance the manifold that our countries share the mission of helping to shape the reality of Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation. We performed our duties and the spirit of frankness with open communications, mutual respect. And I will always be deeply grateful for the exemplary partnership and long-lasting friendships that were formed.

I have the privilege of working closely with a number of non-governmental think-tanks back at home. And I'm honored to serve as board chair of the soon to be launched Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Our aim is to advance cooperative agendas with great powers such as Russia on the most important challenges facing us all in this complex world. Such institutions are important, they are elements of national policy making fostering openness, providing all why it is possible to be and welcoming different points of view. Inclusiveness of civil society is both the measure and the neighbor of national greatness and resilience in challenging 21st century. Your presence here, Mr. President, testifies to the importance of communications, and the list of your speakers to the value of inclusiveness. I look forward to reciprocating with an invitation for Russian participation in the program related to our mutual security at the Atlantic Council of the United States sometimes in the near future.

Today, as then, as always strengthening resets and building closer relationships is the product of all open strong and regular interaction and outreach, the kind of outreach exhibited by President Medvedev's historic participation in the NATO-Russia Council summit in Lisbon. One did exemplify that shared and energetic commitment to the reality of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation. This watershed was one of the most signal achievements: a new START Treaty, the one-two-three agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and the stronger partnership against shared security threats. One of my last acts as National Security Advisor was to attend a conference in Sochi on joint efforts to counter terrorism, narcotics and organized crime. Forty three countries as I recall attended that Russian-led conference. The NATO-Russia Council counternarcotics program exemplifies the requirement of community in tack-

ling common dangers. We've energized the US-Russia bilateral presidential commission to promote engagement at every level of society. And we look forward to Russia's accession later this year to the World Trade Organization.

Today we know that the preminent threat to global security is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Particular efforts with respect to Iran, North Korea and non-state actors must headline our joint agenda. Missile defense represents a new platform for European security, all of European security. There is no other comfortable opportunity for NATO-Russia cooperation on a major security program. Officials on both sides will be working in the coming months to transform missile defense in Europe from a troublesome arrogant to a productive cooperation, which provides Russia the reassurance it seeks in the participation it can have.

We must build on our important successes and refuse to get sidetracked. We recognize even in a shadow of our vital achievements the bold reality is of domestic politics and the experience of campaign rhetoric whatever the system of government. But we can't ignore the reality that words years and hours reverberate around the world and influence the environment in which great nations must continue to work together to accomplish important deeds. We are not naive. We know that we will always have our differences of opinion. Often the discrepancy is more about means than ends. In other cases the gaps are more fundamental. As we work through our differences to pierce the diplomatic fog and grasp the shared strategic necessities upon which the quality of our future rests.

Russians, Americans, Europeans, indeed the whole of mankind have historic opportunities to force, to achieve lasting good. Economic globalization, burgeoning trade and broadening access to technological advancement are opening new and life-altering frontiers. Expanding awareness and opportunity are catalyzing the hopes of hundreds of millions of people around the world who are awakening from ignorance and shaking off inevitability of poverty and oppression, to contribute to the great enterprise of human development. No nation can enjoy a full advantage of its natural wealth and vast human potential without a secure and orderly world. It is possible only by the fervent protection of fundamental human rights by the rule of law, by the free flow of ideas and commerce and by global security.

The hallmark of the new world we live in is the rise of Asia. The international community acknowledges Russia's enormous opportunity and critical responsibilities as the bridge between Europe and the blossom Eurasians of East. It's exciting and filled with potential for Russia and for the world. I can't think of anything more inimical to our shared interest than the opportunity to seize this opportunity of the ages if the Euro-Atlantic Security Community clearly were approved mythical. As we glimpse the future and make the decisions that will define its path let's draw wisdom from the hard warned lessons of our common history. Creating a future to which we aspire will not be easy. Obstacles, pitfalls and divergence will continue to mark the way. We know that the better future is illusory unless we overcome them to meet the strategic challenges of our time: proliferation, opening the channels of international trade, assuring the free flow of commerce and honoring the modern compact between people and government that is the ultimate guarantor of security and national greatness.

We are all influential members of the international community. We are vested with joint obligations, among them leading the world and fulfilling our responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity and preventing the spread of the awful instruments atrocity, weapons of mass destruction. We must find our way past historic impediments and to a better future for the people that government is conceived to serve the kind of future to which

not just Russians, Europeans and Americans aspire but the entire community of nations. So, let us not miss the opportunity. We recognize the stakes and understand the risks and we know that requirements of achieving a better destiny, wise leadership and a faithful collaboration of great nations institutionalize advance through vigorous Partnership for peace. The transatlantic community has an enormous say in the state of the world and the prospects for human advancement. The members of this community are joined by shared interest and by common asset – the greatness of our people. Today as throughout modern history what we do together can significantly influence the course of human events for good, what we fail to do together can produce a future that is unmerited by the sacrifices of progress and manifestly unworthy of generations to follow.

Great alliances don't require an adversary in order to do good; their oxygen is shared values, joint principles and common goals. And great countries don't need to pretend to make themselves look good. Greatness is defined by right protected, responsibilities fulfilled and happiness and security of our people. Like relations between individuals fruitful relations among nations spring from trust and confidence. Lasting trust and enduring confidence are nourished by communication and energized by the recognition that our mutual interests are far more powerful, far more enduring than our differences. So, let us be guided by simple truth. Modernity belongs to participation in convergence, not isolation and division; it belongs to progress, to prosperity and to freedom. Now it is our duty, indeed, our great honor to press forward together with the hard work of creating the kind of future we desire. So, will Euro-Atlantic Security Community be a myth or reality we know what our choice must be. As we drive our past, we might bear in mind that the word community is not simply a noun, it's also an adjective. It can lead to the peace, stability, prosperity and cooperation to which great alliances and great nations pledge themselves.



VOLKER RÜHE, FRG Defense Minister (1992-1998)

My answer to the question posed in the title of this conference «Security community in Euro-Atlantic area: myth or reality?» will be a little different from yours, Mr. President. It's neither a myth nor reality. It is a vision, but it is a realistic vision. I was struck this morning how right Jessica Mathews was when she said it is more difficult to overcome the legacy of Cold War than the legacy of the hot wars which caused millions of deaths. And it is true. There is still a lot of Cold War thinking on both sides and this part of the world is not prepared if this continues to play a proper role in a completely new world.

From my point of view Russia belongs to the West. Now, when NATO was founded the first Secretary General Lord Ismay said NATO had three aims: to keep the Russians out, keep

the Americans in and keep the Germans down. We should bring the Russians in. How about America? It was very unusual to stay in Europe. They didn't stay after the First World War and in order for them to stay in a meaningful way we have to do relevant things together in the 21st century, we cannot just continue doing the kind of things, which we did in the past. That would make NATO irrelevant in the future. So, we have to take decisions. Russia has to decide where it wants to belong and we have to decide if we come to a historic opening of NATO. I believe it's real: United States, Europe and Russia, they face the same challenges, they should work together. And we need a new institution of framework to do that really new beginning.

Now, how is the situation in NATO? We don't agree on how to see Russia. There are still countries that are afraid of Russia. And countries have different histories but we cannot be prisoners of history. And I am very sure that this will be overcome. Very great things have been done between Russia and Poland and I hope the same happens as regard to the Baltic States. But I'm very sure that fear of Russia will not be the glue that will hold NATO together in the 21st century. Protection against Russia is definitely not the future of NATO. And I'm not so sure that we are always aware of it.

Now, what strikes me most is that compared with the cold war where we had existential political conflicts between the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact from the one side, NATO, United States from the other side, political conflicts we have now are peanuts compared with it. But the military structures which are still there together with nuclear hangover. The military structures should really represent the real conflicts which we have. The currency of the Cold War was the ICBM. This is no longer the currency of the 21st century. If you look at the state how strong is internationally, you have to look at this economic performance, technology, sustainability, and you have to look at the political system: how attractive is it domestically, internationally? And then you can also look at the military side. And this is what we have to understand that we live in a different situation.

Last remark and again this is not really a subject of a Defense Minister. If we want to build trust, millions of people have to be able to meet in the easiest way. This is how the European Union do together and how we became very close friends. The attractiveness of the European Union is how open it is. We should go ahead in these areas but there's also issues very strange, administrative thing and migrating quota. So, let us also take this up as an issue to meet.

There are a lot of issues how to grow together. But I would finally like to say, we've seen miracles to happen in Europe, big change, but we have to make a new effort and use this window of opportunity also to starting building up new trust I'm very grateful for all of you who take part in this word.

WILLIAM PERRY, Professor at Stanford University, US Secretary of Defense (1994-1997)

How US are dealing with today's conflicts and threats and what role Russia can play in dealing with them jointly with us? What is the potential of arms control starting first with Iraq and Afghanistan? And now finally Iraq is on the right progress. We now have military forces out of Iraq. I believe Iraq will never serve as a beacon of democracy as once hoped, but I do believe it would be better than it was under Saddam Hussein. We are now on our way out of Afghanistan, and I also believe that it will be much sooner than our government has now stated.

We have entered Afghanistan to defeat al Qaeda and to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. Since then our mission has broadened to include the mission of rebuilding Afghanistan. We will limit our future in Afghanistan to the goal of counter-terrorism ensuring that Afghanistan has not again become a base for global terrorism. In addition to that we will offer some assistance to Afghanistan to train their security forces. If we do make this change then this will require far fewer troops and far fewer bases than we now have in Afghanistan and will lead to a significant drawdown of the United States and NATO forces.

Let's look at Pakistan. I believe this is the most dangerous region in the world today. They have more than a hundred nuclear weapons and are still building nuclear weapons. They have tons of fissile material and are still building more fissile material. They have a violent, radical insurgency going on in the country which threatens a weak government. And they are the greatest proliferation danger in the world today having already proliferated several countries to the A.Q. Khan network. There is also the ever-present danger of another India-Pakistan war. All one has to imagine is another terror operation in India comparable to Mumbai, a Mumbai-2. A possible conflict may very well escalate into a full-scale nuclear war.

In Iran we are in danger of drifting into a military operation this year. There could well be a strike by Israeli or United States air forces against the nuclear installations in Iran, but I fear it will lead to many unintended consequences. Therefore I believe we should exhaust all diplomatic options up to what I would call coercive diplomacy in a particular field, financial sanctions before even considering the use of any military. These sanctions could be much more effective if they were joined robustly by Russia and by China.

North Korea already has half a dozen nuclear weapons. I do not believe North Korean nuclear weapons pose a direct threat to the United States. They do not have intercontinental missiles and even if they did they could be readily counted. But they are very serious to Japan and to South Korea. In addition to that they sell the materials, they sell the technology, and they sell their equipment of which Libya and Syria are just two quite recent examples. And we know that they are collaborating with Iran.

From that basis, now let me shift to US-Russian relations. US military strategy last year stated it clearly and explicitly that the primary danger to the United States is that of violent extremists and particularly with the danger that extremists could get weapons of mass de-

struction, in particular, nuclear weapons. The paper says explicitly that its authors do not see the danger of a military conflict with Russia instead look for cooperation with Russia. US and Russia have no serious security issues, our security threats are from other nations and from transnational threats. And I might say I believe Russia's are the same, not from the United States, but from other nations and from transnational threats.

I also believe that the greatest danger comes from nuclear weapons. And there are equal dangers to both of our nations and the most effective thing we can deal with these threats is to work cooperatively together. But that cooperation seems to get harder and harder. The real progress here I believe requires overcoming a mistrust and building some confidence in each other. A good example of how we might do that is restoring the technical dialogue between our nuclear laboratories. For decade after the Cold War we had intense dialogue between our nuclear laboratories dealing with the technical issues of how to make the weapons more secure, how to protect them from terrorist attacks. This was a very productive and very useful dialogue. In the last decade it has been stopped. I think it's very important to restore that laboratory to laboratory dialogue, technical dialogue to its full dimension.

We should resolve our ballistic missile dispute which is absurd in my judgment. What it takes is the will of both governments to work to overcome this problem. I'm hopeful that it'll be done in this coming year.

We should be working together in robust fashion to deal with the danger of fissile material getting into the wrong hands. We've already had one meeting on this subject in Washington, another one is just getting under way in Korea. This is an opportunity for progress. Let me suggest to this audience that it would be great if one of the future summits or conferences on fissile material were held right here in Moscow. Nothing could be more appropriate than that.

And finally I would give you a follow-up to the new START Treaty. One of the objectives would be to get the lower numbers, maybe down below a thousand; a more important objective would be to deal meaningfully and effectively with the non-counted nuclear weapons: the non-deployed nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons in reserve and with the tactical nuclear weapons. It has been too hard, simply too hard to find ways of reducing the number of these weapons, so why don't we approach for the point of view of at least declaring them and making them open for inspection. This would be a major step forward, which would not have to deal with the strategic issues, which seem to be blocking us in progress at this point.

Well, this is just a list of some of the examples on areas where I believe we could make near term very important progress. More generally, we should look for those issues which are too hard to solve and try to get them solved because they are our benefit in themselves. What is most important is to build the mutual trust, to build up the confidence and to use that as the basis for tackling even more serious, more difficult problems between our two nations.

DESMOND BROWNE, UK Secretary of State for Defense (2006-2008)

I am honored to play this small role and to be asked to speak at this important conference. It's a result of my enduring commitment to the reality or vision of creating Euro-Atlantic Security Community. It seems to me that people of my generation and older have a distinct responsibility to lay the foundations of such a community.

I'm conscious that there are probably fewer younger people in this room than they ought to be for these discussions, but my sense is that because of the Internet and because of the way, in which younger people communicate, these barriers that we have had difficulty in reducing are much less important to them and it should not be part of our legacy to leave them with these 20th century barriers as they challenge, I think, as they address the challenges of the 21st century.

Speaking from my vantage point as a convenor of the Board of the newly formed European Leadership Network, I am to express the hope that this will be the first of many opportunities for cooperation between the Russian International Affairs Council and the European Leadership Network.

Despite two decades of statements to the effect that the Cold War is over and there is a new era of cooperation between the US, NATO and Russia, the truth is that our mutual relations remain characterized by deep mistrust. It seems to me that this mistrust exists on both sides, and is contaminating the debate on missile defense, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the conventional force balance in Europe and on the so-called frozen conflicts in the Caucasus. The recent disagreements over how to respond to change in the Middle East, in particular over Syria, are also making cooperation between us more difficult.

I know that here in Russia there is concern that NATO has misused its military power not only in places like Kosovo and Libya, and that it seeks United Nations Security Council approval to do so again in its own, and not wider international interests. I know there is concern over US capacity to quickly upload nuclear warheads to strategic missiles to intimidate other states. And I know there are concerns over the potential of NATO ballistic missile defense deployments to undermine the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.

Inside NATO on the other hand, I know there is lingering fear of Russia, deep concern over Russia's stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons and its proximity to NATO borders, and concern over what some see as a Russian willingness to use military force to settle disputes in places like Georgia and other parts of its near abroad.

I could go on. But instead of going on, let me ask the audience where will this mistrust lead us? Do we want to let our mutual relations continue like this indefinitely or even allow them to deteriorate further because that's what will happen? Do we want to allow mistrust to persist to the point where it turns some future disagreement into a real and profoundly dangerous crisis between us? Does anybody seriously want to go back to the Cold War and repeat that kind of brinkmanship again? I think, and I hope not.

This mistrust is fundamentally a legacy of the Cold War and of adversarial Cold War thinking and it is up to us, the generation of leaders and thinkers who grew up with the Cold War, to address it. In the era of climate change, of globalised trade legally regulated through the World Trade Organization (WTO), of transnational terrorism that is a threat to all of us, we must move beyond it.

The truth today is that geographically, we share a common Euro-Atlantic Security space but none of us has done enough to make that shared geography into a genuine shared security community. What can be done then to help us change that?

I have five brief points.

First, on missile defense. In my view, and in the view of my colleagues on the recent EASI Working Group on missile defense, the immediate practical task is to create joint NATO-Russia cooperation centers for pooling and sharing data from satellites and radar; in real-time, to build confidence and to provide common notification about any missile attack. Joint command-staff exercises should also be resumed and expanded to include defense against medium and inter-mediate range missiles. This cooperation should be built on the principle of national sovereignty and each party, while cooperating, should protect its own territory.

To break the log-jam and get this cooperation moving, the United States and its NATO allies should be willing to specify the maximum number of interceptors that are to be deployed in Phase IV of the Phased Adaptive approach of NATO's planned BMD system. Such a number would have to be subject to 4 or 5 yearly strategic review against the changing missile threat environment but giving a number now ought to be possible, and it would be a valuable trust-building measure. I see this because I believe simply that if the positions were reversed, then NATO would request such a number from Russia and it ought therefore to provide one itself.

Second, I believe the U.S. and Russian presidents should task each of their military leaderships to find ways of extending warning and decision time as these relate to nuclear weapons. Too many weapons remain on very high states of alert. This contributes absolutely nothing effective to the security of either side and is a dangerous legacy of the Cold War. If our publics knew about it, they would most likely, and rightly, be horrified by it, and we should respond to that.

Third, we need to make progress on the issue of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. In my view, the current U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe are militarily useless and they should be reduced in number, consolidated to fewer bases, and eventually removed altogether. Not everyone in NATO agrees with me and it is not clear what the future of these weapons will be.

I know the Russian position up to now has been that these weapons must be removed to national territory before any discussion of Russian weapons in this category can begin. I say to this audience in all honesty that Russia is strong in this category of weapons systems and is known to station some of them very close to NATO territory, especially in the Baltic region. The nearest NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons to Russian territory are, on the other hand, in Turkey, some 800 km away. I believe, in its own security interests, Russia should be willing to negotiate their removal from Europe in return for a small reduction in its own stockpile, increased transparency on total numbers and locations of weapons held in this category, and some removal Russian systems to points further away from NATO borders. There will be no hope of progress without reciprocity.

Fourth, we need to protect and continue to ensure full implementation of the New START Treaty, the verification regime of which builds confidence and stability in an important

area of the US-Russian relationship. This agreement is the nearest thing we have to a security anchor for the relationship and we should ensure its continued existence and well-being. Any break-down in implementation or withdrawal from the Treaty by either side would immediately replace hard information about nuclear deployments with a vacuum that could only add to mistrust.

Fifth, I urge everyone to balance the areas of controversy between us with growing cooperation across a wider front of issues such as trade, energy, sustainable exploitation of the Arctic, counter-terrorism, stabilizing Afghanistan, and more. We have many areas in common and many future opportunities we can work together to exploit. Although most of my comments today have focused on military issues, it is also on this wider terrain of cooperation that a prosperous and peaceful future for our children will be built.

HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SECURITY

THORBJØRN JAGLAND,
Secretary General of the Council of Europe

It is a great honor to address this very important conference on a very important topic, and I take it as a sign that you want to attach great importance to what I represent, namely, the soft power in Europe, represented by the Council of Europe. It is therefore natural for me to start recalling why we have the Europe we have today, with such a great degree of stability and cooperation.

There has been a long journey to come to this point from the 18th and the 19th century of nation building and enlightenment but also nationalism and two awful wars in the 20th century. We have to recall that actually it was one war, and its result was that the world decided to move from nationalism to internationalism by establishing the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From then on one can say that democracy that we have been living in is what I call 'constitutional democracy', which means that the majority in a country cannot do everything they want because human rights and international law restrain it. And the power of the nation state is also restrained because of that.

These ideas coming from the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were implemented in Europe starting with what Winston Churchill said in Strasbourg just after the war, when one million people came there to listen to him: «The peace in Europe had to be built upon human rights and rule of law, because we saw that where rule of law ended tyranny began». The Universal Declaration of Human Rights established huge machinery for upholding

human rights and rule of law on the entire continent. First, of course, in the democracies those had survived and were reestablished after the war. A huge machinery of monitoring bodies and on top of that the Court of Human Rights, which now gives 800 million people in Europe the right to go to this court, if they believe that their authorities are not in compliance with the ideas or the standards in the European Convention on Human Rights. This is unprecedented machinery. We have to keep this in mind and what we have achieved in Europe is actually the only real implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, because we are able to uphold the principles in that declaration by this huge machinery under the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

This system of common values and common standards is one that constitutes the Europe that they have today. Without these values and without this machinery to uphold them the European Union could not have been founded and endorsed.

If you look at the history after the fall of the Berlin Wall, no member country could have acceded to the European Union without first acceding to the Council of Europe and complying with the standards in the European Convention on Human Rights. Without these common standards we couldn't have the firm security that we have today. These values and standards also integrate Russian Federation in Europe. No other organization could have done it. We have the OSCE which I appreciate very much, which even goes beyond Europe, but we have to recall that the Council of Europe is convention-based. The convention is binding for everybody. And the Council of Europe is now going beyond the borders of Europe: we have agreements with the governments of Morocco and Tunisia, working in Jordan in order to assist them in building democratic institutions, and we are also working on agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It would be very important for this continent if we could include the entire neighborhood in the same value system that we have built upon in Europe after the Second World War.

We also have a system of collective security. During the Cold War years we had NATO in the West and the Warsaw Pact in the East; after the Berlin Wall came down we have also had that system of collective security based on a predictable cooperation between NATO and Russia. There have been problems, but after all they have been able to work in a predictable way. But there are threats that may change this.

One of those threats is that conflicts outside Europe may lead to more tensions within Europe. For instance, if we fail to resolve a conflict regarding nuclear arms in Iran one can easily foresee that this will heavily influence European politics. We do not now know how the redistribution of economic power in the world will influence relations within Europe. And my real concern is that we have growing threats coming from within Europe related to increasing xenophobic tendencies, tensions between ethnicities and religions, hate speech which we see in many places in Europe today, more violence in many societies.

So, the old problem of Europe – how to live with diversity – is again becoming a huge challenge. Even if the economic crisis fades away I think this challenge will remain. Diversity is growing and we have to live with it, and to embrace it. The worst is that nationalism is again being used as an effective tool in politics in many places. We have to look at history: nationalism always comes from something bad and always leads to something bad. So, there is a strong need now for the political mainstream in Europe to stand up and protect the common values that have given us such an enormous stability and spirit of cooperation, and to develop further the institutions that we have.

I would like to see an enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia. We need to

complete the legal structure we have for this continent. Belarus is still not a member of the Council of Europe for certain reasons, and the European Union as such is not a part of the convention system and of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. And that is what we are negotiating about now. It has been written in the Lisbon Treaty that the European Union shall accede to the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore become a high contracting party to the Court of Human Rights. That is incredibly important, that such an important player like the European Union is under the same standards, the same values and the same court as all the 47 member countries. It would be a historic event if it happens and it will happen.

Once again I underline the importance of human rights and the rule of law for peace and stability. Look at what is happening in the South Mediterranean. Why did it happen? Why did the revolutions come there? It was because of lack of democratic institutions, the lack of freedom of expression, the lack of checks and balances in the society and therefore they got corruption, they got mismanagement and misuse of force. And at the end of the day the people couldn't tolerate it any longer and the revolution came. This is always the history of revolutions.

Many say today that more authoritarian regimes are the winners in the globalized economy. I don't believe it. It is only temporarily. Because without democratic institutions, without checks and balances, they will get the same problem: corruption, mismanagement, misuse of force, imbalances in the societies that they are not able to correct because there are no democratic institutions, no freedom of expression, no free media to criticize. So, the winners in the globalized economy will again be the democratic societies. And this is a precondition for stability and peace.

I knew Willy Brandt very well, he was an outstanding European. I met him several times in Bonn and he always liked to take me up to a restaurant above the river Rhine. And once he said: «Why did this catastrophe happen on the European continent? With the concentration camps? And at the end of the day the allied forces saw no other possibility than to land their forces in France and to struggle every meter to the river Rhine, over the Rhine, to Berlin. And they knew for sure that in the first 15 minutes when they landed on the shores of France thousands and thousands of young people would be killed but they had no other option. And the Russians came from the other side with even more suffering. How could it happen?» I answered that there are many explanations to that but one thing is clear that when the Nazis started to send the Jews to the camps people thought they were safe, if they looked in another direction. It was only about the Jews. But at the end of the day nobody was safe. So, we have to understand that on the continent security, human security and human rights are for all or for none. It would be very important to include this in the future security concepts because without this basis no hard security will succeed.

Common values and overcoming mistrust

ANATOLY TORKUNOV,
Academician of RAS, Rector of MGIMO University
of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

There is hardly any sense in indulging into rigorous speculations about common values after more than two decades-long existence in a post-bipolar world, joint participation in multilateral mechanisms requiring humanitarian and legal solidarity and after centuries of common European history in which our genetic ties got intertwined. Common values are something that is understood in terms of basic social and behavioral standards. That said, we are not safe from deviations and distortions in interpreting these values as it was in the times of, for example, inquisition, revolutionary terror and Nazism. In a current conventional situation in Europe the debate over values can be conducted exclusively within the framework of the interpretation of legal and applied elements of these values' implementation, personal, social, national and sovereign rights and freedoms.

Mistrust and overcoming mistrust is a far more challenging and unstructured issue of debate. The phenomenon of mistrust is multi-dimensional and tends to negative dynamics. This dynamics can sometimes be, literally, of an explosive nature. The suppression of the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and the deployment of military forces in Czechoslovakia boosted mistrust in relations with our country. Disavowed by new political thinking fears and complexes of the Central and Eastern Europe of the USSR/Russia were revisiting Poland now and again throughout the 90-s. Mistrust in relations with many countries of Western Europe is based not on mutual resentment but on the lack of elementary knowledge about the developments in contemporary Russia. Mosaic-like fragmentary notion of the «Russian soul» with references to Dostoevsky, actually read by a few, is not enough for the creation of a modern adequate image of the country.

The process of overcoming mistrust has its functional structure which includes certain levels of a dialogue – political, strategic, economic and also humanitarian and cultural ties, and the institutions for the realization of this dialogue, or rather I mean not the formalized bilateral structures but multilateral institutions such as Council of Europe, the European Union, OSCE. If we really want to make serious progress in overcoming mistrust we have to start from the all-sided analysis of the whole functional system.

A new element of social consolidation and multilateral cooperation is social networks existing above all in the Internet. Can we use these social structures for overcoming mistrust or they are good only for pursuing special narrow interests and ad hoc goals? Facebook, for example, or its Russian analogues disintegrate into numerous communities which at the end of the

day get cocooned, go into their shells and fail to create a «borderless world». People start to be divided by interests and topics. Economic mechanisms and business communities are better instruments working for overcoming mistrust and stereotypes. And it is in the economic sphere that comprehensive rules of standardized behavior have been set up – the WTO rules.

ALEKSANDR CHUBARYAN, **Academician of RAS, Director of the RAS** **Institute of General History**

It's not accidental that a conference as representative as this one and hosting prominent Russian specialists in international relations, scholars, historians, sociologists, political scientists, Foreign Ministry officials and diplomats begins with the workshop dedicated to the issues of universal values and humanitarian factor. There is an opinion that the 21st century will be the century of humanism, of interest in humanitarian knowledge, education, and humanitarian problems, or rather related to the role of a man, of a human factor will be dominating the history of the 21st century and world politics evolution. Therefore, humanization which permeates among other things international relations is surely to occupy a significant place in a forthcoming decade. For us it's very much important to define what humanitarian problems are all about as regards diplomacy and relations between the nations and the peoples. Lately one of the most debated at international conferences topics has been the problem of the so-called image of the other or images of others. I mean the images and perceptions peoples hold about each other. The solution of these problems makes a good humanitarian start for changing biased perceptions of peoples based on cultural, psychological and other factors. This paves the way to overcoming mistrust which we are discussing today. There exist certain benchmarks related to humanization of society - these are cultural problems, tolerance, overcoming xenophobia, national narrow-mindedness, chauvinism, everything that is closely related to the humanism we are discussing today.

I'm not a fan of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory, but today even in a successful Europe we are witnessing, as political scientists call it, a kind of civilizational fault line. What I mean is the clash of diverse cultures, different civilizations and, virtually, the search for an adaptation mechanism of certain cultures and civilizations to others and integration of diasporas into titular population. It is also about the interaction of Islamic and Christian factors, and this interaction of civilizations gives a strong impetus for overcoming mistrust.

I don't feel like dramatizing the situation and don't think that we are getting back to the Cold war times, albeit even in that period there were set certain rules of the game which permitted to overcome differences. That said today mankind is faced with too many challenges to counter, which we have to mobilize all our intellectual and other resources.

With regard to Europe there is growing interest to national identity problems. The idea of the European Union founding fathers about the possibility of developing a universal approach,

universal basis turned out to have failed in West European countries. There is a successful economic cooperation, interaction in educational sphere, there is mobility of citizens but all the countries have demonstrated reluctance to sacrifice their cultural identity and desire to preserve their national language and religion, i.e. cultural heritage they have accumulated in the course of many centuries. Studying these processes in academic and diplomatic societies is an important factor of overcoming mistrust which persists and even gathers momentum in the modern world.

I must say that in Russia and in the whole world the focus has shifted towards technocratic issues to the detriment of humanization process. We must remember it and promote humanistic aspects of international relations. This is, from my perspective, the starting point on the path to elimination of mistrust. Current discussions of mistrust are certainly over-dramatized by mass media. I don't believe in a strong anti-Russian mood in the United States, let alone Europe. I don't believe in strong anti-American save anti-European sentiments in Russia. All these things are persistently exaggerated by mass media. Therefore, our mission is to overcome these cliches and stereotypes of the past, which are very often invoked in the world practice today for certain political purposes.

There is another problem we are concerned about – it's the problem of the so-called post-Soviet space. For Russia it's very important aspect. It is in this space that the positive relations that had existed for centuries should be restored and remodelled. What I mean to say is that it's necessary to agree on how to interpret the period in common history when these, now independent states, belonged to the Russian Empire and later to the Soviet Union. I must say that for the last years we have done much work. Such mechanism as the Association of Directors of History Institutes of CIS countries has existed for a decade already. Within the framework of this association we maintain constructive dialogue and hold annual meetings, discuss all pros and cons, positive and negative factors of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union evolution, assess the contribution made into the development of currently independent states, cultural interdependence. Besides, we attach much attention to the normalization of relations, with the Baltic States. Some years ago we established Joint Commission of Russian and Lithuanian Historians which issued the first volume of documents «USSR-Lithuania: 1939-1941». The second volume «USSR-Lithuania: 1941-1944» is due to be released. Six months ago we set up a similar Joint Russian-Latvian Commission, which is preparing the first meeting in autumn this year in Riga. Bilateral seminar, with our Estonian colleagues is also in the pipeline. On the platform of Kaliningrad University and Moscow Institute of General History we are creating the Baltic Institute that will be dealing with the issues of the Baltic civilization, security problems and cooperation in the Baltic region. We seek dialogue based on consensus and eradication of obsolete cliches and stereotypes. The creation of positive images, I think, is an important element of modern development. Speaking specifically about the elimination of mistrust it's necessary to mention the search for compromises which is one of the most important factors. Basically, compromissal approach to building dialogues, the desire to make steps towards each other is a time-tested mechanism in diplomacy and foreign policy. Today it is as relevant as never before. It is relevant in cultural, religious and, of course, political factors, it's important for building relations and overcoming the stereotypes of the past and as the means of eliminating mistrust and reaching consensus.

VLADIMIR LUKIN, Ombudsman in the Russian Federation

If there is humanity then are there universal values? Or, perhaps, the old Soviet-time joke proves its relevance: «What is mine is mine and let us negotiate over what is yours»? This is the main question to be answered. Russia inherited the Soviet approach when our own values used to be considered the only true ones; this approach was accordingly realized in foreign policy. However, it is erroneous to absolutize and politicize own values, i.e. establish a direct link between values and political course.

From my perspective, the theory of universal values is, basically, right because the mankind is obviously moving towards increasing interdependence. But when the theory was taking shape in the first post-Soviet years in Russia it was a bit naive and alienated from the realities of the world politics and the frame of mind both in Russia and other countries. Most likely, serious problems arose from the failure of the West to respond to this theory which, in its turn, led to conflicts. Besides, there emerged a feeling of impossibility to create common values, which brought about heated debates in Russian society.

Although gradually we come to an understanding that it is joint actions based on shared vision that can help address modern threats and challenges, Russia, Europe and the U.S. continue, by inertia, to believe that interests are much more important than values. In this regard, there arises the problem of correlation between interests and values. I'm deeply convinced that when it comes to the human rights set of issues it's necessary to pose the following question: can we achieve a certain degree of its de-politization?

The problem is not to make everybody agree on the existence of universal values. For example, the United States under George Bush Jr. administration in office was very close to conferring a universal status to its national values. This concept of unilateralism is inherent in many countries including Russia. The problem is that excessive politicization of universal values makes them, intentionally or not, only a tool in the hands of certain powers pursuing their own interests. As a result, such a policy breeds big deficit of trust. There is only one solution to it – de-politization of values.

Over the last two decades there have been good periods of Russia's relations with a number of European countries and the USA. During these periods the approach to the assessment of the human rights respect quality also changed in comparison with the periods of deteriorated relations. This problem persists, and such attitude of the West is very much frustrating. Therefore I'm an advocate of taking human rights problems beyond any political category and placing it into the category of fundamental values. Only then we will be able to reach mutual understanding.



JESSICA MATHEWS, President of the Carnegie Endowment or International Peace

It's no historical surprise, it's a given truism that wars are harder to end than they are to begin. What I think is a surprise is that Cold War in which virtually nobody died at least in the protagonist states has been so much harder to end than a war in which millions died. If you look back at relations between the United States and Germany, or the United States and Japan, or at relations between Russia and those two countries, and you compare it to what we have seen in the 20 years since the official end of the Cold War. I think that we have to be a bit depressed or sobered that we see so much less change, so much more stagnation intellectual and institutional. And more fundamental, underlying mistrust that shapes relations. Absent that mistrust, we see a series of issues that are not that difficult to tackle. The survey that the organizers gave us, the set of questions, I think makes it very clear that it is quite easy to make a list of challenges and active threats that the U.S., Europe and Russia face in common. On my list, nuclear proliferation, where we are seeing an increasing North-South division, and threats that would follow explicit Iranian nuclear development.

Climate change where the world as a whole is whistling in the wind about an ongoing scientifically clear catastrophe that we are facing in a very-very short time. If you look at the 2012 report of the International Energy Agency, their conclusion is that the world has five years to make a fundamental move away from fossil fuels. And we are nowhere near being able to do that.

Terrorism and state failure alone pose a list of threats and challenges that really do require us to stretch every capacity at our disposal. On the other hand, if you try to look at the list of threats that we pose to each other, you really have to scrape the bottom of the barrel in order to come up with anything more than a very short list. You have the nuclear hangover from the end of the Cold War. Not simply the stockpiles, especially strategic and tactical, but continuing momentum of technological development, particularly in the areas of missile defense. We had more than a half of century having used to fearing each other.

If you read the conclusion of the EASI commission as a foreign policy expert some of the actions proposed look awfully difficult. If you back off a little and ask yourself how hard any of these steps actually are, they are very modest. If you're dealing with a problem with the underlying mistrust, there is no treaty, no negotiation or institution that solves mistrust. The only thing you can do is nibble away at it from the edges in concrete actions. And that's what this plan of action represents.

We are dealing with a geographical space but we're also dealing with a human space. What we have seen in the last year in the Middle East and, I would argue, also in Russia is that we are living in a fundamentally new age in which individuals are constantly getting ahead of governments, asking more of governments than they have been willing to accept over previous years and have the capacity to effect change on a whole new scale.

The EASI commission took important steps in laying out a fundamentally new intellectual architecture, trying to co-author a new Atlanticism. What it leaves as a further agenda for work of others is to forge much closer connection between the work of governments, the work of institutions in which the public has very little interest or connection and civil society. We need to find ways in which we can connect.

ROBERT LEGVOLD, Professor of political science emeritus at Columbia University

I have a comment to begin on the topic of this conference: Euro-Atlantic Security Community: myth or reality. It clearly is not a reality and in fact in the last 20 years, I think, we moved in the opposite direction. During all this time leaders of our countries lacked a political will to move towards the Euro-Atlantic security community.

I have four points. First - last December in Astana at the OSCE summit the heads of states set out a goal of creating a free, democratic, common, and indivisible Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Asian security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok. I have just participated in a round table of four institutes which was to give conceptual foundation for these ideas. At that meeting there was much discussion of whether a security community has to be based on common values. Most of the people at that round table were from Western Europe or North America and they agreed or insisted that it did have to be based on shared values. My own view on that is more complex. If what one has in mind by a partnership, a durable partnership, producing a consistent and a relatively comprehensive cooperation then my answer is yes, it does have to be based on shared values. An enterprise which is based only on shared interests will only be capable of producing selective and sporadic cooperation. That's what we have today, that's what we had on the last stages of the Cold War.

My second point is that a Euro-Atlantic Security Community is not going to emerge overnight. It can only come about as result of a long and a complex process. And in this context my view is that shared values will be the end of that process. They cannot be the prerequisite for that process. For those of my western colleagues who will not like that statement I remind you if it were not true there would be no NATO today, if it were not true there would be no evolution from the common market to the European Economic Community.

Third point. I think we're often careless in describing what we mean by shared values. Usually it is framed in terms of respect for human rights. Here the problem is over the verb, not the noun, because Russian leaders insist that they share the same human rights values. The problem however and the argument is over implementation. My view is that it is proper to have a frank and a constructive conversation and dialogue over the issue of human rights and their implementation. But unless the abuse in question is egregious, then, I think, it is wrong to hold the process of moving toward the larger objective hostage to that issue: hence, for exam-

ple, I believe that it is not only wrong, but shortsighted that legislators in my country today are threatening to block permanent normal trading relations with Russia because they object from their point of view to the issue of human rights in Russia. I think this is all a more true because the level, at which the problem of shared values enters poisonously into this relationship is less about behavior at home, than about behavior abroad. The tension in US and European relations with Russia today over Syria; the clash of values, shared values is at the heart of that matter. People, who believe that Syria is only about a discrepancy and lack of common interests, are mistaken. The issue of shared values is at stake in the case of Syria and they are interacting in a dangerously unconstructive way.

If we are to move from hope to reality in this business of moving toward the Euro-Atlantic Security Community, then the critical requirement as we certainly discovered in the 2 years of our conversations within the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative is not creating new architecture, it's not inventing new institutions, it's not in agreeing to a new treaty or treaties, but rather it is in developing a process that is step by practical step leading to this larger goal. I think we'll only get to Euro-Atlantic Security Community not by good words, not by grandiose proposals, but by working together on concrete tasks. So the path to a Euro-Atlantic Security Community is through collaboration not through exhortation.

My fourth and last point. This agenda of practical measures, to which I just referred must contribute to achieving a larger goal either by helping to remove obstacles to progress or by helping to give momentum to the process itself. One of the major obstacles to this larger goal is the level of mistrust that lingers in key relationships. And it cannot simply be regretted – it needs to be addressed explicitly and directly in our policies.

The task in my view is to work together toward addressing at least three challenges. The first is missile defense cooperation where mistrust is the key obstacle to achieving success and where success will be indeed a game changer because it will transcend the narrow reason for missile defense itself. But on the other hand, failure in this, I think, is too little emphasized in the discussion of what's right and wrong with the negotiations over missile defense where failure will be a game spoiler affecting far more than missile defense alone.

The second is the issue of historical reconciliation, where the weight of historical legacy is so heavy and where it is so unconstructive in its effect and so closely related to this question of the impact of mistrust as an obstacle to moving toward the Euro-Atlantic Security Community. What has been achieved in the Polish-Russian relationship, thanks in large part to the efforts of the academician Torkunov and minister Rotfeld and their colleagues, needs to be duplicated we believe in the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative and Russia's relations with the Baltic, with Turkish relations with Armenia, Armenia's with Azerbaijan and many instances. And on this issue the EASI reports have a number of ideas that, I think, would help us advance in this area.

And the third and final is the issue of the protracted conflicts. At the Berlin roundtable, Foreign Minister Westerwelle said the problem is not merely that we have frozen conflicts, we have frozen solutions. And one of the other things that the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative try to do was improve on that with some ideas about how you can move ahead in this area. You may want to add to that list, but I think these are three critical areas where if we are going to remove the fundamental obstacle to achieving this objective we need to make progress.

RENÉ NYBERG, Head of the East Office of Finnish Industries, Ambassador of Finland in the Russian Federation (2000-2004)

I would like to concentrate my remarks on one of the central aspects of overcoming distrust that is a systematic effort to achieve historical reconciliation. Looking at our EASI (Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative) report the question, which we pondered ourselves during the work was: are we only talking about historical reconciliation of protracted conflicts; are we concentrating ourselves indwelling too much on Russia and its relations with its neighbors? This is the issue in this part of the world when we talk about reconciliation.

The work of the working group was inspired with a singular Polish-Russian success. And academician Torkunov is the person on the Russian side as was Adam Rotfeld who was part of our working group. And there's no question about that this was an inspiring thing, something which the catastrophe, the air catastrophe in Katyn only, underlined the drama of the issue. And in comparison to the Polish-Russian success the achievements like German-French or German-Polish reconciliation appear as facts of history.

The same applies to Finnish-Russian reconciliation. Actually we never talk about reconciliation, we do not use this term. A process which materialized delicately and gradually and was finally recognized as such by Boris Eltsin when he in 1992 at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki solemnly declared that Russia will not anymore interfere in internal Finnish affairs. Eltsin also laid a reef at the war memorial, something Gorbachev had failed to do despite a request from the Finnish side and the recommendations of the then Scandinavian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to do so. But the comrades in the Central Committee voted against it.

When Vladimir Putin made his first state visit to Finland in 2001 the presidential administration asked my predecessor what procedure would the King of Sweden follow on a state visit to Finland. The administration was advised the King would lay a reef on the war memorial and the second one on the tomb of Marshal Mannerheim. This was precisely what president Putin did. The symbolism cannot be overstated; it was an emotional moment for us, Finns, without any need for loud words.

Achieving reconciliation is a long and winding road. Many steps are needed and canonized views have to be revisited. Vladimir Putin's participation on 1st of September 2009 at the ceremony Gdansk marking the beginning of World War II was an important event. Just like in the case of Finland the war for Poland did not start in June 1941. Nothing in Finnish history or in Finnish-Russian relations can be understood without remembering the Soviet attack, Stalin's attack in November 1939.

For obvious reasons the working group concentrated on the undone work. Historical reconciliation as already mentioned between Russia and Estonia, Russia and Latvia and Russia and Lithuania are the obvious challenges among the others. But I'd like to dwell on these three cases. In our report we made a to-do list for Russia and its Baltic neighbors. But not only for them. The list was drafted with great care and I would claim it is rather comprehensive but demanding. Responsibility remains with the partners and we should remember and underline

but the larger partner has to show the way and take the first step, even a small step, one to start the process. I personally take pride in the implementation list of our report expels out the principles and details of a long road to reconciliation between the big and small neighbor. Let me just quote a couple of recommendations in order to underline the results.

Deepen the Polish-Russian process by being more forthcoming on the issue of archives openness and encouraging more cross-border societal contacts. Expand the reconciliation efforts to include the Baltic States as the Russia-Baltic economic interests are likely to benefit from improved relationship.

Identify the difficult issues in Russia-Baltic relations to be tackled first and foremost. Open the Russian archives dealing with 1939-41 period as they relate to the Baltics and establish between Russia and each of the three Baltic States joint bilateral commissions on difficult issues and joint commissions of historians. As we heard there are two. There is a joint commission on difficult issues between Russia and Latvia and Lithuania, but there is none between Russia and Estonia so far.

Return still held national symbols transferred to Moscow in 1940 such as the Golden Chains of the Estonian president. It's in the Armory in the Kremlin. Prepare for top level visits by the Russian president to each of the three Baltic States which would symbolically normalize bilateral relations. Such preparation would entail official statements on the issue of the forced annexation accompanied by the Baltic States formal renunciation of reparation, compensations claims against the Russian Federation. And finally finalize the ratification process of the Estonia-Russian border treaty. Well, this was just not the whole list but just as an indication, as an illustration of the work of the working group. But Ladies and Gentlemen, the question remains: how to proceed; how can we support a development towards these goals; how can we stimulate it; «what to do?» as the Russian question states.

Russia and the EU: potential for cooperation

VLADISLAV INOZEMTSEV,
Director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies,
Board Member of the Russian International Affairs Council

The problem of attitude to Europe is not new for Russia: over many centuries Russia was assessing the degree of progress and direction of development by comparing itself to the Western (European) civilization. Similar historical fates as well as significant differences in one shared cultural «code» also played an important role. Russia and Western Europe were often

competitors in those areas and in those days where and when they had no worthy match. It is not an exaggeration to say that since the mid 19th century «European» ideology and the ideology of Pochvennichestvo* have become the main opposing ideological trends in the Russian society that has not ceased to exist in one form or another till the present days.

Russia and the remaining part of Europe – and I am convinced that Russia forms part of Europe culturally, historically and mentally – were often involved into large-scale political and military conflicts and only for the last few decades we have not been separated by geopolitical fault lines. On the contrary, Russia and the EU member-states have close economic, cultural and social ties. Half of our foreign trade is carried on with the EU member-states; more than 60% of tourists arrive in Russia from Europe, and Europe, in its turn, is very popular among the Russians; more than 20 million of Russian native speakers and representatives of Russian culture live in the EU member-states nowadays and this number is increasing.

Today Russia needs Europe, maybe, even more than Europe needs Russia, although searching for a balance here is hardly necessary. We appreciate the experience accumulated by Europe in establishing integration structures and no doubt we will use this experience for establishing the Eurasian Union. We appreciate the supranational state and judicial institutions established within the European Union as well as the rules of competition and economic behavior elaborated by the EU. We cannot but welcome the establishment of yet another institutions on the human rights protection that appear in Europe. Cooperation with the European Union in the sphere of investments and technologies is of crucial importance for us. Nowadays, meeting the European standards and requirements is a guarantee of being competitive all over the world and Russia will seek to harmonize its own technical norms and regulations with the European ones. I am convinced that today the contours of Russia's future are shaped by Europe in many spheres.

Global security issue is also a very important sphere for cooperation between Russia and the EU. In the postwar era the European Union became one of the most important tools of peace keeping and stability maintenance in the most dangerous region in the world where two world wars began. Today Europe is one of the key actors that implement and pursue the policy of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention all over the world being at the same time a consistent opponent of unjustified violation of state sovereignty. We saw it during the events in Iraq in 2003. Russia and the EU member-states have the majority of the UN Security Council permanent seats and real possibilities for reforming this most authoritative body as well as improving the international law in general.

Certainly, our relations with the Europeans are not deprived of controversies, but I am convinced that the existing potential for cooperation is of such a scale that it will secure us from reversing the dynamics of our relationship. Russia and the European Union are two parts of one historically united European civilization that now has to compete actively with other civilizations for global leadership for the first time in modern history. None of us will succeed if we compete alone and that will guarantee that in the 21 century an integrated Europe will be revived for sure. I hope that the spirit of this revival will dominate the discussion today.

VLADIMIR CHIZHOV, Permanent Representative of Russia to the EU and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation

In the modern world the concept of security is multi-dimensional and it includes not only military aspects or system of political alliances and treaties. The level of economic development of a country, its clearly-elaborated domestic and foreign economic policies, nature and extent of engagement in the international economic relations constitute the main elements of security. In general this idea has always been true, but in the globalized world it has become significantly relevant. In this context trade and economic relations between Russia and the European Union, two major players in the international arena that, moreover, are located on the same continent and adjacent to each other largely define the nature of the Euro-Atlantic security.

The geographical proximity, common history, belonging to one European civilization, commitment to the same shared moral and cultural values make close and multidimensional cooperation between Russia and the European Union inevitable and it is obvious that such a cooperation will be of mutual benefit.

Distinctive features of our relations are that they are not confined to export and import of goods and services, but they are focused on establishment of strategic partnership, on deeper and more extended economic and political integration. The objectives of creating the four Common Spaces will be achieved through the implementation of the so-called road maps – common economic space; common space for freedom, security, and justice; common space for external security; and common space for research and education including cultural aspects that were adopted in the course of the EU-Russia summit held on May 10, 2005 in Moscow.

I think it is important to reiterate that, for instance, within the roadmap for Common Economic Space creation the parties are working to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia aimed at ensuring sustainability and competitiveness of our economies as well as at creation of qualitatively new atmosphere for cooperation. This objective may be achieved through ensuring creation of conditions for trade and investment development, introducing certain benefits for entrepreneurs, strengthening cooperation in certain economic sectors (energy, transport, telecommunications, space, agriculture, environmental protection, etc.). Great importance is attached to harmonization of industrial policy in Russia and the EU, competition policy, customs policy, sanitary and phytosanitary legislation, protection of intellectual property rights.

We have determined together the principles that shall form the basis for building the common economic space: non-discrimination, transparency and good governance. Aspirations and opinion of business circles, the priorities set within regional organizations and initiatives such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the «Northern Dimension», etc. are taken into consideration.

Certainly the results of assessment of our joint efforts effectiveness may differ. But in fact a real attempt has been made to coordinate economic policies, to elaborate interrelated

development policies for the future. Let me give a concrete example – the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue format that has proved its effectiveness. As a result of the energy crisis broken out in the late 90's the European governments had to face mass protests, blockades of oil refineries, roads and streets. It was then when at the beginning of 2000 the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi suggested Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, that they established strategic cooperation between the parties in the format of the Energy Dialogue. Now a wide range of multidimensional issues related to energy trading, investment, energy infrastructure and energy efficiency are addressed through this dialogue. Comparative analysis of energy strategies is being carried out, scenarios of the EU-Russia energy sector development are being elaborated for the period up to 2050, the implementation process of major energy projects is being reviewed. Russia proposed to discuss draft agreements on cross-border energy infrastructure and on the unified energy system of Russia and the Baltic states. An early warning mechanism is elaborated and implemented by the joint efforts and it proved its effectiveness not only for the EU-Russia relations but also for the whole situation in the Euro-Atlantic space. And there are lots of similar examples of the EU-Russian sectoral cooperation in other industries and sectors. Is the above statement related to strengthening of security? The question is rather eternal.

Two groups of interrelated problems are actually being solved in the format of Russia-EU sectoral dialogue. Firstly, measures to develop multiple, multi-dimensional and multi-level relationships among businessmen, politicians and academics to increase the pace of economic development of Russia and the EU are being elaborated and implemented now. A system ensuring that the success of one party will be beneficial to the other and that one party will be interested in solving economic problems of the other is being worked out. However, I would like to stress and underline here that the system is just being worked out, it is not up and running yet, that is why there are still attempts to use it as «a one-way street» – that is to solve own economic problems at the partner's expense. But anyway the system of economic interdependence and complementarity could make a real contribution to strengthening security in our continent. Secondly, problems in relationship are revealed through dialogues and the parties seek to find ways to address them to the mutual benefit of both parties at an early stage, trying to prevent confrontation. However, here we are also at the beginning and situations where our partners prefer unilateral measures are not rare. For instance, the EU's decision to include civil aviation in the EU system for the trading of greenhouse gas emissions quotas (the EU ETS - European Union Emission Trading Scheme), a system that, by the way, violates the fundamental principle of international law – the principle of sovereignty, a system that led to the fact that now the EU has to face opposition of the rest of the world on this issue and it was not incidentally. It's obvious to me that joint efforts aimed at solving the existing problems strengthen security but unilateral efforts that, moreover, are ignorant of the partner's rights and interests have just an opposite effect.

We see the development of our relations with the European Union in close coordination with the ongoing processes in the world today. Globalization that is deepening and expanding is the most important and influential of them. What impact may it have on the EU? First and foremost, it may reduce the relative weight of the EU economy on a global scale. But it does not mean that the EU will lose its economic power, which, by the way, continues to grow in absolute terms, albeit at a slower pace, especially amidst the current financial and economic crisis. Let me remind you that, with 8% of the world's population, the EU produces 20% of global gross domestic product (global wealth), but in terms of per capita revenue, the average

income of the inhabitants of the EU member-states is fourfold higher than in China, and tenfold higher than in India.

Certainly, the global balance of power is changing due to the rapid «weight gain» of emerging economies in the international economic arena. The peculiarity of the current situation is that now emerging economies develop thanks to the benefits and tools which can't be used by the developed economies primarily because of the implemented social development model.

The EU is looking for new ways of development. A few days ago the European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, speaking at Paris conference on Competitiveness («The Challenges of Competitiveness») said that if salvation of the European economy was only to be found in reducing labor costs, the EU could «close shop» («Fermer la boutique»). It is absolutely obvious that in terms of labor costs as well as goods prices the EU is unable to compete with China and other rapidly developing economies. The EU member-states have to look for new driving forces, real opportunities for development through elaborating new approaches and solutions. In the current situation the EU major strength lies in «non-price competitiveness», their capacity to produce «unrivalled quality» in a wide range of various sectors and industries. It may be achieved through advancement of innovations.

To meet the objective of maintaining and strengthening competitiveness the EU adopted Europe 2020 Strategy that puts forward three priorities: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation; achieving sustainable growth in the economy; fostering a high-employment and poverty-reduction socially-oriented model.

It is not a secret that Russia faces similar challenges. Resources for extensive development of the country have almost been exhausted. We cannot afford competing with the emerging economies in terms of industrial production price indices. I add to it – Russia's accession to the WTO, which along with obvious benefits has a range of risks: the Russian enterprises have to face an increasingly competitive environment and the Government faces restrictions on the trade policy measures imposed by the international law. For these reasons in the field of internal economic policy the Government elaborated a program on transition of the Russian economy to an innovative path of development.

So, common challenges faced by Russia and the European Union – to maintain competitiveness in the globalized economy through modernization and innovations – make us join our efforts once again but on qualitatively new basis. That is why in 2010 the shared initiative «Partnership for Modernization» was launched. I'd like to underline that we have never had illusions: we consider «Partnership for Modernization» to be an important addition to thorough inner work in this direction but it is unable to substitute Russia's own efforts in this field as well as the efforts of the European Union. This initiative is valuable because thanks to the synergetic effect it may significantly increase the effectiveness of each party's work on the track chosen.

Over the past period we have made certain progress but I will not go into detail now. But the challenges that we may face on this track shall be mentioned: and it is natural because interests and priorities are not always shared in all the fields of cooperation – moreover, in certain fields Russia and the European Union are competitors. But even now it is obvious that success of EU-Russia modernization and innovation partnership may contribute to strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic security in its broader sense.

There is another important point. One question is nearly always asked in relation to any alliances and partnerships and this question is: in opposition to who have you established your partnership? China, strengthening of its economic power, its growing ambitions – these are

issues to be a lot discussed nowadays. May the EU-Russia strategic partnership be an attempt to resist to the growing power of China?

Let's be frank: to win the economic struggle with China even by joining our efforts with the EU is impossible and to set such a goal is not only meaningless since it will never be achieved but also politically harmful. On the contrary, we must avoid any confrontation with external partners and other regions through development of cooperation with the European Union as well as with other countries. At the end of the day, globalization creates not only challenges but also opportunities for accelerated development. The goal of the responsible politicians is to transform globalization into a tool for building trust and hope and not a tool for undermining the security. In a polycentric world effective international architecture can be established only if it is based on solid regional «building blocks». China, India, Brazil, integration processes in Eurasia, and the process of eurointegration shall be considered to be exactly such «building blocks». Of course, all have their pros and cons. But to move forward together we must seek common ground.

Finally, I'll try to give my own answer to the question set in the name of our conference. I believe that as usual the truth lies somewhere in between: the Euro-Atlantic security space is certainly not a myth, but today it is not yet a reality. But we shall work now and together with our partners including the European Union to make it real tomorrow.

REINER HARTMANN, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Association of European Businesses in the Russian Federation, Head of E.ON –Ruhrgas AG

We, as the Association of European Business in the Russian Federation, had a briefing in Brussels after 2 day-visit with a delegation of European investors to the Russian Federation. We are representing 80% of foreign direct investment in this country. In the EU a lot of changes have taken place. It's not the monster which we saw always. The proactive approach to Russia in economic, monetary, migration matters is a significant change to the positive.

Trading brings changing. The trade has improved so much between the EU and Russia, and we, as investors in this country, do not need memorandums on modernization. It's good that we have them, but every single investment which we are doing here is a modernization step, is a modernization process. My company (E.ON Ruhrgas AG) today represents the largest foreign power producer in Russia. 5-7 years ago nobody would have thought that something like this would be possible. This change shows that we are on the right track.

WTO accession will move this country much closer to the family of civilized nations. This will help to modernize the economy, which is needed as we know. WTO accession will lead to a very pragmatic approach by the forthcoming government. This is a good sign for integration and a clear commitment of the interrelation between Europe and Russia. The movement

of goods, services and people are to be pushed forward into a new dimension because of WTO accession. We are very excited as investors to see this new horizon coming up, and I am optimistic because of pragmatic views and approaches that, we hope, will be with a new government and a new coming president.

MIKHAIL KOVALCHUK,
**Director of the Russian Scientific Center «Kurchatov
Institute», Academic Secretary of the Science,
Technology and Education Council under the President
of the Russian Federation**

Lately, the very scope and the mode of cooperation between Russia and the European Union have changed dramatically. Russia used to be the donor of highly-skilled labor force. As of today, we have launched our own mega-projects. Major breakthrough projects overhaul the entire economy. That said, our experts continue to actively participate in the EU-based research projects.

Currently, an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) is being built in French Cadarache near Nice. Within this project's framework Russia is creating eighteen unique systems. European Nuclear Research Center (CERN) also plays an important role. Russia hasn't joined this organization yet, but very soon, I believe, it will become its associate member. A substantial part of Russian researchers are financially supported by the Russian government. It's worth mentioning in this regard the creation of the X-ray free electron laser, European XFEL, in Hamburg with Russia being a privileged partner to the project. The Ion and Anti-proton Research Center (FAIR) is being established in Darmstadt with an active participation of Russia.

Thus, Russia plays a key role in the major milestone international projects and invests billions of dollars into the EU projects. Now, we are embarking on the creation of mega-plants on the territory of the Russian Federation. First four pilot projects have been selected. A high flux neutron research reactor PIK in Gatchina has successfully been launched and soon will be put into operation. It's a joint Russian-German project. Thermonuclear reactor IGNITOR is currently being built as part of Russian-Italian cooperation. Superconducting accelerators will be built in Dubna. We are also working on the creation of the synchrotron radiation source the creation of the fourth generation synchrotron (ISSI-4). It's also a joint project with the participation of Japan and a number of European states.

Any cooperation is a two-way road. We have provided significant aid to the EU, now we expect reciprocal steps. It concerns, in particular, building of the above-mentioned synchrotron. The venue for it's the implementation of the project is most likely to be Gatchina where a unique research center will be set up. We are hopeful to engage countries of Northern Europe and other partners into this project.

In the second half of 2012 – first half of 2013 we're going to conduct the Year of Russia in Germany and the Year of Germany in Russia. Bilateral Russian-German cooperation also

has a scientific dimension. We have established a Russian-German Joffe-Roentgen Institute. From the German side the work of the Institute will be coordinated by German Electron-Synchrotronic Center (DESY), from the Russian side – by National Scientific Center «Kurchatov Institute». We have already started recruiting Russian scientists to work at the Institute. We also intend to arrange intensive international exchange and invite our foreign colleagues to participate in educational activities in Russia.

VALERY YAZEV, President of the Russian Gas Society Non-profit Partnership

In my opinion, we shouldn't juxtapose values on the one hand and mutual interests and interdependence on the other. The relations are most sustainable when they rely on unity and fundamental values as well as on mutual interests, but it doesn't happen very often. Therefore, we should benefit from what we have in common, i.e. mutual interests and interdependence. Let's take, for example, the EU-Russia cooperation in energy and commodity sphere. The European Union imports from Russia all types of energy resources: gas, oil, coal, uranium enrichment services. Russia accounts for about one third of European import. With years this interdependence will only be increasing. Despite the fact that Russia is currently diversifying its energy resources supply markets Europe will continue to be in some perspective our main partner and major supply market. As of today, Russia enjoys surplus trade balance with the EU amounting to \$100 bn. To redress the balance it's necessary to increase import of goods from Europe to Russia including industrial production.

The services market, which currently takes an insignificant share in the EU-Russia foreign trade relations structure has a strong potential for growth. The EU-Russia political rapprochement and economic space integration will allow us to step up the scope of mutual trade in services. Direct investments enjoy even stronger potential. Today Russia invests very little in the European economy – only 1% in comparison with 35% of FDI coming from the USA. Russia's accession to WTO is expected, to increase trade turnover in this segment of foreign economic cooperation that will result in the inflow of direct investments in upstreaming and downstreaming projects in Russia.

However, we must realize that in the future Russia will either continue to play the EU advanced economies' raw-base, raw-materials appendage role, which, obviously doesn't make us happy, or will become an equal participant of a single economic space. It will, to a great extent, depend on the processes of economic and political cooperation between Russia and the European Union both at the leadership and civil institutions levels. For further development and deepening of the cooperation firstly, it's necessary to have comprehensive legally binding international agreements which are in place, actually, and continue to be improved. Secondly,

we expect that the EU-Russia Framework Agreement will finally be reviewed. Thirdly, the just launched joint Partnership for Modernization project has a great potential. Within its framework it's necessary to extend the list of priorities including into it, say, the ones related to upstreaming and downstreaming of mineral materials with further manufacturing of rare-earth metal-based products with unique qualities; it will help avoid economic dictate of China. Fourthly, the convergence of the EU and Russian technological platforms may and must contribute to the success of our cooperation.

We can single out the following technological platforms with regard to supplying economies with mineral resources. On the Russian side it's the technological platform of solid minerals and hydrocarbon extraction and exploitation technologies. On the European side it is the platform of mineral resources sustainability. All this, of course, doesn't exhaust the potential of the EU-Russia cooperation in raw materials sphere. We would be well advised to create joint technological platforms of innovative raw materials developments and include them into the EU-Russia cooperation agenda. Fifthly, it's vital to continue the decade-long ongoing analytical dialogue between Russia and the EU. And, finally, it's important to develop bilateral cooperation of Russia with the EU member-states. Russian-German cooperation in this regard can serve as a positive example of comprehensive and deep interaction. The participants of the Russian-German raw materials forum have devised the concept of Russian-German innovative raw materials cooperation agreements.

In the near future the agreements on Russia's accession to WTO will be submitted to the Russian State Duma for ratification, and Russia's participation in WTO as a full-fledged member will give a strong impetus to the establishment of an equal partnership in the integrated competitive market of the European Union, Russia and the Customs Union member-states.



ALEKSANDR GRUSHKO, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Answering the question put at the title of the conference I can say that the security community is becoming a reality today. The notions of «good» and «bad» are not applicable to the EU – Russia relations. In our joint work many important events take place on a daily basis. There is hardly any sphere where Russia has failed to propose to our EU counterparts to take concrete steps forward. The EU – Russia relations are becoming a key factor of European integration. Do we use this potential to a full extent? Presumably, not. But, at the end of the day, long-term interests will take an upper hand – Russia and the EU will be integrating into a single community.

Currently, the EU is faced with the challenge of overcoming the economic crisis, strengthening its role in the world political system and keeping up its attractiveness for the neighbors and other partners. Russia's goals are well in line with the EU priorities. Cooperation will only

enhance the position of both sides.

That said, there are factors impeding EU – Russia rapprochement. These are, for example, old stereotypes, the perception of Russia as a society unable to do away with the USSR legacy, which lost its relevance. Very often it is the application to Russia some standard schemes traditionally used in the relations with such partners who are prepared to perform a supporting role that prevent from faster rapprochement. Although there have been created all preconditions for cooperation in energy sphere there is a lack of regulatory base, unity of views on the energy strategy till, for instance, 2050. That said, it should be noted that currently we have in the pipeline three or even four documents called upon providing such a base.

We are collaborating in the international arena. Fundamentally, the EU and Russia's approaches coincide. Both we and our partners believe it necessary to abide by international law, pay heed to the the opinions of all sides to a conflict and use predominantly non-forceful methods for crisis settlement. So far, we haven't developed a decision-making mechanism on external security issues. In this regard, we lay hopes on the implementation of a Meseberg Initiative – the creation of the Russia-EU Committee on foreign and security policy issues proposed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel. Besides, Russia and the EU need an agreement on crisis settlement which is currently being negotiated. Such an agreement should necessarily imply the equality of the parties' rights. Inequality-based options would be non-viable and leave little room for cooperation.

It's extremely important to make progress in the sphere of visa-free regime introduction for short trips between Russia and the EU. We shouldn't regard it as something feasible in the distant future. The «Schengen Wall» must be destroyed. Besides, it will add momentum to business activity. We shouldn't be scared of interdependence. On the contrary, it must be given positive dimension and even be enhanced.

Russia, on its part, is not afraid of this interdependence. We are prepared to keep on investing into cooperation with the European Union because it is in line with our interests. It is vital not to draw dividing lines in our relations. There is no justification to denying rapprochement of the EU and Russia in the spheres where it is in our common interests.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY.

Missile defense – a factor of security or confrontation?

ALEXEI ARBATOV,

Academician of RAS, Head of the Center for International Security of IMEMO RAS

I would like to quote two extracts from one of the pre-election articles by Vladimir Putin, the newly re-elected President of the Russian Federation: «The Americans are obsessed with the idea of securing absolute invulnerability. <...> By definition, absolute invulnerability for one nation would mean absolute vulnerability for everybody else». And further on: «If then we had managed to achieve a breakthrough on missile defense, it would have literally opened the floodgates for building a qualitatively new model, similar to the allied model of cooperation in many other sensitive areas». These are two different, but nonetheless, logically related statements. Why have we failed to develop together a missile defense system, which has long been the subject of discussions at an official and other different levels? The answer to this question is the key to our future success. During the Cold War there were disputes, negotiations and setbacks with respect to the defensive and offensive weapons limitation. So far we have been unable to jointly develop a missile defense system, and this is a different level of relations. 25-30 years ago the very idea of joint development of a missile defense system would have been regarded as insane. However, we conducted negotiations on the START Treaty. Today we continue the normal process of negotiation and despite the lack of trust and disagreement on many issues we know how to move forward.

I'd like to ask you several questions. The first one is about the cooperation on missile defense. An agreement on missile threats must be reached. Has such an agreement been established in relations between the U.S. and Russia, NATO and Russia? I know that this issue has been discussed. Were these discussions successful? Is such an agreement possible in the future? Second, it is not only the U.S. that is trying to create a missile defense. Russia too is working on it. Question: at whom is the Russian system supposed to be directed? Can Russia create two anti-missile defense systems – one against the United States, and the other jointly with the United States and NATO? Is it possible to make the European missile defense system compatible with the Russian system targeted against NATO and the U.S.? Third, we are talking about missile defense in Europe. And what about Asia? Is it O.K. to protect Russian citizens in Europe, leaving them defenseless in Asia? And would it be correct to categorize joint missile defense, concentrating one's efforts only on Europe while ignoring such a country as China?

Speaking about sector-based missile defense, our proposal to the United States is: «Let us make an arrangement: we will defend you, and you will defend us». And does this mean that Chinese missiles that could theoretically be targeted at Europe and the United States would be intercepted by Russian missile defense when flying over our territory? And the last, very important question: the link between missile defense and the START Treaty. What strategic offensive weapons level will be required after the missile defense deployment? The preamble to the Treaty stipulates that «the current defense system» does not undermine the effectiveness of offensive weapons. What is meant by «the current system»? The one that existed at the time of signature, ratification or the one which was in force in conformity with the START Treaty before the year of 2000?

DMITRY ROGOZIN, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation

What kind of missile defense could be acceptable to us? It would be better if there was no missile defense in Europe at all, especially in its present form. This would be the best guarantee against heightening tension in connection with NATO's military infrastructure deployment in Eastern Europe. However, if the decision has indeed been made, we are fully convinced that from the point of view of both the project's ideology and technology no effective missile defense system can be created. It does not exist as a system, in reality there are only American information-gathering elements and anti-missile complexes, deployed in NATO's European member countries, and a separate Russian system. All this talk about the possibility of building a unified European missile defense system out of two separate systems, which will cooperate is a bluff in the first place, and a propoganda in the second place. It's nothing but lip service. Those are simply two different systems. There can be no single system if it has information sensors, radars, sensors, space group, let alone firing systems, operating under national control. That is why Russia proposed the creation of a full-fledged integrated system. Due to the Russian Federation's geographical location and technological capabilities we have a unique opportunity to provide an effective missile interception should it be directed against Europe.

By the way, I'd like to remind you that it was in my country that the first-ever successful missile defense system was tested 51 years ago.

Even with those systems, which were created back in the Soviet times, let alone the new systems put into service in Russia, we have a guaranteed opportunity to detect a potential launch of a ballistic missile that could be directed at European countries. To create a separate missile defense system in Europe, to pinpoint a ballistic missile launch, to calculate the flight trajectory to a ballistic target, and, moreover, to shoot down these targets would be ineffective without Russia. Besides, it actually provokes the response from the other side.

The thing is that ballistic missile interception is most effective during the boost period and pre-burnout in the trans-atmospheric space, as long as a heavy ballistic missile does not undergo changes, does not divide into warheads and spread the so-called decoys. It is like duck hunting – it is best to hit a duck when it takes wing, gathers speed and fights gravitation. Hence the question arises: what would be the response of its firing and information elements based, for instance, in Poland or on US warships deployed in northern European seas (the Norwegian Sea, for example) at the third or fourth phase of phased missile defense? What would be there to destroy from the point of view of declared goals? For example, «bad guys» in the Far East or to the south of Europe? Or, perhaps, it concerns other targets located in Russia? We have a strong feeling that there are other reasons why we cannot reach an agreement with our American colleagues on the tactical and technical characteristics of missile defense – I mean the speed, distance, altitude, deployment of missiles and the number of interceptor missiles. It's just because the «firing a cannon at sparrows» technology is being tested: that is, weapons are being created that cannot be effectively used against a small number of short – and medium-range missiles in case they are launched against the European continent from the south. At the same time a strategic intercept system for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles is being developed. Such ICBMs could be launched from the territory of the Russian Federation. And this, of course, is direct evidence of the fact that missile defense plans are aimed against Russia.

What is the difference between the Russian aero-space defense system and the U.S. missile defense? Our system is located on our territory to provide security only in the event of an attack against the Russian Federation. As to the NATO missile defense in Europe, it is an American-backed system in Europe, outside the U.S. territory, and in close proximity to the territory of the Russian Federation. We respect the way, in which the United States or its allies wish to ensure their safety from a missile attack, but in this case they should limit themselves to the area within NATO geographical and political competence. However, when the range of the missile defense systems not only extends far beyond the European NATO territory but covers the Russian territory up to the Urals, controlling the main Russian strategic nuclear forces bases, then the question arises: what kind of a defensive system is it? It is an offensive system. Everybody understands that nothing is ever done without first answering the questions «why» and «for what purpose?» It is this kind of questions that must be asked in relation to this system. Such missile defense cannot be regarded as fully defensive; it should be viewed in the context of the «Prompt Global Strike» strategy adopted by the United States. The point of this strategy consists in a paralyzing preemptive strike against the enemy. In this case the attacked country uses missile defense to protect itself. I'm describing now a bad scenario. But the military always think about the bad scenario, while diplomats hope for a positive scenario. Therefore, the President of the Russian Federation speaking to this audience, once again drew our attention to the fact that we do not need assurances given over a cup of tea of the non-aggressive nature of the system, and the words «this system is not against you, it is for you»; we need clear legal guarantees linked with the tactical and technical characteristics of the weapons created. These characteristics should be proportional to declared goals, that is, the interception of a small number of short- and medium-range missiles that could be potentially launched against the European continent from the south. The speed, deployment, altitude, number of interceptor missiles must be defined in legal terms. In this room there are many Russian negotiators from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They will confirm that no answer has been received even to such a question: «Tell us at least how many anti-missiles are needed as part of your missiles European system?» And to the question: «Will

the third and the fourth phases be followed by the fifth, sixth, seventh...? We can count to ten, you know.» – we got only smiles in response. Of course, we understand that after the fourth phase there will be the fifth, sixth, seventh. Scientific and technical progress will go on; there will be hypersonic speeds, which will go far beyond the current characteristics of SM-3 Block II missiles and many others. What guarantees, apart from military and technical ones, do we have to ensure our own safety? During the entire period after World War II up to the present time the strategic balance has maintained global security. To date, no one has come up with a better solution. We appreciate the fact that today we have an opportunity to reduce our conventional weapons, but at the same time we shall cherish our strategic nuclear potential as the ultimate guarantee of Russian sovereignty and our independence. And any attempt to eliminate our sovereignty by creating problems for our strategic nuclear capability would arouse a stubborn desire to develop respective means of suppression and overcoming any missile defense. So we're really hoping that serious people in Washington and Brussels will at last realize that such challenges to the development of rocket weapons as one of the types of WMD delivery, such potential risks must be mitigated, isolated and neutralized by joint efforts. The best way would be to create a truly unified missile defense system, which would include identification, tracking and destruction of ballistic targets.

We must bear in mind that any missile defense functions solely on the basis of algorithms. No generals are going to press a certain red button together – missile defense operates in an automatic mode; that is why agreements should be reached at the initial stage of missile defense creation, afterwards it would be impossible to change the system. It is necessary to input such algorithms that would allow for joint action.

In 2010, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council joint efforts were made to assess missile risks. A review of common threats was being prepared, with the evaluation of missile challenges as one of the five themes selected for separate analysis. And on that single topic we failed to reach a complete agreement. We saw that our American colleagues somewhat exaggerated the existence of real missile threats from individual countries. In other words, there was a kind of mystification of threats from an enemy that did not possess that kind of missiles in order to have the rationale for further development of technologies and their use in weaponry. And no one could answer the question: «Why should the 'enemy' want to use these weapons against the European countries?» Nevertheless, we believe that the dialogue must go on. In the opinion of our top military leaders and representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex the best guarantee of our security could be an agreement on developing such means that would enable our strategic security. And our only regret is that all this could be avoided – instead, we could spend hundreds of billions of rubles on much more desirable and pleasant civilian needs.

I believe that the U.S. plans to develop missile defense are a demonstration of Washington's geopolitical self-interest. This project is more of a dogma rather than a living theory because it does not allow for any doubt and develops at a pace determined by scientific and technical progress. The Russian Federation is outside the scope of this project. We state this with great regret, and we believe that if the ABM develops in this way, we are wasting our time and a unique opportunity to create a common European security system. This runs counter to Russian intentions to restore itself as an integral part of the common European political culture. That is why we hope that there will be significant changes in this area in the near future. If however it is not to happen, we will have to implement all the measures outlined by the President of the Russian Federation in his statement on November 23, 2011.

Dispute

F. Heisbourg: Mr. Rogozin, you mentioned that nowhere in Europe there should be a missile defense system. Do you suppose in this case that the missile defense shield around Moscow could be dismantled?

D. Rogozin: Yes, I truly believe that missile defense and its development are not the best way to ensure the country's security. At one time intelligent people limited the anti-missile capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union by the 1972 Treaty. Why was this done? For the simple reason that these intelligent people realized that the defensive weapons arms race is no better than the offensive arms race. Historically, since the era of knights, an attempt to strengthen the shield resulted in the desire of other people to strengthen their swords and vice versa. Therefore, in the absence of real risks of a missile threat to Europe the creation of a huge military infrastructure – and in a separatist way – is tantamount to pushing forward the defensive arms race, which would immediately precipitate an offensive arms race. The best way to ensure security is one's own strategic power. Take, for example, the French nuclear doctrine. It provides the country's security through the possession of nuclear deterrent forces which can be used both in the French territory and outside only in case of a direct attack, or, say, when the French political elite feels there is a direct threat to France's sovereignty.

De Gaulle's doctrine still holds water: ensuring the security of the country from any attack, including with missiles, due to the possession of its own strategic nuclear capability. No one has ever told you and ever will about how effective a missile defense can be, whether it really creates a guarantee of your safety or is just an illusion of your safety. No one can ever test missile defense in real life, it can only be done in a real-life massive missile attack – that is, we hope, never. Consequently, it is pointless to rely on this system though I believe it is possible and necessary to rely on one's strategic nuclear forces.

Missile defense of Moscow established by the 1972 Treaty is a missile defense located within our own territory and cannot threaten any strategic offensive arms on the territory of other states. As to the U.S. missile defense system equipped with much more sophisticated missiles, especially in the third and fourth phases, it is to be deployed in Poland in 2018-2020. There is also a possibility, according to American documents, of «temporary» deployment of «Aegis»-equipped fleet, with missiles on board, in the northern seas. This means the appearance at our doors of anti-missile weapons with the range covering the territory of the Russian Federation that is of a foreign state. This is the fundamental difference between these two systems: one is domestic and the other could be compared to a tank which someone would like to put near somebody else's doorway. And when a neighbor asks what the tank is for they say: «It's not against you. It's just to be on the safe side. You know there are all kinds of gangsters and terrorists around... Let the tank stay near you». Americans too have missile defense on their own territory. We know this, of course, it's no secret. Now we are talking about the European segment of the global missile defense system which extends far beyond the US territory and beyond the range and area of its own responsibility.

Noone informs us of any limitations on the performance of missile defense systems – moreover, they are constantly enhanced. The SM-3 missiles have the range of thousands of kilometers, not 200-300 kilometers. No one informs us of their velocity: instead, we are offered the so-called «transparent» information which is almost impossible to verify. The real capabilities of these missiles could be checked only if our telemetry equipment was installed on them. That would be a real guarantee for us. Any other information which is read by U.S. sensors and transmitted to us cannot give us the feeling of absolute certainty. We proceed from

the fact that even according to the official data that we receive from our American colleagues, missiles fly thousands of kilometers. This, of course, causes our great concern.

A. Arbatov: Would Russia be obliged to intercept Chinese missiles with targets in Europe and the US, passing over our territory?

D. Rogozin: This is a question of algorithms, and they are determined on the basis of political goals and objectives: who is identified as a potential ally and who is a potential adversary. Unquestionably, namely the algorithm of the antimissile defence configuration determines the optimal interception. If Russian antimissile systems were optimally used to destroy a ballistic target directed at a European NATO country, naturally, the computer would give such a command. And vice versa, we could a situation when a NATO antimissile could bring down a target going on the Russian Federation. You are well aware that if we are to build this kind of system and establish such algorithms, we have to create an entirely different spirit of trust and mutual cooperation. Therefore, we offered to work out a common unified project of antimissile defense as it would generate an entirely different quality of mutual trust. It would practically bring to a stop NATO defensive planning against Russia, and Russian planning against anyone, NATO in particular. But this was not to happen. The above technological project has failed to become a political project of an in-depth cooperation between Russia and the NATO. What country would launch the missiles, and what would be the target is another matter. The essential aspect is to determine that we will ensure our own safety, mutually support each other as regards identification of the actual launch of a ballistic missile, calculation of its flight path and the method of optimal destruction of the target. Today it already looks like a virtual reality, therefore, there is not much to be discussed.

There are always questions to the author of an idea. The United States of America is the architect of the antimissile defense project. Any architect would construct a building and make the design in a way to avoid creeping on other buildings. Therefore, the heart of the matter is not so much limitation than self-restraint. This is what we have repeatedly said to our American colleagues focusing their attention on the fact that the architecture of the US antimissile system in Europe per se generates serious problems. Naturally, if it were really proportionate to the threat, the number of questions would be considerably less.

One cannot be a victim of one's own appetite. If the antimissile defence had been limited by reasonable «appetites» it would have been free from any Russian criticism. Regrettably, today we can see that the architects of the project display an unrestrained appetite.



SERGUEY RYABKOV, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

I am going to emphasise a number of aspects. We failed to finalize an arrangement with the US and NATO on the assessment of missile threats. Having understood that, we suggested that we step over this disagreement by establishing a sectoral antimissile defense, i.e. a unified security perimeter. Thus, we suggested the quasi-alliance, or maybe a full-fledged alliance, which Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin wrote about in his article quoted by Alexey Georgiyevich Arbatov. When it became clear that the North-Atlantic Alliance would not agree to outsource its security as the organization operates according to the Washington North Atlantic Treaty, the Russian side suggested a different scheme. We believed that the option of establishing two separate but interrelated cooperative systems of antimissile defense was not a good idea as it did not cover important aspects of the US and NATO antimissile defense system, which in the longer run would create actual problems to Russia. Hence, we suggested a more simple option of advancement, i.e. the US and NATO would continue construction of their system but would give Russia legally binding written guarantees that the system would not be directed against Russian strategic nuclear forces. That is, it would exactly perform the initially declared function: the task of preventing missile threats from non-Russian directions. Unfortunately, this is not the case, apparently because the current US administration believes that it is unacceptable to make a step forward toward the provision actually made by the ratification resolution of the US Senate on the START Treaty. The resolution reminds the administration that it is unacceptable to impose any restrictions on the country's capability in antimissile defense.

I would like to mention the complexity of the current times. The terms of «criteria» or «parameters» were not a haphazard choice to identify a range of issues we have to resolve before we would be able to say that such and such hypothetical American guarantees might be satisfactory.

I would like to underscore that we are not talking about imposing some formal limitations on the US capability in this sphere because we understand that any discussion on such limitations would face an extremely harsh antagonism in the US Senate and Congress and, in fact, would rule out any agreement. In our view, quite an acceptable option is to come to terms as regards the criteria on the numbers, speed, areas of deployment, opportunity to make independent conclusions what actually is going on in this sphere, an option which could unite and reduce to a common denominator the US and Russian approach. You may well ask: «Why are naïve Russian diplomats so sure that the US would never withdraw from legally binding commitments? Even in an entirely different historic environment when the whole world was more respectful of the international law, Washington began talking about withdrawal from the Treaty, which was a cornerstone of international security?» My answer is as follows: «We are not that naïve, and we know that the US can pull out from the Treaty. But the related question is whether it would be better to have no guarantees at all or to have the guarantees accompanied by appropriate objective criteria?» I think the answer is self-evident.

I would like to get back to the point where Alexey Georgievich Arbatov started his speech, namely the US pursuit of absolute invulnerability. Let me tell you, it is a controversial presentation of a problem. It tackles the core of the current discussion, and which poses the question of why the US needs the BMD system at all. I strongly doubt the statements of my American colleagues, and I openly declare it, when they are trying to convince me that the antimissile defense is needed to protect the country against the threat from Iran or North Korea because the system under construction is a global structure, it would be a phased development, it would retain the elements of strategic uncertainty for Russia from the viewpoint of positioning of the deployment areas, the number of interceptors, as the sensors would be upgraded, and satellites launched... The capability, which is already available in Alaska and California, would be more than enough for the guaranteed interception of any potential ballistic target possibly launched on the United States from the territory of North Korea. I do not believe that Iran, under such rigid sanctions and such serious scrutiny of all intelligence services of the world, would be able to produce a nuclear missile capability, all the more to use it. At that, they are trying to persuade us that there is no other means to protect oneself from such arms than the BMD system. The natural logic of the conclusion is what all that is needed for.

I reaffirm that at the advanced stages of the European phased adaptive approach we perceive American plans as a real threat to Russian strategic nuclear force. But the ideology of the BMD system construction used by the United States is rather curious. One can notice the US ambition to find a guaranteed technological solution to a political problem per se, i.e. to resolve the problem, which should be resolved by political means by virtue of their confidence in omnipotence of technology. This is the real problem and a serious source of misunderstanding between Moscow and Washington. We believe that logically, judging by the entire history of development of international relations, it is easier to resolve certain problems by way of negotiations and political means than to try and hide oneself from an anticipated threat under an umbrella of sorts even the one based on the state-of-the-art hi-tech achievements.

Another question is to what extent the current setup and what is now declared by the present administration to be its plans until the next decade would be sustained. We have quite a number of examples when the American plans both in this particular and other spheres were revised. We have to be prepared to the worst scenario, and in this respect I share the logic voiced by our military. We shall keep trying to reach agreements; we shall keep carrying out the tasks and instructions given by the President. Whether we shall succeed or not depends, at the end of the day, on whether we would be able to find eventually a mutually acceptable platform, keeping in mind the gravity of our disagreements dividing us to date and, I shall be frank, poor compatibility of conceptual approach to the problems of providing security in the strategic sphere.



FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG,

Advisor to the President of International Institute
of Strategic Studies (France)

If the argument is that Russia has a right to have an anti-missile defense system on the basis of a treaty, which no longer exists, while Europeans do not have a right to have a ballistic missile system, this is not going to work politically.

It's a tale of two obsessions – the American and the Russian. Ballistic missile defense can most easily be presented in the most destabilizing manner as a substitute for a deterrent. The French like it no more than the Russians do.

A problem of Russia, U.S., China, France and Britain is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Hopefully, by diplomacy, otherwise – by sanctions and coercive measures. It is a bizarre signal to send to Iran that we are so convinced that we are going to fail in deterring them from having a nuclear program that we are going to build a BMD system. Strategically and politically this is a bit strange.

I don't think that we would be talking today about deployment of BMD in Europe if Obama was not a prisoner of political complexities of the Congress in Washington. He had to find a substitute of sorts for a BMD system proposed by G.W. Bush, but if he hadn't had to do that, I am quite convinced that this would not be happening.

Of course, we have a military industrial argument. There are lots of congressmen, who appreciate BMD elements being made in their own constituencies, and this is actually on the top of everything else, one of very few areas of more or less bipartisan agreement in the U.S. Congress.

That is why we have a strange situation, where NATO puts ballistic missile defense on the top of its list, when there are so many other things that NATO would need to work on. But we do not allow the American program to be a block, to be overdetermining for our overall relationship with the United States. And here begin the differences with Russia. You allow ballistic missile defense to overdetermine every other aspect of your relationship with the United States. You have to ask yourself a question: whether it is a satisfactory price to pay? I cannot answer this question for you.

You talk as if the credibility of your nuclear deterrent were somehow at stake. I'm a Frenchman; I have a very small nuclear force. I see the Moscow ABM system. I see the Americans working on technologies, which are becoming ever more serious in terms of preventing warheads from making it to their target. I see the Chinese working on exoatmospheric intercept. The Chinese are also getting into the ABM game. And yet, I am not terribly worried, somehow I do not feel that the credibility of my nuclear program is being existentially threatened, and not simply because the US is an ally. Why don't I worry? The defender can never have full confidence in his system, while the attacker knows pretty well, how his offensive system is going to work. Why do the Russians do otherwise? There could be two reasons for that. One could be that Russia really fears for the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. If that is the case, in place of a Russian expert, I would question the effectiveness of taxpayers' money

put in a large number of delivery systems, platforms, warheads, which Russia possesses today. Or there may be another reason. And that is symmetrical to the one I have mentioned talking about the American obsession. It is the military industrial complex. I allow myself to drop this suspicion on the motives of people who may want to have more money to spend on their nukes and rockets, because we have this in our country. And sometimes these people actually deserve the money, but the question is: do you really want to have your missile makers in the driving seat of your foreign and security policy?

What can we do, given that the American program has its momentum? Don't count on the French to stop it. If you really want to prevent it from happening you will have to do it yourself. There are three things here.

First of all, I think you'd actually be serving your goals better if you did not make this the pivotal issue of your relationship with the U.S. You could deprive the Americans of a situation in which the system appears to be so tempting. If the BMD system which America would like to deploy is so powerful that it poses a threat to the penetration capability of the Russian nuclear force, this must be a good system! If you're a congressman from Utah or Idaho, you may be impressed by the Russian resistance. This may be an incentive to deploy.

Second, a solemn political statement by the US about the non-Russia focus of the system is something which would be quite useful.

Third, the joint data exchange that we talked about in the EASI document. There is a lot to do in this field. Today there are three players in this field of data gathering – those who have a capability to detect and track incoming missiles – United States, Russia and France. NATO is not a player, except it is a recipient of American data. Discussions should take place between those three countries about making processed raw data mutually exchangeable in real time. Fully raw data will not be exchangeable, and this is actually one of the reasons, why the agreement between Russians and Americans is not in place. Because the raw data will tell your partner what exactly you know about the penetration capability of the other guys' rockets. That is the most sensitive kind of information. But you can process it and you can agree on the rules of processing. You can, therefore, put in place a system of surveillance, for example, of Iran, when they do their rocket tests, so that we could share data. This is public good. Is this undoable in terms of secrecy? I do not think so. Would it be deeply stabilizing? Yes, I think so, because we would actually have the common threat assessment.

VIKTOR YESIN, Chief of Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (1994-1996), Leading Research Fellow at the Center of Military and Strategic Studies of the RAS Institute for US and Canadian Studies, Colonel-General

A new ABM Treaty identical to the one signed in 1972 will never be negotiated. In my today's remarks I would like to focus your attention on the results of the efforts made by the working group on antimissile defense established in 2010 in the framework of the international

project of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative. I was a member of the group. It made an attempt to find a mutually acceptable solution to the antimissile defense based on a pragmatic approach and feasible results of cooperation among the US, NATO and Russia, without cherishing excessively large hopes.

We were guided by the understanding that the existing deficit of trust as regards the intentions of each side and, what is highly essential, its impact on nuclear deterrence, disallows to build a full-fledged antimissile defense, even with a political recognition that Russia, US and NATO are more partners than adversaries.

I shall state a fact: participation in a joint practical project can enhance the level of trust, take into account each other's interests, get rid of certain apprehensions and avoid confrontation.

Proposals developed by the working group completely failed to satisfy its members. We had to find a compromise, which boils down to the following four points.

First, the deadlock related to the antimissile defense cannot be immediately and completely removed. The problem must be resolved gradually, step-by-step, beginning with what can be a solid ground for practical interaction and cooperation.

Second, the first step to cooperation in the antimissile defense sphere must be the establishment of a center for cooperation, and resumption of joint exercises of respective HQs and command structures. As regards air defense matters, under the auspices of the Russia-NATO Council we cooperate in the field of air reconnaissance providing data to two coordination centers in Warsaw and Moscow. Three teams for data collection are stationed in Russia, three more are to be found in the NATO countries. The working group on antimissile defense suggested using the same approach toward the joint observation system to monitor antimissile defense based on two cooperation centers – one in Warsaw or Brussels, another in Moscow. We assume that such Centers would be manned by NATO, US and Russian personnel, specialists would be working together shaping a joint picture of threats to antimissile defense and working out countermeasures against such threats based on objective data supplied by early warning systems and other sources. Essentially, this is nothing else than a revival of the 2000 US-Russian project on establishing a united center for information sharing received from early warning systems and notifications of a missile launch. However, this time we suggest wider functions. We do not rule out the participation of other countries' representatives, China for example, in the work of those Centers. It would contribute to reducing tensions.

Third, the dimension of sufficient AMD systems should not provoke destabilization. The existing balance is based on the START Treaty of 2010. The architecture of the European antimissile defense would be based on the assessment of a future threat. The most serious potential threat is ballistic missiles with the range of up to 4,500 km.

Have a look at the existing US and NATO plans as regards the European approach to antimissile defense and Russian plans in building air and aerospace defense. By the year 2020 the US and NATO would limit the deployment of ground bases equipped with SM-3 missiles – bringing down the capability from 24 interceptors per each to two pieces, and would retain 12-15 vessels in the Mediterranean and North Seas with SM-3 interceptors. By that time Russia, in addition to the existing system of antimissile defense covering the industrial area around Moscow would deploy in the European part of the country S-300 missile complex as well as dozens of antimissile defense S-400 and S-500 systems and similar antimissile systems in the Black, Baltic, White and Barents Seas. Each side would independently protect its territory, but we shall interact through cooperation centers. The sides could agree to individual operative

protocols which would obligate each side to intercept missiles targeted against the other. Such a component was provided for by the Russian initiative on sectoral antimissile defense.

In this proposal on antimissile defense the meaningful aspect is that Russia does not participate therein. American and NATO ships would stay close to the Russian shores, which irritates the Russian side. There is a possibility of devaluation of the Russian strategic forces' potential: a missile site in Poland and ships in the North Sea can well produce such an effect. Experts say that theoretically speaking (I emphasize this point) an SM-3-type interceptor, which exists only on paper, is capable of engaging approximately two-three (maximum four) dozens of warheads of Russians ICBMs, disregarding a powerful complex for overcoming antimissile defense, which Russian ballistic missiles are capable of. At any rate, this is an unpleasant factor for the Russian side, and our concern is undeniable. Moreover, it remains unclear what the US behavior in the sphere of antimissile defense is going to be after 2020. The working group tried to resolve this problem proposing to all sides to pledge to regulate the rate of deployment of AMD system in Europe as required by the appearance of actual and not virtual threats from such countries as Iran. It means that if Iran fails to produce ballistic missiles, the parties would not upgrade their systems of antimissile defense.

And the last point. In order to implement the proposals of the working group we have to establish appropriate institutions of cooperation among Russia, the US and NATO on antimissile defense, having concluded an executive agreement. It could delineate the principles of cooperation and interaction in the field of antimissile defense which should correspond to the fundamental act of 1997 between the NATO and the Russian Federation.

RICHARD BURT, US Chair of Global Zero, former US Chief Negotiator at START talks

The Cold War is being over for twenty years and that the world is changing. And the two countries in the world that are having the most difficulties really adjusting to the fundamental changes under way in the international system today are the United States and Russian Federation and missile defense issue underscores that in a very sharp sense. It's not only the end of bipolar international system and the ideological competition but other changes under way that we as well need to take account of. There is a growing public and political consensus that the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy and defense has to be deemphasized. And I think not every country but most countries in the world realize that we have to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. It's not going to be easy but nuclear weapons don't have the relevance or shouldn't have the importance that they once had. And that's something that our defense posture and policy need to take into account.

Another point is a new and absolutely critical importance of geo-economics. If the 20th century was a century where military hardware was the primary unit of account in terms of

national power, I would argue that national power is going to be increasingly reviewed in terms of economic capabilities and not military forces.

If we look at the future of American defense spending, it is clear that defense budget should be cut down, and to begin that process we started to define and prioritize threats facing the United States. And what was most interesting to me is that Russian nuclear forces didn't even make that list of the top 15 threats. I think in the consciousness of people who think about defense and foreign policy in the United States the likelihood of a nuclear war with Russia is viewed as basically negligible. And it tells me that we, the people in this room, the people who think a lot about these issues are somehow behind the curve.

So, that takes me to my second point and that is the missile defense issue itself. There's a long history here, and offensive-defensive relationship has always been a theme in the discussions. There are two differences though right now. One is we are really at a point where it's not clear if we are going to be able to continue the process of further offensive force reductions without agreeing to some type of actual ABM Treaty constraints on defensives. It's an open question.

But secondly, what I think is more important, is this is an argument that is literally taking place not in terms of a preoccupation with the US-Russian strategic relationship it's really the spillover of an issue that flows from a decision taken by NATO to focus on a third country which is the emerging threat of Iran. So we are essentially holding a very critical part of the US-Russia relationship hostage to the Iranian problem and I've got to ask myself: «Does that make sense?» But what if we are successful in reaching a diplomatic settlement taking strains the Iranian problem and there is no eminent threat of Iran with nuclear weapons? Will that make this issue goes away? Will NATO review its decision on deploying these systems? I don't know but it's a good question to ask because it's interesting Barak Obama has said that he doesn't believe that containment is a strategy that will work in the case of Iran. If containment isn't on the table as a strategy then what is the basis for NATO's decision to deploy strategic defenses? Don't strategic defenses only make sense in the context of a containment strategy?

But the other point on the Iranian element and the NATO program which is of concern is the effectiveness of this system. As I understand it, Russians seems mainly concerned about NATO capabilities that could emerge in maybe 2021 or 2022. That's the so called SM-3 Block 2B. But these capabilities will depend on the US defense budget and there will be in my judgment some serious cuts to US defense spending. And point number three is that if you look closely at the American R&D, research and development record for our strategic defense projects they've never worked as advertized, they've never been as effective as people predicted to begin with. Aren't we maybe talking about a threat that's not just a decade away but a threat that will never materialize?

If that's the case then I'm wondering how we can hold hostage further US-Russian negotiations on reductions which should form part of a broader strategy to deal with what is the most pressing nuclear problem in the years ahead – the problem of spread of nuclear weapons and the potential for nuclear terrorism. Global Zero believes that further US-Russian reductions, then movement towards a multilateral effort with the Chinese, the Indians, the Pakistanis and others to negotiate reductions is an important element of a strategy to deter the further spread of nuclear weapons. If we allow the missile defense debate which I think is exaggerated on both sides to block the process of moving to lower levels of nuclear weapons, in my judgment, it would be a huge mistake.

What kind of solution could there be? On the one hand I don't think we are going to be

able to politically agree on the ABM Treaty. But I think the kind of practical collaboration that the United States and NATO have suggested for dealing with the missile defense problem is not enough, we need to be creative here. Why not think about amending the NATO-Russian Charter with language that would say that neither side would take any steps that would adversely affect the retaliatory capability of the other. It wouldn't be an ABM Treaty but it would be I think a real step towards the Russian desire as President Medvedev said this morning to have something on paper in addition to some cooperative projects and programs of the sort that General Yesin discussed a few moments ago.

In conclusion I would like to say that there is not enough public engagement or public pressure in Russia or in the United States steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs, to come to grips with the threat of non-proliferation. I ask political leadership to think a bit. When we have made real progress in arms control it has been when the public was engaged and worried about nuclear war. And ironically the fact that nobody even thinks about the possibility of a US-Russian strategic exchange has left this issue to be dealt with by a very tiny priesthood. Deputy Prime Minister D. Rogozin talked about dogma. Well, we have dogmatists on both sides of this issue. And what is necessary and seems to be is for the public to really press for movement on these issues and for leaders to be responsive to that, to be able to deal with the vested interest whether the military, ideological, technological or other to come to grips with this problem.

Remark

A.G. Arbatov: About 45 years ago, a small place of Glassboro located close to New-York city, hosted the first discussions of ABM defense attended by US President L.Johnson, Defense Secretary R.McNamara, and the USSR Prime-Minister A.N. Kosygin. R. McNamara who I believe to be one of the greatest strategic thinkers of the XX century would have been surprised to learn that 45 years after Deputy Prime Minister D. Rogozin passionately defended the ideas expressed by McNamara to Kosygin. But, Alexey Nikolayevich Kosygin would have been even more surprised to find how the American party insists on those approaches to the problem that he suggested at that time saying that «efense is good, but offence is a danger and a threat to the world».

I recall it because the life is long and the positions of the parties change. It's not impossible that some time after the USA and Russia will switch their positions again, so whatever our contradictions let's not dramatize them, but settle them calmly instead.

Enhancing military security: the role of arms control

SERGUEY ROGOV,

Academician of RAS, Director of the Institute
for the US and Canadian Studies

The first and the utmost question – what should be understood by arms control? The arms control that has existed for more than four decades already implies the reduction and limitation of arms. The issue is to regulate the balance of forces (a strategic balance or a military balance as a whole), but not to reach a general and total disarmament. So the arms control and disarmament are related, but not identical notions.

Secondly. Currently, the whole system of arms control created in the Cold War time and enshrined in a number of treaties is facing a severe crisis. The strongest damage to this system was caused by US withdrawal from AMB Treaty of 1972. The efficiency of anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft defense is rather small. But during the Cold War the American party was trying so hard to convince us that AMB Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability that we finally believed it and still do. A number of other agreements that were fundamental for arms control are either wrecked or actually non-functional. It pertains in particular to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) that formally might not be dead, but obviously is not alive.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Formally it exists, but the number of states with nuclear arms has increased and the issue of Iran and North Korea is not resolved and we can soon be confronted with the problems that new nuclear countries might pose to us. The ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate is out of the question and it's yet another blow to the system of arms control and non-proliferation. All the above makes us seriously think why the regime of arms control created during the Cold War begins to stall.

One of the reasons is a radical change in the system of international relations. The world is not bipolar any more, it moves to multipolarity and nearly all of the poles either already have nuclear arms, such as Japan, or are weeks or months away from them. Furthermore, if earlier a multipolar world was represented by key states of a common European or Western civilization, today this world is made up of the most diverse civilizations.

At the present stage, we have failed to generally accept and honor the norms and effective institutions that can govern this multipolar world. The systems of arms control established during the Cold War must obviously undergo a significant modernization. If we involve other centers of power into arms control we will immediately see that the key principle of the Cold War control was the parity of forces. But when the number of sides is not only two, but – three, four and more – new challenges emerge, i.e. – what the best alternative to the parity

principle there might be, if there is any.

The USA and the USSR and later Russia agreed to make the parity principle a legally binding one. But the UK, France, China, and unofficial nuclear powers do not have any practical experience of participation in legally binding agreements on arms control. Though even in Russian-American relations where everything is laid down in the form of legal obligations this approach fails. It can be seen in BMD negotiations and Russia's demand to make some obligations legally binding.

There are new threats. And it is not only the BMD. There are conventional arms that are similar to nuclear arms. They allow hitting protected targets and delivering a strategic strike. These are just first steps in the development of these armaments but it's clear that it will go on. How to restrict them when CFE Treaty is not operational and we don't have any tool to control non-nuclear arms whatsoever?

Space-based arms pose a real threat that can undermine strategic stability. If the anti-ballistic defense shall include a space level, the situation with the strategic stability will change dramatically.

We have reached a critical moment that demands a complete reframing of the arms control mechanism. If we don't do it, the whole mechanism may fail in its duty and a new START Treaty will become the last arms control treaty. The alternative is to invent the arms control anew and to adopt it to the maximum possible extent to the realities of a multipolar world.

ANATOLY ANTONOV, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

I'd like to highlight three important aspects: first – the factors that today impact the security of Europe; second – the existing system of treaties and third – my view on the development of future agreements on arms control. Significant changes have taken place in the Euro-Atlantic area security over the last 20 years. There are two groups of factors. The first group concerns the reduction of Russia's security while the second group contributes to the strengthening of security.

The change in the security architecture I would put into the first group. We should take into account the NATO military build-up and, of course, the deployment of BMD near Russian borders, together with the shrinking of Russian defense area and the fact that our key administrative and industrial centers have become more exposed. Moreover, new types of armaments appeared and their possible effect is comparable to that of nuclear arms. It's important to underscore that the role of nuclear containment in strategic stability hasn't changed. The concept of nuclear deterrence is the core of the nuclear powers' nuclear policy.

The second group includes positive factors. Currently we don't have any principle ide-

logical differences that can evolve into a military confrontation. Economic interests of countries have intertwined, and this process is still on. The mere nature of a military threat has changed. We have abandoned the concept of direct confrontation of a large number of troops, and a new threat has emerged – the global terrorism. There are new trends in an armed combat. Today the priority is given to a non-contact fighting; in view of new threats and challenges the majority of European countries are committed to the reform of their military forces.

The second group, besides, includes the higher level of transparency of a military capability development. The volume of available information about the military status has skyrocketed. I can tell you that at all bilateral consultations between, for example, defense authorities, the topical issues are the results of military establishment reforms both in Russia and in its partner states.

It's obvious that the relations between Russia and NATO in the military sphere are changing. I'd like to mention the agreement on military-technical cooperation as a positive sign. If to compare the negative factors that I've outlined and the positive ones, from my point of view, the positive will overweight.

Now, a few words about the current legal framework of the security system. It seems to me that we should consider the whole system of interrelated agreements and treaties, i.e. ABM Treaty that doesn't exist, but has been mentioned today, INF Treaty, CFE, and adapted CFE Treaties, the Vienna document and Open Skies Agreement.

What is the mission of these interrelated agreements? Initially, it implied a tight control over actions of the enemy and minimization of a sudden force deployment – that was one of the tasks in such agreements. Additionally, they are aimed at reducing military costs. And finally, they are supposed to become platforms for discussing security issues and to resolving concerns.

I'd like to comment on the anti-missile defense issue that was several times raised during our discussion and to react to the remarks of Mr. Heisbourg and Mr. Burt. First of all, we don't fear that American BMD system will «zero» Russian nuclear deterrence forces. Secondly, I would question a statement that nuclear forces of the Russian Federation do not pose a threat to the USA. Otherwise, Washington would not have conducted with us negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. Moreover, the new treaty stipulates the intrusive system of inspections and while the initial Russian proposal included 5 inspections the final figure is 18. And this is very serious – START prescribes not only the quantitative indicators, but also the verification issue, so important for the American party.

As for the interrelation between START and BMD I would recall that it was the American party, who suggested that we include in the paragraph about the interrelation of START and BMD in the preamble of the Treaty the provision stating that with the reduction of strategic offensive arms the role of BMD will go up.

Our French colleague (Francois Heisbourg) deduced from the remarks of D.Rogozin that Russia supposedly has the right for BMD system and the Europeans don't. But nobody puts the question this way. We say that if you acknowledge the concept of indivisible security as described today by our President, don't strengthen your security at our cost. We speak about our BMD system around Moscow and do not conceal that it is against the USA, while you try to convince us that the system deployed in Europe is not against Russia. At the closed bilateral negotiations with exact facts and figures we demonstrate that this system undermines the forces of nuclear deterrence at a certain stage of development.

We keep saying to our American counterparts: «Friends, don't upset the balance. If you

choose this path and follow it we will take specific military and technical actions». And that's what the President warned about. That's it. If you want these systems – God bless you. Let France and US develop it – no one objects to it.

Next, I'd like to express my views on conventional forces in Europe: CFE is dead and the adapted CFE is nearly dead. There is no way to modernize something in it or modernize within CFE framework. CFE and the adapted CFE were devised with the Cold War thinking. If now we are no longer enemies – let's cooperate.

If our partners have a wish for cooperation on the BMD issue why in the sphere of conventional arms we can not abandon the quantitative limitations and verifications and start cooperating? Let's create a cooperation agreement on conventional arms. Recently I discussed this issue with a deputy Defense Minister from one of the major West European states. I got a very interesting answer to my question about what they want in this sphere. «We want transparency. We want to reduce the threshold of notifications about military exercises and we want to resolve the problem of Abkhazia», he said. I reminded him that there is the Vienna document for the first two points and wondered why we couldn't work within its framework. But if someone today wants to resolve the problem of Abkhazia using the issue of arms control, it's a dead way. No agreement will be possible.

It wouldn't be wise to forget the new START Treaty. The Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs has several times pointed out that the new START is a «golden standard» in the sphere of strategic stability.

I want to draw your attention to seven points, which in my opinion should be reflected in the future arms control agreements:

1. To define the sources of a military threat.
2. To identify the response priorities with reliance on the level of military security.
3. To elaborate a mechanism for the joint response to challenges and threats.
4. To take into account an overall capability of all types of arms available to the parties of the agreement.
5. To implement in practice the principle of indivisible security.
6. To use the existing control mechanisms, but after having adjusted them to the current realities.
7. And, finally, to think about the development of voluntary actions of cooperation and trust ensuring the transparency of goals and directions of military construction.



BRUCE BLAIR, President of the World Security Institute (USA), Co-founder of Global Zero

The Global Zero group has defined several key next steps that are the top priorities for the arms control agenda in their view. There are really deep cuts bilaterally between the United States and Russia accompanied by a joint effort lead by the United States and Russia to bring all the nuclear weapons countries to the table to begin the first ever multilateral negotiations for the reduction of nuclear weapons and to get our nuclear weapons off their current launch-ready alert status.

For many reasons these steps are possible and desirable. The mutual nuclear deterrence in my view no longer is a cornerstone of the US-Russian security relationship. First – MAD, mutual assured destruction, or mutual deterrence does not any longer strongly resonates broadly in societies; it does not resonate psychologically or politically in the US-Russian relationship except as Richard Burt pointed out within a very small precincts of government. There of course does still exist a technical side of MAD in our relations. There are also rather vested interests that has kept MAD alive in the technical sense but these holdover scenarios from the Cold War are utterly implausible today, there is no conceivable situation in which it would be in either countries' national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side. This could only happen accidentally.

The second reason to take these steps line is that the actual existing threats to our two countries (Russia and USA), the threats posed by rogue states, failed states, proliferation, terrorism, regional conflicts, just say nothing of piracy, and drug trafficking and refugee migrations simply cannot be resolved with nuclear weapons. In fact nuclear weapons have become more part of the problem than they have presented themselves as any solution to any problem that we confront today. Very strong conventional forces and missile defense's offer are far more credible and usable option for deterring and defeating a 21st century aggressor. Non-nuclear forces are also far more credible instrument for providing reassurance to our allies. As was mentioned by Richard Burt, the Council on Foreign Relations conducted a survey, which asks hundreds of experts about the threats that the United States faces today and Russia was not even mentioned among the top 20 contingencies that in the view of these experts directly threaten the US homeland or countries that have strategic importance to the United States.

But I'd like to illustrate this big shift by pointing out the last three times that United States put its nuclear forces on high alert during a crisis. The first time that this happened was the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The second time was the Yom Kippur crisis in 1973. The third time that we were on high nuclear alert happened in the 21st century on September 11 of 2001, when a powerful nuclear arsenal failed to deter 9/11 improved completely useless in responding to the attack. In fact the launch keys and hands only fear that they themselves might be the targets of the terrorists like the Pentagon. So this is what we're up against today. Our nuclear weapons are really practically irrelevant and useless against today's threats, they may even be liabilities.

The third reason to take the steps is that for 40 years arms limitation and reduction talks have excluded everyone except the US and Russia. And this nearer focus misses all the action in the current century, all the new nuclear dangers such as Pakistan's uncontrolled raise to build nuclear weapons soon to overtake everyone but China, Russia and the United States in the size of its nuclear arsenal. These are the dangers that are completely outside the scope of traditional bilateral arms control. And lastly, they were spending a lot of money to maintain these vestiges of the Cold War: Up to 30 billion dollars annually by the United States and 10 billion dollars by Russia and furthermore we have embarked on the modernization program that could cost Russia 70 billion dollars over the next decade approximately and the United States 200 billion dollars over the next 20 years. These investments are just being driven by outmoded logic, the Cold War logic of the 20th century.

We have adopted the position that the United States and Russia are recognizing that the most serious nuclear risks today lie outside their bilateral relations. They are to take the lead in bringing all the nuclear weapons countries to the negotiating table for the first in history multi-lateral negotiations to limit nuclear arms. Their aim is to be the freeze and proportionally reduce the total weapon stockpiles of the rest of the field, not just the United States and Russia. And by total we mean total: strategic and non-strategic, deployed and weapons in reserve, all weapons. Obviously it will be challenging to get everyone to the table, at least at the beginning. And the effort probably needs to begin with just a dialogue with China and some of the other countries focusing primarily on issues like transparency and verification. But a concerted effort led by the United States and Russia, we believe, could achieve real progress and could gradually bring in the holdouts.

The US and Russia should begin a new round of bilateral talks ended cutting their arsenals down to a level of a thousand total weapons on each side for reasons having to do with the fact that these numbers vastly exceed reasonable requirements of deterrence in the 21st century, but also because we believe that that's a level at which the Chinese would be drawn into the process. Somewhere between 500 and 1000 total nuclear weapons on each side we believe would engage the Chinese.

The two sides should take operational steps to increase warning and decision time in the command and control systems used to manage the deployed nuclear forces in Russia and the United States. Today, this time is measured in minutes and seconds for the strategic forces. They're primed and ready to fly at a moment's notice. If our early warning centers get indications of a possible missile attack against North America, how long do they have to assess this attack according to established procedure and check-list? They have three minutes to make a preliminary assessment and if it's believed that North America may be under a nuclear missile attack an emergency conference is conveyed by the President and his top nuclear advisors and he's briefed on his response options in the event of that attack is actually under way. In how much time does the strategic command in Omaha have to brief the President on his response options and all of their consequences? The time can be as little as thirty seconds to brief the President. And the president has at most twelve minutes to make a decision. And Russia's timelines and deadlines are exactly really the same. It's a dangerous throwback to the Cold War, as we've heard earlier from Desmond Browne, and the Global Zero calls on the two sides to stand down of these accident-prone and dangerous launch-ready postures. We have done some studies that would also argue for increasing the decision and warning time of the tactical nuclear forces by removing them from combat paces and putting them in national storage sites which would buy considerable amount of warning and decision time measured in days.



VICTOR KOLTUNOV, Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic Stability, Major-General

I have been dealing with the problem of arms control for some 25 years already. Since one of the goals of our Conference is charting possible steps to further military security, the first idea to turn up in this respect seems to be the preparation of the next nuclear weapons treaty. And this is hardly arguable. Nevertheless, let me offer several suggestions on what we should do and should prevent from happening.

Evidently, the next treaty should not be an end in itself. Not every agreement brings better security. A pact may have a chance for success only if based on parity; if the parties refrain from attempts to obtain more security at the counterpart's expense; and if it accounts for all factors that determine strategic stability and national security.

The new START Treaty is in force and will remain effective for ten years, up to February 5, 2021. Hence, there is time left for the development of the next accord. I suggest not making haste and using the period for detailed elaboration of numerous issues involved. As a matter of fact, should both strategic and tactical systems, both deployed and stockpiled weapons, both delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads be covered, which is widely discussed nowadays, the new treaty is bound to be much more complicated. At the same time, mutual mistrust of the parties is immense and is regrettably increasing. Steps are needed to be taken to have the suspicion gradually removed.

Confidence building could be put back on track through the restored mechanism of negotiations between the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staffs and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

Allow me to remind you that the first Russian-American talks after the disintegration of the Soviet Union were held in May 1994, and I happened to participate in the proceedings. Similar meetings were continued in Moscow. Both parties found the negotiations quite helpful. However, due to certain reasons this kind of work was soon discontinued, while new problems have snowballed. And they do require clarification and common vision, especially at the top level of experts who at the same time normally participate in shaping of their country's policies.

One of the key problems is achieving common understanding on strategic stability and global security in current circumstances. As soon as it is reached, a more specific discussion of the ways to maintain and strengthen it could be launched. Today, there seem to be two distinctive approaches to the problem. Some say that in current conditions the role of nuclear weapons remains unchanged, while others attempt to define global security and strategic stability through the status of international relations that suggest that the parties neither have intentions nor possess capabilities to use military force for the promotion of their interests.

The US Quadrennial Defense Review released in February 2010 states that the mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance the US national interests, which means that the armed forces are committed to perform two functions. How-

ever, questions arise as to the definition of national interests and the mission implementation forms in view of preventing additional worldwide tensions and confrontations. Clarification is absolutely essential.

In August 2002, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the Joint Doctrine of Space Operations that has materially pronounced the US right for operating in space, out of space and towards the outer space. The text suggests that space may acquire weapons, and the US would like to lead the process. Notably, the document uses such terms as space power, use of force and space dominance.

The Prompt Global Strike, a well-known US military effort, seems to be underway. The project aims to develop super-fast, super-powerful and super-accurate weapons able to engage any target in any part of the globe within one hour after receiving the order. And opinions on the matter do differ. Some believe that the official aims of countering terrorism and proliferation of the WMD are only a guise for quite different intentions.

I believe that the talks, should they begin, become more productive if American troops are withdrawn from Europe. The US and Russian experts agree that in current conditions tactical nuclear forces have no military significance, ensue extra costs and security risks including seizure by terrorists, and also generate political frictions between Russia and NATO.

As is known, on September 26, 1997 in New York the US and Russia signed the Agreements on Delimitation of Strategic and Nonstrategic ABM Systems including the Memorandum on Confidence-Building Measures. Whereas the Russian side has ratified the package, the US has failed to follow suit so far. But we could, which is the gist of my proposal, use the potential of this Memorandum that contains such measures as exchange of opinions on test grounds, dates of antimissile launches, demonstrations of missile defense systems, invitations to military exercises, etc.

A future agreement is being intensely discussed at different levels. And I think that the debate should be channeled into elaboration of mandates for future negotiations, as had been the case with the CFE Treaty. The mandate should, in good time outline, the subject of negotiations, the weapons to be covered by the agreement, and the participants. It has been suggested that the agreement should be multilateral, which seems quite right. But then the question arises on the participants to the process, i.e. whether these should include only five official nuclear states or in company with unofficial nuclear countries, how the threshold states should be treated, etc.

The Americans say that the disproportion in tactical nuclear weapons must be diminished. But many more questions remain open. What about the disproportion in conventional weapons or the missile defense or sea-based cruise missiles? In other words, future negotiations do require a properly streamlined mandate worked out well in advance.

EVGENY BUZHINSKY, Senior Vice-President of the PIR Center, Lieutenant- General

Arms control has been effective to significantly strengthen military security – firstly, through lowering potentials in certain types of weapons, and secondly, by provision of greater transparency. But recently, this activity has regrettably acquired peculiar forms, largely due to the fault of our Western partners.

For some queer reason, no attention is given to the point that security is indivisible and all matters should be considered in package. On the contrary, in focus are only those fields that are of interest to our Western partners and provide either advantage or parity to Russia. Marginalized are the matters of interest for Russia but of no substance for the West, i.e. missile defense or deployment of weapons in outer space. We are being told that these problems are irrelevant since no threat to Russia is meant. Hence, no discussion is required.

I have taken part in practically all missile defense consultations after the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002, and when the discussion on cooperation in the missile defense area began. So, the thing I worry about is the continuously hardening US approach to the missile defense issues. And I do not mean the Senate Republicans, who on the verge of hysteria demand that the Russians must be given neither concessions nor information. Missile defense is a sacred cow. What I mean is the overall approach. As far as I remember, at the initial consultation stage it went about the defense of the North American continent. By the way, this is just the reason for the response to the statement of President Putin. He said Russia deplored the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty but at the time the missile defense system did not threaten Russia because it was confined to North America. A little later the European segment emerged to be followed by the Asia-Pacific component. But even then our question about the fate of the US missile defense system in case the Iranian threat faded away received a seemingly reasonable answer: «Then we halt the process and even may dismantle the system». At least there were sensible declarations. And what about now? We are being told that Iran is only one of potential threats and other dangers may surface. Since the world is essentially unpredictable, let the system go ahead.

A couple of words on the currently trendy issue also touched upon at this Conference. I mean the nonstrategic weapons. The issue was included into official documents of the NATO's Lisbon Summit and the US Senate Resolution of Ratification of the START Treaty. A popular view materialized concerning the alleged disparity between the Russian Federation and the USA. But there is no disparity at all. We should count not just strategic warheads but warheads of all types. And if we do so, the two states will have about 5,000 each. More than that, as I see it, due to its geostrategic specifics the USA needs no nonstrategic weapons at all. The two oceans cover the USA from the west and from the east, an ally from the north, and an almost-ally from the south. There is nobody to protect the territory from by nonstrategic nuclear systems. So, 200 weapons to fill up the NATO nuclear arsenal seem quite sufficient.

Russia's situation is absolutely different. We have a vast territory with a lot of neighbors, who possess nonstrategic nuclear systems. Hence, the very idea of a supposed unified level seems wily. We are being told «Let us establish a unified level of 1,500-2,000 warheads and you make up your mind yourself. The USA would have more strategic and you would have more nonstrategic pieces». Hence, the USA would not mind if we have more nonstrategic weapons. Hence, it goes about overall reduction of Russia's nuclear potential. But the approach is absolutely unrealistic because nuclear containment exists and will remain at any rate. It is in all doctrinal documents of the USA and the Russian Federation. This is why Russia will try to maintain parity only in strategic weapons.

I have never heard our Western partners suggest limitations on precision weapons, long-range sea-based cruise missiles or unmanned long-range combat systems, which are comparable in capacity with nonstrategic and even strategic nuclear means. Why not ban the development of weaponry based on new physical principles? I have not heard anyone advance such an idea, which would make quite a progressive step as far as arms control is concerned.

I fully agree with Anatoly Antonov on the CFE Treaty. In fact, my skepticism has been growing lately towards multilateral agreements on arms control where the North Atlantic Alliance stands out as a single entity. Why should Russia need such an agreement if 28 participants allegedly monitor the other five parties but in fact keep an eye on Russia? I do not see much sense in the process, especially as the current level of armaments in Europe is much lower and there seems to be no large-scale military confrontation between NATO and some other party in the offing. The Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty are quite sufficient for adequate transparency.

In conclusion, let me say a couple of words about life after the START Treaty. Let us watch the treaty's implementation and the process of reducing strategic offensive weapons. And later, if conditions ripen, why not take up further reductions to ensure the overall strategic balance?

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG, Advisor to the President of International Institute of Strategic Studies (France)

We are living in a world where an access to any type of weapon, including a nuclear one, is becoming easier to get. Practical, technical and financial barriers are becoming easier to overcome. If you count the countries possessing military space surveillance systems, their number has increased from two to fourteen over the last fifteen years only. The same is happening in other spheres.

China has the second largest military budget in the world. China still lags behind the United States but with such rates of military budget growth by 2020-2022 it will be spending on defense as much as the U.S. spent on military needs before the tragic events of 9/11. It is inevitable and will have a significant effect on the arms control format. Russia will not tolerate the downgrading of the rating if China occupies the second place on the list.

We should maintain and improve the measures of compliance with transparency requirements in the field of conventional arms in Europe. New transparency measures are needed also in other fields, for example, an effective early warning and data exchange mechanism concerning test missile launches and all launches in general even those performed for the purpose of testing.

Provided somebody asks me a question whether there exists a doctrine or rationale explaining the current deployment in Europe of 180 or so American nuclear tactical weapons, my answer will be simple – it's hard to explain. If somebody asks me, whether we intend to keep some of these weapons in Europe, I will answer – it depends on what you mean by Europe. Do I prefer to have American nuclear arms in Turkey, or Turkey would better have its own nuclear arms? My answer is – I would prefer if Turkey continued to be NATO member with American nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Does the current status quo meet the interests of Russia, the U.S., Europe and Turkey? Possibly, it does. Will we succeed in reducing arms within the Russia-USA/NATO format? Perhaps, we will. But I am not an advocate of taking such a step until the situation around Iran is successfully resolved. I'm certainly not the proponent of this status quo component change.

Two years ago I worked together with Bill Perry and Aleksei Arbatov in a nuclear arms non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament international commission. We prepared a very good report. I insisted that we should impose certain limitations on nuclear arsenals of the countries, such as Pakistan, India and China, that considered it impossible at that stage to hold negotiations on arms reduction. There was much resistance from China. Today our major concern is the reduction of nuclear arsenals because I don't know what nuclear weapons stockpiles China will have in 5 or 10 years time. They are most likely to increase. China continues to work on the creation of ABM defense system and its technical components. It would be useful both for the USA and Russia to think in terms of a dialogue on strategic arms with China (I mean the recent American survey on nuclear strategy).

Functionally, space can be compared to what maritime space has become to us over recent centuries. Nobody was able to prevent fast evolution of war ships and submarines, and nobody will be able to prevent us from using outer space for military purposes. That said, we are able to work out «traffic rules», a certain «code of conduct» in space, agree on no-use of specific technologies, such as impacting on other countries' satellites and refusal from conducting tests on destruction of one's own satellites as China did some years ago.

I'm not too pessimistic about the multilateral format of arms control, apart from one thing – this format suggests that we will have to do much more to ensure transparency and compliance with the code of conduct and not to boil everything down to a mere calculation of arms units. In the world we will be living soon such calculations will be less important than intelligence information and specific knowledge or C4ISTAR systems necessary for the assessment of certain facilities. But these systems go beyond all calculation within the arms control framework.

Dispute

A. Arbatov: We've just heard the opinion that there's no danger in Europe with regard to conventional arms, there's nothing to be concerned about, that nobody cares. I'm really surprised because it's in full contradiction with the spirit of our military doctrine signed by our President in 2010. The advancement of the NATO infrastructure to the east is put on the top of the list of risks that pose threat to Russia's national security. If this is the case, then I can't understand why nobody cares. If nobody cares, let us revise our military doctrine.

A. Antonov: What the CFE Treaty is all about? Why would it fail to work if, say, a member-

state withdrew from it or suspended its participation in it? General Vyacheslav Trubnikov speaking at one of the events in Vienna proposed a good idea: «When the West gets used to the idea that Russia is not only the object but also a subject of international agreements, it will be a genuine breakthrough». Today I, as a former MFA officer currently working for the Ministry of Defense, don't see any willingness of the Western countries to cooperate, but one – to screen Russia's capabilities and exercise control over Russian conventional arms capabilities.

We're saying today that we are not enemies. Then why do we need such an intrusive control, such an intrusive transparency when there is, for example, the Vienna Document? What do we seek to achieve? Let us sign the agreement on cooperation. I, for one, am more inclined to champion the idea of the Russian President to elaborate a treaty on European security. If you seek consensus let us enlarge this treaty, make it a bit different. As the President said today we have never claimed that the Russian proposals should be regarded as the last resort.

Of course, we are concerned that NATO is expanding towards Russia's borders. I always ask the question: if you (I mean the USA) are faced with the threats from the South, why are you expanding to the East? We are frankly saying that we regard our non-strategic nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent potential. Our defense policy reads as follows: «To seek such a situation when neither side has supremacy in conventional arms in Europe». But, if we realize that NATO is one side, than how will Russia (the other side) be able to achieve some parity in the course of negotiations? Therefore, levelling the playing field in the sphere of conventional arms (NATO-Russia parity) should be done differently, what we are actually doing.

V. Koltunov: The ABM system in Russia is the system aimed at protecting one area predetermined by the ABM Treaty. The BMD system deployed by the USA in Europe is a global system, the ban on which makes the core of the ABM Treaty. It's a mistake to put them on the same plane.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary made recently an official statement, according to which the U.S. intelligence establishment had revised missile threats. Now it's the short-range missiles that pose the main threat to the USA. Then the question arises: why a strategic component is being developed in the global BMD system? If they confine themselves to the threats emanating from short-range missiles then the New-York agreements will make it possible to deploy such systems without violation of the ABM Treaty. Then there will be no need to withdraw from the Treaty.

They say: we shouldn't overexaggerate the American BMD capability. Obviously, we misconceive notions. The thing is, an ABM system can't be assessed by a number of launchers. There are three main components in any ABM system – the system of information support, the control and communications system and anti-missile systems. The most costly of them are the first two components. They make the brain of the system. Provided these components are in place, there will be no problem in building up the number of anti-missiles – it's a matter of political decision. It could be taken upon any feasible set of arguments.

They say that some anti-missiles will pose no danger to Russia. But they forget about one important detail: despite the number of anti-missiles – 10, 20, 30 or 100 – the other side will have to respond, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, in the sphere of offensive arms. This is what triggers off an arms race. And, this is where the main danger of the system lies.

Y. Buzhinsky: We need a new treaty instead of CFE Treaty. It must be simpler and less costly. That said, I haven't got the slightest idea how to cooperate with Georgia on this issue. The advancement of NATO infrastructure to Russian borders is defined as a threat. For me as a military man it's not clear why the former Soviet infrastructure on the territory of the East European countries and the Baltic states is being modernized. Igor Ivanov, who signed the Agreement on CFE Treaty Adaptation, Aleksandr Grushko, the head of our delegation in 1999, can testify

to my words. Then, in 1999, we proposed: «Let us restrain the infrastructure on the territory of new NATO member-states». The answer from our NATO partners was: «It has nothing to do with infrastructure».

S. Rogov: The ABM Treaty laid the focus on the number of area-based interceptors. This was proposed in the Protocol of 1974 that change the number of interceptors. In default of the ABM Treaty there appears some uncertainty, which leads to the desire to rely on the worst-case scenario. However, from my perspective, if we are so stubborn in relying on the worst-case scenario, we'll never have the best-case one.

The CFE Treaty is a good example of an obsolete treaty of the Cold War times, which rests on the principles of parity, in this case not between USSR and USA, but between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. But where is now the Warsaw Treaty? It has long been a part of NATO. Let us have a look at those limitations that are still in force. They allow each side to increase the amount of arms two- or even three-fold because they have already reduced them to a record-low level. What is this treaty over arms control is all about if it allows for a buildup instead of a builddown? Why do more than a dozen of European countries not belong to this regime? Because they are NATO members? Russia is not a member of the North-Atlantic Alliance. What we need is an arms control regime in Europe that will take over from the CFE Treaty, not copy it, that will involve all European states without imposing inadequate parameters.

The arms control regime which regulated the USSR-USA confrontation during the Cold War times was a unique one – it ensured a certain level of strategic stability. Today the situation is different, and it's hard to build the control over arms on these principles. Many of us have spoken today about possibility of cooperation in security sphere, and the conference itself is devoted to this issue. Clearly, we can not give up arms control completely. We have to modernize our approach and define what elements of the Russia-USA bilateral the arms control agreement we will need. We must also decide how to use our Russian-American bilateral potential in the arms control area with the view to engaging into it other nuclear powers. We can contain each other with the U.S. and NATO indefinitely long but at the same time somewhere in Asia there will exist an uncontained giant, and there may be many.

And if we let things take this course, the future historians will have the right to say: «Arms control was an accidental episode in the times of a bipolar world. The bipolar world collapsed, and arms control was an occurrence that reflects a momentary reality of the second half of the 20th century».

A. Grushko: When we talk about arms control we should always remember that we mean not only the end-product in terms of limitations, information sharing and control. The control over arms in modern foreign policy set of instruments is the only way to translate political intentions into military constructions and predictability. We can keep saying to each other that we are not enemies, we don't mastermind against each other (we've heard much about it today). What is necessary is to produce evidence to that. Arms control used to be the platform, on which the sides could produce evidence in form of deployments, number of launchers, etc. The on-going talks are a powerful tool of enhancing trust between the parties. They involve military representatives, who in their own language can exchange views and explain to their counterparts why they take this or that decision related to the deployment of arms components in certain areas.

CONCLUSION

IGOR IVANOV,

President of the Russian International Affairs Council

In 1999, in Istanbul I was signing the Adapted CFE Treaty and the Treaty on European Security. Madeleine Albright, Robin Cook, Hubert Vedrin, Joshka Fischer, me and my colleagues after very hard night of negotiations felt very happy to have turned over a page in the history of European security and opened up a new path towards more stable Europe.

I assume that not a few people in the Ministry of Defense of Russia, and, perhaps, in other countries, were rewarded even, I don't rule it out, with state orders of honor for this treaty. I haven't heard in any country from any acting or retired politician a single criticism of the Adapted CFE Treaty. All admitted that that the treaty was the cornerstone of the future of European security and stability. Only 13 years have elapsed since then. This treaty has turned out to be needed by no one and even harmful. In other words, we haven't advanced a jota, instead we retreated. But what would happen provided the treaty had been ratified. Our foreign counterparts made a serious political mistake. If we had ratified the treaty we would have been moving forward and nobody would have stopped at the Adapted CFE Treaty. We would have gone even beyond the CFE Treaty. After the Adapted CFE Treaty there would have been another treaty, anyway there would be a movement forward, but not backward. Today we have to start from scratch, in fact. And this, from my perspective, gives rise to grave concerns in all the countries regarding the issues of our security.

Some words about the ABM Treaty. I, personally, spent three years in negotiations on the possibilities of not destroying the Treaty, firstly, with the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright, then with the Bush administration, with my friend Colin Powell and others. We posed a simple question: How does an ABM Treaty damage the U.S. national security interests? Give us the list of concrete problems and, perhaps, we will introduce amendments into the current Treaty. The Treaty has been destroyed. Today we are saying again that we have to start everything from scratch, actually. We have retreated to the situation of 1972.

Losing momentum in security issues is a very dangerous thing because it's easy to destroy but it's very difficult to start something again from scratch. Mistrust and misunderstanding are gaining ground. Even during our discussion hosting specialists with excellent knowledge and expertise we have failed to agree. It means that we must meet more often. We in RIAC will do our best to organize such meetings. I'm encouraged by the appeal of the Russian President to the academic and expert society to be pro-active in discussing all those issues, elaborate proposals for the country's leadership with a view to agreeing our positions and searching for compromises. This is our common mission, I think.

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